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Albania: Commission Announces Final 16 Jun Election Results

AU1806145996 Tirana ATA in English 0830 GMT 18 Jun 96

["Press Release of Central Electoral Commission in 17 Constituencies"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 18 (ATA)—The Central Electoral Commission [KQZ] had observed serious irregularities in polling process and vote counting in 17 constituencies and so decided the re-run of the elections on June 16, 1996.

The KQZ after examined the process-verbaux from the polling commission noticed that in 17 constituencies the voters turnout was 244,681 out of 362,416 registered in the voting lists, which constitutes 69.43 percent of the registered electors or 76.4 percent of the electors which have participated on the elections of May 26, 1996.

Below is the list of the winners in 17 constituencies.

Winners in 17 Constituencies

Constituency	District	Candidate	Party	Votes	Percent
11	Puke	Ndue Ded Uni	PD	9,550	62.85
24	Mat	Idriz Daut Xhamara	PD	10,968	66.88
42	Tirana	Fadil Tahir Kepi	PD	9,128	69.50
62	Peqin	Ali Ethem Gripshi	PD	14,281	86.05
67	Elbasan	Kozma Kozma Tavanxhi	PD	9,953	70.03
69	Elbasan	Bardhyl Riza Musai	PD	11,030	71.31
75	Lushnje	Agim Kasem Fuga	PD	10,717	61.95
81	Fier	Vasil Lluk Ndreka	PD	10,571	74.91
82	Fier	Iliaz Ali Vrioni	PD	9,544	77.81
89	Berat	Mirko Anastas Haxhistasa	PD	14,382	87.02
90	Kucove	Vili Shefki Minarolli	PD	10,453	78.59
92	Korce	Bujar Hysni Isak	PD	6,546	67.30
94	Korce	Kleri Petraq Kasimati	PD	7,297	66.29
101	Tepelene	Blerim Neim Cela	PD	7,333	78.83
104	Vlore	Shpetim Maliq Mezini	PD	8,313	65.71
113	Delvine	Burim Xhelil Husi	PD	10,027	73.16
115	Sarande	Leonard Petrit Demi	PD	6,250	73.66

Source: Central Electoral Commission

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Albania: PD Leader Examines Elections, Coalition Possibilities

AU1806153396 Tirana ATA in English 0926 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Report by A. Sakja: "PD Victory Shows the Right-Wing and Progressive Orientation of Albanians"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 17 (ATA)—The Democratic Party [PD] victory in Sunday's [16 June] elections clearly showed the right-wing and progressive orientation of Albanians and its determination never to turn back in its way of progress, said yesterday [17 June] in a press conference the PD Chairman Tritan Shehu.

He said that "June 16, 1996 election results although close to the first one and those of the second round confirm the validity of May 26 elections."

According to the data, the PD won in all 17 constituencies of June 16 elections with results ranging from 61-78 per cent.

After the rerun of elections in these constituencies, the whole cycle of political elections closed in Albania.

The PD chairman was open for coalitions although he underlined "like in the last parliament we have a crushing majority." We will find possibilities to widen the coalition with forces of the centre and of the right wing. As cooperation possibilities except governing coalition, Shehu mentioned the cooperation in different governing levels and cooperation in election of local government.

Albert Brojka, the PD secretary for international relations, reported to the press conference about the last stand of the EUCD [European Union of Christian Democrats] parties during a conference this union held in Malta some days ago.

The resolution of this conference said that all EUCD parties support the results of May 26 elections in Albania "as results reflecting the vote of the people" and said that they will express the same opinion in European Parliament where they will ask the ODIHR [Office of Democratic Institution for Human Rights] "to clarify its different reports on elections in Albania."

Brojka voiced the stand of the representative of the Greek "New Democracy" Party, Tzitzikostas, which was the same with that of 48 other EUCD parties. (Neritan Ceka, leader of the Democratic Alliance Party, had declared some days ago that "Tzitzikostas will express an opinion opposite to the PD in Malta.")

"I have a cassette recorded in Malta meeting, said Brojka, and I will put it in disposition of media as well as an official document referring to the resolution signed by 49 EUCD parties. The representative of the 'New Democracy' had been against new elections in Albania and for a political dialogue among the political Albanian parties to find a consensus among them."

EUCD, said Brojka, will see its stand towards Ceka because he is collaborating with a left-wing grouping and they would not accept a party having the observer status in this grouping to collaborate with a socialist party.

Albania: Press Views Democratic Party's Electoral Success

AU1806180196

[FBIS Report] The Albanian press on 18 June covers the Democratic Party's win in all 17 of the constituencies in which repeat parliamentary elections were held on 16 June.

Rezear Xhaxhiu, in a report entitled "Elections: 17-0 for the Democrats" on page 3 of the independent GAZETA SHQIPTARE, writes: "Held on a key day of the Euro '96 soccer championships, the third ballot appears to have been relegated to the background of the ordinary Albanian's interest. The electoral marathon, the heat, the European soccer, and the indifference of a section of the electorate turned the third round into a backstairs game rather than a real electoral contest."

The Democratic Party's [PD] RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE devotes the first two pages to the party's election victory, reporting PD Chairman Tritan Shehu's news conference under the headline "Our Victory Shows the Albanians' Progressive Orientation." The progovernment ALBANIA carries on page one an 800-word editorial entitled "The Left-Wing Opposition Repeats its Defeat of 26 May."

The Republican Party's REPUBLIKA carries on pages one and two an 800-word commentary by A.D. entitled "The First Parliament Without Communists," which states, "Albania will finally have a parliament without communists or communist leftovers. Regardless of the circumstances under which this situation has been created, this is inevitably a step forward for the further development of the country's life, not only politically. Over the last five years, starting from the parliament with a communist majority elected on 31 March 1991 and down to the most recent parliament, it must be admitted that, regardless of the parliament's composition, a communist mentality prevailed at certain key moments."

The independent KOHA JONE, which is close to the opposition Socialist and Center Pole parties, carries on page four an 800-word report by Enton Abilekaj,

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entitled "The Albanian Blue-Black Parliament," which states that "the turnout remains central to this election. Without the slightest hesitation, the PD reported a turnout of 70 percent, a figure confirmed by the Central Electoral Commission. According to repeated announcements by Albanian Television, this figure was reached in record time. According to observers brought in by the PD and Albanian Television reporters, 12 percent of the electorate had voted by 1200 [1000 GMT]. Three hours later, at 1500, when the 1600 news broadcast was being prepared, the figure had risen to 60 percent. Thus, a record number of almost 50 percent of the electorate cast their votes in three hours, and moreover, in the midday heat of 1200-1500, when human beings eat lunch and relax out of the sun. This time no accurate figure can be supplied by trustworthy observers or foreign journalists, who entirely ignored the elections."

The Socialist Party's ZERI I POPULLIT carries on page 1 an 800-word editorial entitled "The Berisha Parliament," which concludes that "democracy is in peril. The 'Berisha parliament' bears the shameful mark of a stolen mandate. It is, therefore, illegitimate and the people neither recognize nor accept it. Despite the 'plastic surgery' that Berisha has performed on this mark of shame on 4 and 16 June, nothing has changed. We remain the sole country in Eastern Europe in which the elections that produced the 'Berisha parliament' have been called 'a significant step backward in comparison with the 1992 elections.'"

Albania: Democratic Party Accused of Manipulating Elections

AU1806151396 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 18 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Gavrosh Levonja: "The PD's Exclusive Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sensational results achieved by the Democratic Party [PD] on 26 May, which it did not hesitate to call "fantastic," have unexpectedly boomeranged on the PD itself. It above all totally proved the manipulation of the elections and the enormous extent of these manipulations. A result of such dimensions moreover fully justified the claims of the opposition in this direction and its protests at what it called "vote-stealing." However, what was most important was the sensitization of the foreign public and the different states that hastened to level their criticisms, in which there was no lack of strong language. The declarations of the U.S. State Department and the EU were noteworthy among them. Under these circumstances, when they saw themselves that they had committed irregularities and thinking that a single-party parliament would put them in a difficult and ridiculous position in front of the international public, the Albanian state and President Berisha themselves saw fit to make room for representatives of two right-wing parties, which, although they denounced the irregularities of 26 May, agreed to take part in the second round of the voting. For this reason, the PD withdrew some of its own candidates and made room for these others. However, the PD still emerged from these elections with 80 percent of the parliament, not far from the 99.99 percent of days of yore.

Meanwhile, after the completion of the second round, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] report on the elections in Albania arrived and provided evidence of many violations and irregularities both of international standards governing free elections and of the Albanian Electoral Law. The OSCE also advised that the elections should be repeated in a large number of elections instead of being repeated totally. This was interpreted as a call to the PD to reduce even further the size of its group in the parliament in favor of other parties. The Central Electoral Commission announced first three, then four, and finally 17 constituencies in which the greatest irregularities had been observed, and, as usual, President Berisha's decree decided that that the elections would be repeated in these places. It was expected that the PD would again "make gifts" of a few seats in order to at least slightly break the monotony of the PD-ite parliament. This conviction grew after some statements by the PD leadership, claiming that "the PD will withdraw from six further constituencies in order to give the parliament a more pluralist character and to permit the representation of its right-wing allies." While the "right-wing allies" of the PD were drawing up lists of people who would fill the seats to be left by the PD's generosity, events took a different course. A few days before the third round of the elections, the PD issued a rally cry calling for victory in the 17 constituencies that were up for auction. One of the points of compromise announced by the leaders of the Center Pole might have influenced this unexpected turn of events. Among other conditions, the Center Pole leaders tried to link their participation with the response of the PD to the results of the elections. According to them, if the results in the 17 constituencies overturned the results of 26 May, the elections would have to be repeated as a whole. Thus the elections in these 17 constituencies were a test of the general preferences of the electorate. This led to the PD leadership adopting the idea of winning in all 17 constituencies, in order to "show the world" that in any event the Albanian electorate preferred only one color, the blue of the PD. The care of official propaganda to highlight "the high turnout" of the Albanian electorate in last Sunday's [16 Jun] elections reinforces this impression. However, it would be a mistake to exclude another possibility.

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The "right wing" may have gone out of control. This means that the PD-ite deputies appointed as "sacrifices" might have refused to sacrifice themselves, threatening to expose the manipulative scheme and thus create other headaches.

In a sense, the PD has indeed succeeded in showing the public at home and abroad that the people voted almost 100 percent for it, but it has also fully showed that it is in a position to produce the election results that its own interests demand.

Albania: Intellectuals Criticize 'Berisha's Unfettered Power'

AU1706104996 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 15 Jun 96 p 4

["Memorandum" addressed to the U.S. Department of State, the EU, and the diplomatic representations of the member states of the Council of Europe from a group of 23 "nonparty writers, academics, artists, journalists, translators, and publishers": "The Last Bastion of Communism in Albania Is President Berisha's Personal Power Itself"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the information of nongovernmental national and international organizations and the democratic Albanian and world public.

From a group of nonparty writers, academics, artists, journalists, translators, and publishers.

The institutions of democracy in Albania are in a state of collapse. In the parliamentary elections of 26 May 1996, the free votes of the sovereign people were plundered and violated, and a democratically legitimate parliament no longer exists. As a result of the plunder and violation of a free ballot in a country with a multiparty system, we have in practice a puppet parliament with a single party. Dialogue between this party and the president of the republic on one hand and all the brutally discriminated and demonized other parties on the other hand has been frozen into a state of paralysis for which it is difficult to find a cure. The rule of law has become a fiction, and the citizen is totally defenseless against the rule of the police. People with parliamentary immunity are beaten in the most savage way by the police, even in front of the television cameras of the whole world.

We signatories of this memorandum address this appeal to the democratic governments of the free world, to its international organizations, and to the democratic Albanian and world public, in order to draw their attention to the expected and fatal consequences of this situation and to call on them to make a serious commitment to using their influence to changing this situation.

It is clear to the Albanian and world public that since the electoral farce of 26 May Albania is taking its first steps toward reestablishing a dictatorship. Those few freedoms won through the great efforts of the Albanian people after the overthrow of half a century of communist totalitarianism, and which make it still possible to issue this appeal, will disappear. Tomorrow will be too late. Tomorrow, faced with an arbitrary regime that has already snubbed the political will of its citizens as expressed by their votes and which is not responsible to any authority or any law, the safety of every individual will be threatened by immoral and ravenous servants of this regime. The old fears of the state have revived and are spreading everywhere. Freedom of speech, the most elementary right of every citizen, is already under threat today, and will tomorrow perhaps be as unimaginable as in the dark era out of which we have barely emerged. Faced with the reestablishment of a dictatorship of this kind in the heart of Europe, the free world must not once again behave irresponsibly as it did toward the situation in the former Yugoslavia, which led to the tragedy of millions of people.

However, the consequences of the present Albanian situation, if it does not change, do not end here. A dictatorial Albania would be turned into a flashpoint of conflict for the entire region. This is because the dictatorship, with its impoverished form of capitalism without adequate financial resources, will generate a black market in weapons and drugs and contraband of all kinds, of which the first signs are already evident in Albania. The country thus runs the risk of becoming an important crossroads of international crime, like other dictatorships in Latin America. Its geographical position and relief provide extremely favorable conditions. There would be an increased probability of Albania becoming a hotbed of conflict and a running sore that will infect the region. President Berisha's unfettered power, beyond all democratic control, is violating all the standards set by the OSCE despite all promises to the contrary, and he has no reason not to also break his two-faced promises connected with international and regional policy.

Just as he is sacrificing the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Republic of Albania for the sake of personal power, he may with the same motives trifle even more dangerously with the fate of Albanians across the border. The free world must not be shortsighted or naive about these dangers with their unforeseeable repercussions.

Political circles in the free world must also not deceive themselves by justifying Berisha's authoritarianism with the danger of a return of communism in Albania.

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A free Albania, moving toward Europe, can only be achieved with the involvement of all the existing political forces in the country, not by ghettoizing them according to a Cold War mentality that conflicts with the processes of integration in Europe and keeps alive the ghosts of the past. What postcommunist society needs most is peace, understanding, and dialogue among all the political forces, tolerance and mutual respect, and not vindictiveness and discrimination. We will either all make democracy together, each possessing the necessary elbow room for diversity and cultivating this diversity together, or democracy will never be made. This aspirations of the entire people must not fall prey to the violence and deception of an authoritarian regime. This would be our common tragedy and a burden on the conscience of everybody who has the opportunity to do something to help the fledgling Albanian democracy to free itself from the clutches of the past.

[Signed] Andi Bejtja, writer and journalist

Arben Kumbaro, producer, teacher at the Academy of Arts
Dr. Ardian Klosi, writer, teacher at Munich University
Armand Shkullaku, journalist
Bashkim Shehu, former political prisoner
Ben Blushi, writer and journalist
Brikena Cabej, translator and publisher
Delina Fico, women's rights activist
Daut Gumeni, poet, translator, former political prisoner
Edi Rama, artist and publicist, teacher at the Academy of Arts
Fatos Baxhaku, historian and journalist
Fatos Lubonja, writer, former political prisoner
Fron Nazi, Albanian-American writer
Gjergj Peci, poet, former political prisoner
Ilirian Zhupa. poet, publicist, publisher
Assistant Professor Jorgo Bulo, literary historian
Lorenc Vangjeli, writer and journalist
Luan Rama, film producer
Mirela Furxhi, teacher at the Faculty of Foreign Languages, translator
Petrit Ruka, writer
Assistant Professor Pullumb Xhufi, historian
Vladimir Myrtezai, artist, teacher at the Academy of Arts
Virgjil Muci, writer and translator
Vjollca Mici, translator

Albania: Parties Call For CE to Review 'Electoral Farce'

AU1806185996 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 18 Jun 96 p 3

["Letter" from the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance to Leni Fischer, chairwoman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in Tirana on 17 June: "The Political Situation in Albania Is Under a Total Blockade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Mrs. Fischer, expressing to you our constant respect for the Council of Europe [CE] and you personally, we are writing this letter to you to inform you again of the very serious political situation in Albania.

Yesterday, on 16 June, the final act of the electoral farce of 26 May was played out. With his arbitrary decree for the repetition of the elections in 17 constituencies in contempt of all the proposals of the opposition and despite all the advice and recommendations of the EU, the United States, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the European Parliament, President Sali Berisha finally cut off the path of dialogue with his political partners to emerge from the crisis. The Democratic Party and the president of the Republic of Albania now only recognize the language of force, a characteristic of dictatorships, and in the international arena maintain an attitude of contempt toward the prestigious organizations that criticize him. The political situation in Albania is under a total blockade.

Dear Mrs. Fischer, we regretfully wish to emphasize that the destruction of the institution of free elections in Albania on 26 May was the last twist in a spiral of increasing violations of democratic standards by the regime in the course of four years, and was carried out while the reporters of the Council of Europe delayed issuing their report on the situation in Albania following their visit to Tirana at the start of this year.

This extreme delay became an intentional attitude when you made your visit to Albania during the electoral campaign, when you unfortunately did not meet any members of the opposition parties, did not acquaint yourself with any of their protests, and came out in favor of President Berisha without waiting for the report of the Council of Europe reporters. Those who give you direct credit in the "common cause" of manipulating the free elections in Albania are not the opposition parties, but are the very authors of the electoral farce, who diabolically interpret for their own antidemocratic purposes every word, movement, and letter of yours in connection with Albania. However, we are convinced

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that the fragile democracy in Albania cannot be either a hostage or a victim of chance misunderstandings or interests.

Under these conditions and to overcome this situation, we turn to you and the lofty institution you lead and represent, requesting you to create the opportunity for representatives of the opposition to meet you in Strasbourg as soon as possible, or to send a group of reporters from the Council of Europe to examine the situation in our country.

We make this request with the overriding aim of stabilizing the political situation in Albania. With the unswerving trust that you will take our request into consideration, we avail ourselves of this opportunity to express once again assurances of our deepest respect.

[Signed] The Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance.

Albania: Army Officers Depart for Multinational Exercise

AU1806133996 Tirana ATA in English 1859 GMT 17 Jun 96

[Report by Aljosha Keko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 17 (ATA)—Staff representatives of nine armies of NATO member countries and of partner ones who will take part in the multinational exercise "Eagle of Peace '96," due in Albania in July, will also engage in another significant activity.

After the Final Conference on Planning the "Eagle of Peace" exercise at the new National Training Center, in the context of Partnership for Peace Initiative, the exercise of the staff, as the final preparatory phase, will begin, according to the spokesman of the Defence Ministry.

To this end, high ranking officers of the Albanian Army have left for Vincenza of Italy, where together with military staff representatives of another eight states, will carry out the staff's exercise at several levels, from that of the brigade to that of the company.

The eight states participating in these exercises include: the U.S., Italy, Greece, Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], and Slovenia.

Albania: Team From Defense College Visits Germany

AU1806155496 Tirana ATA in English 1018 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 17 (ATA)—The second course of the Albanian Defence College paid a working visit to Germany from June 11-16, 1996.

The team of 27 people comprising officials of different ministries, directors of banks and INSIG [Insurance Institute] and journalists followed a seminar on the compilation of defence and security strategy in "Marshall" centre of Garmish, land of Bavaria.

Members of the Defence College were also acquainted in this seminar with issues connected with the role of economy in defence and security policy of a country and its army modernisation.

This is the second visit to Germany after that of the first course of Defence College last year.

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Bulgaria: Changes in BSP Executive Bureau Detailed

AU1806193996 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 18 Jun 96 p 2

[Staff report: "Kamov Remains in BSP Executive Bureau Despite Videnov's Reluctance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhan Videnov could not prevent the election of Nikolay Kamov, chairman of the National Assembly commission on Foreign Policy, as member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Executive Bureau. In the early hours of Monday the participants in the BSP plenum elected as members of the Executive Bureau the six candidates proposed by Videnov, and Kamov, who was proposed from the floor. Nikolay Dobrev, minister of internal affairs and head of the BSP Organizational Department, received most votes in the secret ballot. Some 51 of the 66 participants voted for him. Filip Bokov, who will most probably become the party spokesman, received one vote less. A new plenum will take place in two weeks and elect him party spokesman. Nikola Koychev, leader of the BSP Sofia organization and chairman of the National Assembly Economic Commission, and Iskra Baeva, NOVO VREME chief editor, received 45 votes each. Mariyana Khristova received 43 votes. Vasil Kalinov, who acts as Dobrev's deputy in the Organizational Department, and in recent weeks processed the data on the preferences of the local organizations regarding the nomination of the BSP candidate president, received 37 votes. Ivan Khristov, leader of the BSP Smolyan organization, received 34 votes, and Violeta Vasileva—25. She became the third member of the Organizational Department in the Executive Bureau—after Dobrev and Kalinov. Nikolay Kamov also received 25 votes and it was decided to also make him a member of the Executive Bureau.

Yuriy Borisov (22 votes) and Miroslav Popov (11 votes) were dropped from the Executive Bureau. Proposals were made from the floor to include in the Executive Bureau Zlatimir Orsov and Nora Ananieva, but Orsov received only 12 votes and Ananieva received 13. Valentin Vatsev—Videnov's friend and Alternative Socialist Association chief—achieved the worst result. He received only 6 votes. Klara Marinova, Lyubomir Kolarov, Kiril Zhelev, and Anton Grigorov were dropped from the Executive Bureau. Each of them holds too many party posts simultaneously and their candidacies were not discussed at all. Videnov did not touch the current BSP deputy chairmen—Yanaki Stoilov, Georgi Purvanov, Doncho Konakchiev, and Krasimir Premyanov—and they kept their seats in the BSP Executive Bureau.

Bulgaria: Prime Minister on Cabinet, Executive Bureau Changes

AU1906085396 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 19 Jun 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov, BSP chairman, by Sevda Dinovska; place and date not given: "Losing Presidential Elections Is Greatest Danger for BSP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dinovska] How do you respond to the claim that by supporting Pirinski's candidacy [for the presidency] you have removed one of your most serious rivals for the office of prime minister?

[Videnov] I can only cite elementary logic. Changing the cabinet or the prime minister is not the greatest danger for the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. Losing the presidential elections is the greatest danger in 1996. Thus in general, considerations related to winning the presidential elections were the only ones that led me to support Georgi's candidacy.

[Dinovska] At the plenum it became known that you had talked to Pirinski about his possible candidacy two months ago. Why do you think that for a long time the rumor was circulating that you are not on good terms?

[Videnov] This was the interpretation of certain newspapers, above all TRUD. You should ask them.

[Dinovska] However, someone is nevertheless providing the press with information. Your circles constantly hinted to journalists that you are at odds.

[Videnov] I have no explanation. I do not think that you should look for the cause in me or in him.

[Dinovska] The proposal that was made at the plenum before the last one, namely, to make changes in the cabinet and the socialist leadership—was that a case of your arm being twisted?

[Videnov] It was essential to make changes in the Executive Bureau because it has recently been ineffective—even been dysfunctional. Once I made changes in the cabinet I had to make changes in the party leadership, too.

[Dinovska] Why are deputies of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction hitting you in the back by claiming that there must be changes in the leadership of the parliamentary faction? You called them "deputies who have forgotten themselves."

[Videnov] Everyone must observe the rules. Everything else is opportunism. It is inevitable that there will be political shocks when economic reforms of such scope are carried out. Whether one plays a part in them in

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a worthy or unworthy manner is a question of private ethics. I would not waste my time in interpretations.

[Dinovska] Did you select the Executive Bureau by yourself or was it the result of compromise, as has been said?

[Videnov] I never select the people I work with on the basis of compromises or balance. You can view this as a shortcoming or as an advantage—the future will tell. The Executive Bureau that I proposed and the Supreme Council supported is an organ that I trust will be very efficient and will help me. I am responsible for the Executive Bureau on the basis of my commitments as a politician.

[Dinovska] How do you explain the fact that Nikolay Kamov, who most loudly demanded that the functions of party leaders be separated and that changes be made in the Executive Bureau membership, did not resign, but became a member of the new bureau? He was not on your list.

[Videnov] The Supreme Council decided to increase the size of the Executive Bureau because the two candidates who came last in the voting—Violeta Vasileva and Nikolay Kamov—received an equal number of votes. I proposed this and I think that it was correct. I think that you should ask him why he did not resign. The old bureau did not adopt any mandatory decisions in this respect.

[Dinovska] Yanaki Stoilov has called on you to propose a new cabinet within one month. In addition, Anton Grigorov said that some leaders want to lead the party on a white horse. What is your response to this?

[Videnov] Yanaki has not made any such proposal. Perhaps someone is thinking about something like this, but it is not reasonable. Of course, anything can happen, and we must act according to circumstances. As of now, however, I have no such plans.

[Dinovska] Are you calm?

[Videnov] Absolutely.

Bulgaria: Commentary Predicts Internal Battle in BSP

AU1906100496 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 19 Jun 96 p 8

[Commentary by Tatyana Braykova: "BSP Internal Opposition Lowers Profile, Expects Next Battle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Apparently political intrigue in Bulgaria ended with the vote of confidence for Prime Minister Videnov. There is no governmental crisis. Some 135 deputies supported the government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and its coalition partners.

The victors cannot be judged, even if one does not like them.

The BSP's internal opposition died before it was born, or at least it lowered its profile to prepare for the next battle.

Following the triumph in the National Assembly, the 16 June plenum of the BSP Supreme Council resembled a congress of victorious socialism. Videnov effected almost mythological changes in the Executive Bureau, while Pirinski became the official BSP presidential candidate.

Thus all interparty contradictions were eliminated, at least until the presidential elections. The BSP continues to be led by Videnov, while Pirinski will be the face on the advertisement.

Both leaders and their circles received something.

Videnov received the Executive Bureau and promptly filled it with nonentities. Thus he resecured his party. At least for a while he can rest assured about what is happening in the party. Not that those who were dismissed from the Executive Bureau were not his people. The problem was that they acquired a certain popularity over the last two years that could allow them to become stars in the political arena at given moment.

Videnov also succeeded in presenting himself as a party democrat at the Sunday plenum by showing respect for the opinion of the party structures. It could have been dangerous for him to oppose the decision of 28 regional BSP organizations, which expressed support for Pirinski's candidacy. Some of the Supreme Council members have reservations about Pirinski and do not consider him the best candidate. However, most of them are still thinking that the word of the party's lower echelons cannot be ignored. By succumbing to this opinion, Videnov gained points with the party elite. Thus he can be calm about his future in the party.

Thanks to the decision of the last plenum, the prime minister got rid of a minister that made him rather uncomfortable. Pirinski entered the cabinet as a guarantee for peace with Andrey Lukanov.

What did Pirinski gain?

The foreign minister will leave the Council of Ministers, but he will become one of the most important figures in the party.

In the next few months he will conquer the BSP's media space. He will be more often in the news, even

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more so than the prime minister himself. All voters, including BSP voters, will see his face and hear his words, whether they want to or not.

Pirinski and those close to him will have the BSP's great financial potential at their disposal. This will make him as powerful as Videnov himself.

In addition, Pirinski will receive the entire party apparatus, which—willingly or unwillingly—will have to work for him. The apparatus will paste his portrait on the walls, organize his meetings, and become accustomed to Pirinski's image as "our boy."

The balance of power was reshaped at the BSP Sunday plenum. This reshaping conceals either a compromise or the beginning of a new clash.

Videnov preserved the posts of party chairman and prime minister and continues to suffer the consequences of the reform that has not begun yet and the chronic money shortage. He will lead the party in the upcoming presidential elections, but Pirinski will reap the possible credit.

If a compromise between party factions is behind all this, things in the BSP and in our society will remain the same. The reform will be implemented piece by piece, and our political life will swing from one plenum to another, if not until the end of the world, then at least until the end of the parliamentary mandate. Pirinski has a great chance of winning the presidential elections, and then the government in Bulgaria will turn completely red.

The suspicion that Videnov has been forced to accept Pirinski but will push him toward defeat in the presidential elections has no serious grounds. Nevertheless, if this is what lurks behind the bright face of the BSP chairman, then he will lead the party toward the political backstage. Maybe he considers himself the gravedigger of capitalism, but he would hardly become the gravedigger of his own party.

If we are witnessing the beginning of a new skirmish within the red elite, events most probably will follow a different order. As long as Pirinski's campaign is continuing, the crisis will continue to strain our nerves. The autumn will greet us with a new jump in the dollar rate and hyperinflation, even if the government's optimistic macroeconomic forecasts materialize. Then the party's new face—Pirinski—could himself play the card of his dubious citizenship and thus free himself of assuming the executive power. Then he will enter Videnov's cabinet on a white horse. The BSP will shout: "The prime minister is dead; long live the prime minister!" The change will not resemble a palace coup but a simple change of leadership.

According to this script, the BSP could lose the presidential elections, but it will win the executive power. It will strengthen its positions there, despite the fact that it will not have a president from its own ranks. In any case, in the Bulgarian variation the president serves more as a decoration than as a real factor.

On the basis of how long Pirinski continues to be foreign minister, we will understand the real nature of the agreement reached at the last socialist plenum. If he remains foreign minister, we will reap the fruits of the BSP compromise unity. The internal party battle is yet to be fought, especially if a plausible reason is found to dismiss Pirinski from the executive power. However, when the battle erupts, the means will be different and the chances of the two wings equal. Each will work for himself until he prevails. The solution will come at a plenum or an extraordinary congress. Until then, we all will have to pay dearly for our ticket to the political theater, which is developing before our very eyes.

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Czech Republic: Daily: Options for 2d Round of Russian Elections

AU1806142696 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 18 Jun 96 p 23

[Commentary by Dusan Spak: "The Key To Solving the Puzzle Will Be the Name Lebed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The wishes of neither Boris Yeltsin nor Gennadiy Zyuganov have been fulfilled. Neither of them won a necessary absolute majority of the votes cast in the first round of the Russian presidential joust. Their duel as the two most successful candidates will thus continue, and the second round will determine who will take Russia's future into his hands.

Yeltsin and Zyuganov know that, first and foremost, time is now not on their side. The second round is virtually knocking on the door, and to regroup forces for two or three weeks in such a polarized society as Russia's is a task from the category of the almost impossible. It is obvious that the one who is successful in winning over more of the voters of the other presidential candidates will sit in the presidential seat for the next four years. Therefore, coalitions necessarily have to be taken into consideration, and the tactic of individual struggle from the first round has to give way to negotiations and seeking new allies.

Both Yeltsin and Zyuganov will undoubtedly engage in a struggle first of all for the camp of followers of the third most successful man in the first round, Aleksandr Lebed. B. Yeltsin is being given the biggest chance of winning the retired general over to his side; apparently he is willing to offer Lebed the post of first deputy prime minister. Indeed, the possibility that, if Lebed were to turn down this post, Yeltsin would be prepared to change certain articles of the Constitution, create the post of vice president, and offer it to the general is not out of the question.

Of course, even Lebed would not have to suffice for Yeltsin. According to statements from members of Yeltsin's election team, the economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and the ophthalmic surgeon Svyatoslav Fyodorov, whose programs have several points in common with that of Yeltsin, are emerging as his other coalition partners. However, reaching an agreement with Yavlinskiy will be a tough nut to crack. That is, this U.S.-style reformer was Yeltsin's sharpest critic in the election campaign and has firmly rejected a coalition with him.

As opposed to Zyuganov, Yeltsin can also count on those of his supporters who did not vote in the first round going to the polls in the second. And, as opposed to Zyuganov's supporters, there would be enough of them.

Zyuganov's situation is more complicated, and it will be far harder for him to find partners. He could maybe count on Zhirinovskiy's nationalists, but even this is not certain because, as their leader said after Sunday [16 June], he would rather remain a critic from among the ranks of the opposition. Zyuganov does not have much choice. The gains of the other presidential candidates are small, and even the possible sum total of their votes would not bring him much.

So, quite certainly, the key to solving the Russian presidential puzzle remains the name Lebed.

Czech Republic: Comment: Lebed's Role Crucial in Russian Election

AU1806132296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Doubrava: "Lebed Will Determine Russia's Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was no major surprise in the first round of the Russian presidential elections. According to the hypotheses, Yeltsin will go into the second round slightly ahead of communist leader Zyuganov. Unexpectedly, however, the game has been made more complicated by the person who came third—Aleksandr Lebed.

The retired general won about 15 percent of the vote, and no one now knows to whom this percentage will belong in the end, whether to Yeltsin or Zyuganov.

The Russians voted for Lebed because he promised to introduce order, an end to corruption in privatization, and uncompromising conduct. This is exactly what the Russians wanted to hear, and such promises sounded more credible coming from Lebed than from the ultranationalist Zhirinovskiy, who has sometimes acted ridiculously.

The inhabitants of the world's largest country want a firm hand. Never in their history have they known democracy, so to speak, 100 percent. Their country has almost always been led by a strong personality—whether the czar, Lenin, or his successors.

Lebed has entered into the leadership vacuum in a manner that has perhaps surprised even himself. First and foremost, he will be the one to determine the conditions that will influence Russia's future development. The communists are capable—in view of their feeble prospects of victory in the second round—of offering him virtually anything. Yeltsin would not have to go so far, but even he cannot afford to lose the battle for Lebed's favor.

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A man has appeared suddenly at the crossroads of Russia's history who, until recently, had little to do with politics. It is the third one who is laughing, but perhaps he also realizes how great a responsibility he has all of a sudden. Despite the brilliant manner in which he commanded the army corps, the unexpected crucial political role may be too difficult for him.

Lebed will not be president this year, but he will decide who will be.

Czech Republic: Holan Advocates 'Qualitative Change' in PFP

AU1906085496 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 18 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "(bak)": "The Czech Republic Wants a Higher Quality Partnership for Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Czech Republic would welcome a qualitative change in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and new impulses for its activity. This follows on from the speech made by Defense Minister Vilem Holan at Friday's [14 June] session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. V. Holan therefore suggested holding a working seminar on the PFP's development. At the same time, the Czech Republic would like to be the coorganizer and host of the meeting. This suggestion attracted a great deal of attention in Brussels and was received positively. The Defense Ministry's press spokesman, Vaclav Tichy, has confirmed this for HOSPODARSKE NOVINY. No date for the meeting has been fixed yet. Holan emphasized that the PFP project has, in essence, made possible the problem-free cooperation between NATO members and nonmembers in Bosnia within the framework of the IFOR [Implementation Force] forces.

V. Tichy also said that more discussions on enlarging the North Atlantic alliance took place at the session. He added that Poland and the Czech Republic have already received a questionnaire on entry into the alliance. NATO standards are gradually being introduced into the Czech Army; all of the international exercises with the alliance's armies are oriented toward this. At the same time, one of the main tasks is the linguistic preparation of the troops, to which, according to V. Tichy, ample attention is being paid in our country.

Czech Republic: Klaus on Coalition Accord, Florence Summit

LD1806194496 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1620 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Regular interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Jaroslav Skalicky in Prague on 18 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Skalicky] Prime Minister, the newly elected Chamber of Deputies is to meet on 25 June, and the coalition agreement should have a definitive form by then. What points are clear and what remains to be agreed upon?

[Klaus] The rough outlines are clear. I think we all understand that very much depends on coalition cooperation because one party cannot be against the other in a situation where parliament is as divided as it is in our case. We have stipulated certain factual points in the coalition agreement: what we want to do in the spheres of health care, housing, social policy, transport, and so on. I think this will help us in the future orientation, and I think it will mitigate certain conflicts that have existed within the coalition, although there will always be conflicts.

[Skalicky] There is the question of forming a new government. Are your ideas about the composition of the government clear?

[Klaus] I cannot say this. Unfortunately, I am not getting any precise information from the coalition parties. They are much meaner than we are. [passage omitted]

Coalition partners are mean. I hope that, step by step, we shall reach a conclusion. The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and I find it unacceptable that individual ministries should be allocated to individual political parties without mentioning names because so much depends on the kind of person who is to lead this or that ministry.

[Skalicky] You have indicated that the coalition must be united, must accept compromise. Would you consider it useful, in this connection, if the ODS coalition partners concentrated more on reinforcing the position of the entire coalition, although it does not have a parliamentary majority, rather than promoting their individual demands?

[Klaus] I think this is the feeling of many citizens. I do not want to say that the majority feel this way, but definitely quite a few do. At least this is what they have been telling me in their letters, faxes, telegrams, and telephone calls. If the coalition was not sufficiently cohesive in the past, that was a pity, and it undoubtedly contributed to the outcome of the elections. Now it

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would be quite lethal. It is not essential for me now to fight for 101 votes in parliament; what is essential is to get at least 99 votes, and then everything will be so much easier.

[Skalicky] The Social Democrats [CSSD] have said that only members of the ODS and the CSSD should be represented in the leadership of the Chamber of Deputies .

[Klaus] That is not a solution. That is something one cannot take seriously or comment on. I cannot believe that a thinking person could seriously come up with this kind of idea. [passage omitted]

[Skalicky] On 22 June you will take part in the EU summit in Florence. The enlargement of the EU is also to be discussed, among other things. Are you expecting any changes in the attitude of other states?

[Klaus] I am not expecting any fundamental changes. There is no time for them and no opportunity because the EU intergovernmental conference is only just beginning, and that is decisive for further development of this institution, as well as for its acceptance of further members.

We have done a number of things between Madrid last December and Florence this Saturday. We have submitted an application to the EU. We have received the questionnaire from the EU that every country striving for membership must fill out. It is hard and analytical work. Last but not least, we have had elections. So I will speak about these three things in my address.

Czech Republic: PM Calls For Coalition Unity in Current Talks

LD1806133896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We all understand how important cooperation within the coalition is in this situation, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said today in connection with the ongoing talks between the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and the Christian-Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL]. When asked by Czech Radio whether it would not be more useful if the partners of the ODS concentrated more on reinforcing the position of the whole coalition rather than on promoting their individual demands, Klaus said:

[Begin Klaus recording] I think this is the feeling of many citizens. I do not want to say that the majority feel this way, but definitely quite a few do. At least this is what they have been telling me in their letters, faxes, telegrams, and telephone calls. If the coalition was not sufficiently cohesive in the past, it was a pity and it undoubtedly contributed to the outcome of the elections. And now it would be quite lethal.

It is not essential for me now to fight for 101 votes in parliament. What is essential for me now is to get at least 99 votes, and then everything will be so much easier. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Daily Reports ODA Split Into 'Two Streams'

AU1806175096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Jiri Kubik and Sabina Slonkova: "Kalvoda's Alliance Is Again Divided Into Two Streams"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The views on the involvement of the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] in the minority government that will be supported by Zeman's Social Democrats have, according to information from ODA members themselves, divided the Alliance into two streams. The party's founders Daniel Kroupa, Ivan Masek, and Pavel Bratinka are in opposition to the so-called small wing, which, for example, comprises Libor Kudlacek, Roman Ceska, and Vladimir Dlouhy.

"The first group is not at all sure that ODA is doing the right thing by being in a government supported by Zeman. Chairman Jan Kalvoda is also inclined toward this view. The second group, in turn, thinks that the party has no other choice. If ODA were to go into the opposition, its fate would, in all probability, be uncertain," said one of the Alliance's senior officials.

Officially, of course, ODA has not confirmed any ideational disagreements. "If there is no scope for us to be able to fulfill at least part of our program, we could not be in such a government. We have always approached the talks on the government in this manner. But the current course of the coalition talks is not heading toward anything like this," declared the party's spokesman, David Rozanek.

On the other hand, the leader of the ODA Deputies' Club, Ivan Masek, did not rule out the possibility on the weekend that the Alliance could find itself in the opposition. "Maybe it would not be so bad for this country for parties other than the extreme parties to be in the opposition," said Masek on Sunday's [16 June] "Debata" program on Czech Television.

Alliance Chairman Kalvoda has never made such a radical pronouncement, but, at the same time, he has not distanced himself from Masek's comment. Masek spoke about the possibility that ODA could end up in the opposition before the elections. "Mr. Masek did not say anything more than the fact that a businesslike

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agreement about the program part of the coalition treaty is essential for us; nothing else is being discussed. Today, a step was again taken toward this aim," said Kalvoda after yesterday's talks.

Its coalition partners are also aware that the Alliance is not quite united. "We know there are two streams within ODA that disagree on whether to go into the government. We can only speculate about which one is the stronger. If it is that Mr. Masek, then it is sad news," said one of the Civic Democratic Party's [ODS] deputy chairmen.

ODA Deputy Chairman Vladimir Dlouhy, who belongs to the less radical wing, has refused to comment on the formation of the next government or the situation in the Alliance since the elections. Yesterday, he let it be known through his press spokesman that he does not intend to reply to such questions.

The last more serious disagreements within the Alliance were caused by the scandal at the beginning of last year, in which ODA accused the secret service of the illegal surveillance of political parties. At that time, forces were divided as they are now. Dlouhy criticized Kalvoda for going public with this accusation without consulting the Alliance's broader leadership beforehand. He also proposed far closer cooperation with the ODS than Kalvoda's wing was willing to allow.

Czech Republic: Expenditures for Education Increasing

96CH0113A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 May 96 p 5

[Article by Radka Kvackova: "Public Expenditures for Education Are Growing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since 1989, public expenditures for education in the Czech Republic have risen from 21.1 billion korunas [Kc] to last year's Kc70.6 billion. The actual increase, net of inflationary influences, amounts to approximately 26 percent.

The share of expenditures for education in terms of the gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 4.2 percent to virtually 6 percent, by virtue of which the Czech Republic ranks among the most-developed nations for the second year.

Middle schools enjoy the greatest growth in the volume of resources invested (2.3 times, net of inflationary influences). Expenditures for advanced schools increased only in proportion to inflationary developments.

The average annual cost of instruction per student at the basic school level last year amounted to not quite Kc21,000; a gymnasium student cost the state treasury 42 percent more; a student at a secondary specialized school cost 49 percent more; an apprentice cost 101 percent more; and an advanced-school student cost the state treasury 266 percent more.

The comparison, which Jitka Zarubova chose for the subject of her dissertation at the Advanced School of Economics, indicates that the Czech Republic is devoting the same portion of its public expenditures to education as is the case in Sweden (11.7 percent) and more than, for example, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, or Spain. A larger portion is allocated to education in Great Britain (11.9 percent) and Denmark (12.5 percent).

However, the same source indicates that we are worse off in a comparison of teacher salaries.

While in the majority of the developed countries the starting pay for teachers is approximately the same as the per capita GDP, in the Czech Republic teachers do not reach this level of pay, which amounts to $8,592 in this country, until they are at the peak of their careers. But it is necessary to add that the comparison did not use the official rate of exchange, but rather the parity of purchasing power. According to this method, which is customary for work performed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the U.S. dollar is valued at Kc10.4.

Libor Svoboda, director of the Department for Strategy and Analysis at the Ministry of Education, does not exclude the possibility that the disproportion between the relatively high expenditures for education and the relatively low salaries of teachers might be the result of an excessive number of teachers in the Czech Republic. Specialists from the OECD also arrived at similar conclusions.

Czech Republic: Low Unemployment Predicted for 1997

96CH0113B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 May 96 p 5

[Article by "am": "The Principal Employer Is the Demanding Nature of the Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The economic level of the Czech Republic is based on a high measure of participation by the population and by the relatively high labor intensity involved in economic growth. Among other factors, we are also indebted to low labor productivity for the low unemployment rate.*

The labor-intensive nature of economic growth became specifically manifest in its acceleration of last year. The demand for manpower increased, which led to an

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increase of overall employment in the national economy by 1.9 percent. The demand for manpower continues to be influenced by the relatively low wage level relative to the prices of machines and production installations.

On the offering side, the effect of an increased influx of foreign workers was felt. Strong age classes from the population wave of the 1970's continue to enter into the labor market. Nevertheless, the average unemployment rate last year declined by 0.3 percentage point, which indicates that the labor force was augmented by the ranks of the unemployed.

The pace of growth relative to the average nominal wage accelerated moderately in 1995. The average monthly wage in "large enterprises" amounted to 8,171 korunas [Kc]. If the average were to also include small enterprises, then the average wage amounted to Kc7,880, with wages growing in the business sector by 17.7 percent and that rate of growth being not overly different from the development of wages in budget-controlled organizations, which recorded a growth of 17.3 percent—which is one of the indicators of "the wage infection."

The average real wage in 1995 rose by 7.7 percent in the large enterprises being monitored and, on an overall basis, the development of real wages in the national economy already approached the level achieved in 1990 (index 95.1 percent), whereas it is still shy by 10 points (index 89.8 percent) of the starting level for 1989.

The effects of factors that led to the stabilization of, or even a modest reduction in, the unemployment rate from 3.3 percent in 1994 to 2.99 percent in 1995 are persisting. In view of the continuing economic growth, which at the same time is labor-intensive, there are no reasons why unemployment should experience a substantial rise in the near future. The Czech Statistical Office is, therefore, predicting a rise in unemployment for 1996 to only 3.3 percent and to 3.4-3.8 percent for 1997.

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Slovakia: Prosecutor To Carry on Kovac Kidnapping Inquiry

AU1706120596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 14 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by "pt": "Prosecutor Will Issue Instruction To Continue Investigating the Case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s Kidnapping"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—R. Vlachovsky, prosecutor with the Regional Prosecution Office in Bratislava, who is overseeing the case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping, turned down the complaint of the injured party against the decision of investigator J. Ciz to shelve the investigation file. According to Vlachovsky, the injured person is not authorized to file a complaint against such a decision, not even if the injured party is simultaneously the person who reported the crime. In spite of this, after checking the file, R. Vlachovsky came to the conclusion that, in view of the submitted complaints, it will be necessary to carry out some additional acts. The reasons for carrying them out came to light, on the one hand, after the issuance of the contested decision, but there are also such that need to be documented with reference to the already ascertained facts of the case [sentence as published]. For these reasons, Prosecutor Vlachovsky will issue to the investigator a special instruction to carry out additional investigating acts.

National Council of the Slovak Republic MP L. Pittner yesterday submitted to Prosecutor R. Vlachovsky an explanation on the independent civic commission's report [on the Kovac Jr. kidnapping case] and an analysis of J. Ciz's decision to shelve the file on Michal Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping. "After the talk with the representative of the Regional Prosecutor's Office I have hopes again that it is possible that the case will be successfully solved," L. Pittner told SME. He did not want to provide any details on his deposition and talks at the Prosecutor's Office.

Slovakia: HZDS MP Criticizes Secret Service Chief

AU1806165696

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 15 and 17 June continue to publish items on the critical views of Frantisek Gaulieder, MP for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and member of the Special Parliamentary Body [OKO] for monitoring the activity of the Slovak Information Service [SIS], on the situation at the Interior Ministry and in the SIS.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 17 June on pages 1 and 4 carries a 1,200-word interview with Frantisek Gaulieder by Juraj Handzo entitled "I Have Not Changed My Views." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Gaulieder reiterates his view that OKO should be expanded to include representatives of the opposition "so as to eliminate doubts about the activity not only of OKO, but also the SIS." He also voices the view that OKO should not play its supervisory role only "formally," but that it should react to media reports about the SIS in order to "guarantee the purity of fulfillment of SIS tasks." Gaulieder also believes that the law on OKO should be amended in a way that would "give OKO greater powers in relation to the SIS."

Replying to another question, Gaulieder reiterates his belief that the recently publicized telephone conversation between SIS Director Ivan Lexa and Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, which confirmed their interference in the investigation of the kidnapping of the president's son, was authentic and that the two officials ought to resign, even if the recording was made illegally. At the same time, Gaulieder denies that his objections to Lexa and Hudek are motivated by his ambition to take up their posts. Rather, the reason for his criticism supposedly is that "we should be guided by the principles contained in the HZDS election program and in the government's policy statement."

Asked whether he sees other reasons for Lexa's and Hudek's resignation, besides the contents of their bugged phone call, Gaulieder then says: "Yes. One of them is the gradual replacement of investigators of the Michal Kovac Jr. case. These steps did not arouse confidence in the minister within the ranks of the Police Corps. Besides, the Interior Ministry is one of the bodies involved in criminal proceedings. How is it possible that a ministry that is supposed to guarantee the safety of the citizens of the Slovak Republic is unable to make sure that telephone conversations are not bugged? This applies, of course, also to the SIS, which should uncover such practices. I think that only these two institutions avail themselves of the technical equipment to wiretap telephones. If someone else avails himself of this equipment as well, the question arises of how the provisions of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic on civil rights are respected. Another recording of the telephone conversation of a constitutional official—Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik—has now surfaced. How is it possible that such a conversation was leaked to the public? Who will guarantee that the phone calls of other persons will not be bugged as well? Furthermore, I have findings about information leaks from the SIS. How is it possible that information from the SIS is getting to the media or landing in the hands of Pittner's commission [conducting an independent inquiry into the Kovac Jr. kidnapping case]? I will

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return once again to the interior minister: I avail myself of findings that his inappropriate remark about Police Corps members [reference to Hudek's comment in the recorded conversation with Lexa about policemen being 'idiots'] has had a very negative response among them and I believe that they will hardly forgive him that mistake."

In conclusion, Gaulieder is asked whether he has come across any negative reactions to his criticism. "Not so far," he replies.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 15 May on page 9 carries a 700-word commentary by Ivan Horsky entitled "Frantisek Gaulieder in the Role of Meciar's Hammer Against Lexa?" The commentary considers the motives behind Gaulieder's criticism of the situation at the Interior Ministry and the SIS. Horsky says: "Frantisek Gaulieder has always been the man in the background, he never appeared in the public much. He has even been spared the cruel fate of other HZDS renegades, although it is known in well-informed circles that, at the time of the split in the movement [in late 1993, early 1994], his sympathies were with the followers of Knazko and Moravcik. At the last moment he did not have the courage to cross the Rubicon and stayed in the womb of his native movement, however. The open question is why he did so, which elicits justified doubts about his true intentions.

"It is being openly said that the prime minister, HZDS chairman, and Defense Council chairman in one person is using Gaulieder as a hammer against the unsuccessful or even discredited SIS chief, the assumption being that he promised him Lexa's post. This would explain the deputy's busy critical activity. However, knowing Vladimir Meciar words of several years ago, spoken to his then companions when they demanded that he give up cooperation with Anna Nagyova and Ivan Lexa [allusion to Meciar's alleged statement that Nagyova and Lexa could 'destroy him within 24 hours'], such a sacrifice is scarcely conceivable, in view of possible risks, particularly personal ones. The present SIS chief knows too much.

"More likely is the gradual removal of Ivan Lexa from his present position. By means of a trade-off, so that he will have no reason to speak out. People in the HZDS already speak aloud about the possibility of shifting him out of sight, to a diplomatic post in a country that is not too strict about good democratic manners."

Horsky concludes his commentary by saying: "I suppose that it will soon become clear what role, if any, is played in this scenario by Deputy Frantisek Gaulieder. The cup of patience is starting to run over. But it is equally possible that, in the case of Vladimir Meciar's longer-lasting and more serious illness, everything could take a completely different turn. Like in Moscow after Stalin's death, for example."

Slovakia: New SDL Leader Apologizes for Past Policy

AU1806180596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 18 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by "klo": "Jozef Migas Apologized for the Previous SDL Leadership's Policy That Was Not Close to Workers'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—A turnabout in the policy of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], whose previous leadership was not pursuing a policy that would be close to workers, was announced by SDL Chairman Jozef Migas at a public rally in Banska Bystrica yesterday. Jozef Migas went on to say that the SDL, as the party of workers, cooperative farmers, teachers, but also physicians, would devote itself, first and foremost, to the issue of social guarantees. As it is opposed to polarization, however, it will be trying to deal with these problems primarily by means of its parliamentary policy. SDL Deputy Chairman Robert Fico said that the SDL would ask the parliamentary clubs of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] to support its proposal to amend Law No. 92 of 1991, which concerns bonds. "The policy we want to pursue is neither that presented by the right-wing opposition nor the one presented by the present coalition," Fico added, stressing that no one should expect any confrontation from the SDL.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 18 June on page 2 carries a 250-word report by "mb" on the SDL rally in Banska Bystrica, which adds: "According to SDL Chairman Jozef Migas, representatives of his party will come out of their offices and among the people—workers, cooperative farmers, entrepreneurs, students, and others. 'That is also why we are here, at National Uprising Square in Banska Bystrica,' he stressed. 'I want to apologize for the former SDL leadership that the party did not carry out an unequivocal policy toward workers. This is not going to be repeated.' According to the SDL chairman, however, the party wants to pay heed to society as a whole."]

Slovakia: Loss of License by Radio TWIST Foreseen

AU1706122696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Jun 96 pp 1, 5

[Article by Pavel Kapusta: "Radio Twist's Unethical Practices Increase Tensions on the Slovak Political

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Scene; Is Andrej Hryc Begging To Have the Radio License Withdrawn?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—On Wednesday night, Radio TWIST broadcast a poor recording of an alleged telephone conversation between Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and finance minister, and (in all probability) Lubomir Dobrik, state secretary at the Justice Ministry of Justice. According to Radio TWIST, the phone call had been recorded on 3 June and concerned the circumstances of the police operation in Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] headquarters. It is not for us to comment on its contents. However, we want to pause to ponder the fact that this private radio station, acting at variance with ethical principles, has made public within a short period of time the second illegal recording of a telephone conversation between constitutional officials.

Some time ago, I wrote in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA that by virtue of the unequivocal contents and orientation of its "Journal" [main newscast], but also its other programs, Radio TWIST is more and more clearly becoming the mouthpiece of the opposition. Radio TWIST Programming Director Lubos Machaj quickly addressed to our chief editor and to myself a fax full of invectives in which he vigorously denied the politically one-sided orientation of this medium. Nor did he forget to emphasize how difficult it was at present to maintain balanced views and objectivity. Much water has flowed down the Danube since then, but he did not convince me—nor did he convince thousands of other listeners, I am sure—of his sincerity. Despite tireless propaganda about the radio station's independence, we bear witness to daily direct and indirect attacks against representatives of the government coalition. At the same time, Radio TWIST is an outright El Dorado for opposition (and, I will be quite open about it, often expressly anti-Slovak) views (apart from the "Journal" program, I am thinking, in particular, of the hate-filled "Apropos" and "Pawnshop" [satirical shows], two programs that have hardly anything in common with genuine humor and satire).

The Distributor, Too, Bears Responsibility

telephone conversations between the interior minister and the Slovak Information Service [SIS] director, and between the deputy prime minister and the state secretary of the Justice Ministry. The investigation will show whether these are patched up forgeries or not. By making them public, however, Radio TWIST's management ignored the fact that we live in a law-governed state and only increased suspicions that it is pursuing a long-term goal of discrediting the government coalition's constitutional officials. As a distributor of the recordings, Radio TWIST violated not only ethical principles but, evidently, also the Constitution and basic human rights and freedoms. Under Article 16, Section 1, of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the inviolability of an individual and his privacy is guaranteed and can be limited only in cases defined by law. However, the management of Radio TWIST should take particular interest in Article 22, Section 2, which reads: "No one may violate the privacy of correspondence and the secrecy of other written messages and records, whether these are kept in privacy, sent by mail, or conveyed in another way, with the exception of cases to be defined in a special law. Equally guaranteed is the secrecy of messages transmitted by telephone, telegraph, or other similar means."

Practically a Mirror Image of Radio Free Europe

as, chairman of the Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, to ask him whether this parliament-elected body, which is, among other things, vested with the right to award and withdraw licenses for private electronic mass media, would draw any conclusions from the broadcast of the Kozlik-Dobrik conversation the day before yesterday. (Radio TWIST broadcast the tape without the knowledge of the two protagonists, and Sergej Kozlik refused to comment on it on the grounds that the bugging of telephones was at odds with democracy). "We have asked them for the tape. On Monday or Tuesday we will summon legal experts who will listen to the recording and will assume an official position on the whole affair. Should breach of law, or breach of the conditions under which the license was awarded, be proven, the Council will be able to take action," Peter Juras said. It should be added, for the sake of objectivity, that in addition to the circumstances of the broadcast of the Kozlik-Dobrik conversation on Radio TWIST, the Council will address at its meeting next week a violation made during a Slovak Television broadcast.

While Radio TWIST Director General Andrej Hryc is succeeding, by means of permanent scandals, in increasing the popularity of the radio station, he should not forget that this is a double-edged sword. When the license extension comes up for debate in the future (incidentally, hardly anyone knows that Hryc did not ask for the license himself but that he received it as a gift), he could find himself in a situation similar to that of Radio Free Europe some time ago. Because of the anti-Slovak nature of its broadcasts, Radio Free Europe obtained the license by a hair's breadth. And

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Radio TWIST is practically a mirror image of Radio Free Europe. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Slovak Parties Protest Erection of Hungarian Memorial

AU1906081796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Jun 96 p 2

[TASR report: "No Agreement in Kapusany"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Velke Kapusany/Bratislava—"The planned construction of a memorial in Velke Kapusany, Trebisov District, to symbolize the Hungarian nation casts a shadow over the coexistence of Slovaks and Hungarians in our city," Velke Kapusany Mayor Tibor Bodnar said yesterday. He added that even if it is an undeniable historical fact that the Hungarians arrived in the Carpathian basin 1,100 years ago, "the opponents of the memorial cannot accept the planned inscription, which refers to the 'takeover of the homeland,' and the fact that it will be written only in Hungarian."

The mayor of Velke Kapusany said that while the first meeting of political parties and movements, as well as of Csemadok [Hungarian cultural organization] and Matica Slovenska [Slovak Heritage Foundation], allowed advocates and opponents of the memorial to clarify the pros and cons, no consensus had been reached. The next roundtable is scheduled for the last week of June.

According to Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota, at its regular meeting yesterday, "the SNS Political Board expressed its dismay at the arrogance and audacity of the decision by the Velke Kapusany Municipal Council deputies." According to Slota, at the next meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], SNS deputies will propose the inclusion of this problem on the agenda and will demand that the decision to build a memorial "glorifying an invasion by nomadic Asiatic tribes" be reversed.

Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Chairman Jan Carnogursky yesterday sent a letter to the Environmental Office in Velke Kapusany, Trebisov District, in which he proposed that it not permit the erection of a memorial to mark the "takeover of the homeland" by Hungarians 1,100 years ago.

"I do not consider it a fortunate solution to turn the erection of some memorial into a national affair," Kalman Petoecz, secretary of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] for foreign relations, said yesterday.

"We follow with concern the developments and hysteria unleashed by the construction of a memorial marking the 1,100th anniversary of the Hungarians' arrival in the Carpathian basin," says a statement issued yesterday by the initiator of the memorial, the local Csemadok organization in Velke Kapusany. [passage omitted]

The Csemadok members rejected Jan Carnogursky's claim that "the memorial glorifies violence and could upset coexistence."

Slovakia: Commentary on Coalition's Antifascist Commitment

AU1706115096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "The Unsilenced Sad Truth"]

[FBIS Translated Text] People who cherish 14 March [anniversary of the founding of the pro-Hitler Slovak state in 1939] above everything else, and not 29 August [anniversary of the antifascist Slovak National Uprising in 1944], met in the Istropolis hall in Bratislava in mid-March. Historian Frantisek Vnuk said there: "Without 14 March 1939, there would not have been 1 January 1993 [founding of independent Slovak Republic]. He who is ashamed of, or renounces, the legacy of March 1939 cannot lead our second republic either." One week later the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] assembly convened in Zvolen. The HZDS chairman declared there: "We follow up on the traditions that emerged from the resistance struggle in the Slovak National Uprising...." Hence, according to Vnuk, the HZDS chairman has no right to lead "our second republic." In spite of this, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, a daily in the ownership of the HZDS, continues to provide space to Mr. Vnuk, for him to promote ideas with which the HZDS chief disagrees out of principle. According to the HZDS chief, as long as he is prime minister, "fascist ideology is not going to be promoted in our country." From which it clearly follows that Mr. Meciar does not read the newspaper of his movement.

MP [for the coalition Slovak National Party; SNS] Bartolomej Kunc claimed at the beginning of May that what happened in Slovakia during the war [reference to the deportation of Slovak Jews] was a consequence of the endeavor to "set right in a certain way the inauspicious state of affairs, under which a small proportion of the population, 3.6 percent, owned too large a share of national wealth. Property was concentrated in Jewish hands." Despite the evident fact that a National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] deputy speaks in 1996 like a 1939-vintage Ludakist [member of fascist Hlinka People's Party during World War II), his SNS stood up for him. The government, in which this party has ministers, conducted itself differently, however. It, too, declared that fascism would not be rehabilitated in

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Slovakia during its term of office. One week later Slovak Television, which is fully under the control of the government coalition, massively promoted in its main news programs the book "The Silenced Truth About Slovakia" and its authors, including Mr. Vnuk. To make it absolutely clear why the book came out, its publisher wrote in it: "May God bless the Slovak nation so that it can achieve, as soon as possible, the rehabilitation of the first Slovak Republic and the first Slovak president, Doctor Jozef Tiso."

The ruling movement promotes in its own daily the views of a historian who was, and has remained, a Ludakist; one of the government parties defends the neo-Ludakist statements of its politician, and the government-controlled television is promoting a book that defends fascism in its Slovak variety. Indeed, we must not silence this sad truth about Slovakia.

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Hungary: Editorial Sees 'Low-Level Victory' for Yeltsin

AU1806141296 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 18 Jun 96 p 8

[Editorial by Gabor Stier: "The Loser Is Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, miracles do not even exist in Russia, which is known for its extremes and absurd steps. Therefore, Yeltsin had trusted in a sure victory in vain. The electors, now with their democratic reflexes strengthened, not only appreciated his indeed remarkable dashing finish, they also assessed his many years of performance, which are hardly worth more than the 35 percent he got. The president's tactical sense played a major role even in this, as, by exaggerating the "red danger," he depicted himself as the only force able to prevent the return of communism. Yelstin's revival is also due to the fact that he has set an incredible pace in recent months, proving that he is also physically capable of performing the presidential duties. Naturally, we should not forget, either, that the press also deserves much credit for the victory—which, in spite of all this, can be said to be hard won—because it distinguished itself by a one-sidedness that is unacceptable in developed democracies. We can by all means say that Yeltsin gave his utmost, even if it was a mistake for him to state conceitedly in the last days that he was not preparing for the second round so that some of his voters (who, unlike his competitor's voters, are undisciplined and wavering) decided to spend the weekend at their allotments instead of voting. In the next round, the president can hope for the votes of those who stayed away and, of course, can hope to gain the voters of those who are now out of the contest. However, this will not be easy because the voters of Yavlinskiy, and especially Lebed's, will not automatically vote for Yeltsin.

The criticism of the past years is clearly expressed in the president's low-level victory. The losers in the reforms made Yeltsin pay for the cost of the changes, and the democrats made him pay for his hesitation and that fact that he practically wasted the past four years. It is sad for the country's future that none of the forces could provide a real alternative to Yeltsin, who had piled mistake upon mistake. The communists' dangerous harking back to the past could only gain the sympathy of the most desperate people and, as it can be seen, the number of these citizens is not low; they are a factor to be considered. General Lebed's views are also closer to this group, and Yavlinskiy has, in fact, lost the possibility of becoming a real political force once and forever. Zhirinovskiy has found his proper place, the periphery of political life—and this is also a sign of normalization. In the end, regardless of the final outcome, the country, which is struggling with huge problems, will be directed by a person who enjoys no more than 30 percent of society's support, and even these people have not voted for him whole-heartedly. So the majority of the Russians have had enough of the semifeudalistic and authoritarian governing, which, like the waste deposits of an immature democracy and the changeover to a market economy, has brought with it wild capitalism, crime, and the impoverishment of the masses exceeding previous levels. At the same time, a large section of society does not want any of the communists' authoritarian reign, which would leave the reforms stranded for good, threatens chaos, and has proved to be nonviable in the past. Some of the disappointed people are still trying to believe in Lebed, who only differs from the above in his personal charisma, which, of course, is still better than the expectation of a miracle that brought Zhirinovskiy popularity, but even this does not show a true way out of the current situation. This has also proved that the current political elite is unable to handle the problems and that the country needs a person who is able to adjust to the new times and who was actually born in the new times. This will take time, however, and, until then, they have to make do with the half measures of the existing people. In the interest of remaining in power or gaining power, they will spend their time seeking allies instead of dealing with the important issues, and people of the moment like Lebed will gain temporary importance, while Russia remains the real loser. It is also a loser because, as is shown by the results of the first round, Russia is divided. Although the citizens have tried in vain to vote for the various promises of stability embodied by Yeltsin, Zyuganov, or Lebed, only one thing will continue to be certain, and that is uncertainty.

Hungary: Air Force Chief on Development Tasks

AU1806175996 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 17 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with Major General Gyorgy Feminger, chief of the Hungarian Air Force, by Irene Szabo; place and date not given: "Pilots' Appreciation Has Been Delayed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Szabo] In your view, what is the situation of the Hungarian Air Force?

[Feminger] I agree with the opinion of the lieutenant general in Hungarian Army Headquarters and I can add that, today, the Hungarian Air Force still possesses the professional culture and ability that can face any challenge in a short time. However, the prevailing situation is such that, in the short term, only decisions

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made at the adequate level can make the Air Force suitable for fulfilling its task, and for joining NATO in the medium term.

[Szabo] The government decided to postpone issuing the planned tenders for purchasing combat aircraft for next year. If the professional urgency is true, is this delay not dangerous?

[Feminger] It is not my task to evaluate the government decision. To your question I can say that, in this definitely new situation, my task is to seek the technique and procedures that guarantee the adjustment of the Air Force to the new situation.

[Szabo] What do you mean specifically?

[Feminger] My firm position is that NATO membership is not primarily a technical issue; instead, it is guaranteeing the oft-mentioned compatibility, a term that has become increasingly fashionable today. Concentrating on its conceptual elements, we must urgently work out the tasks connected with the Air Force.

[Szabo] As far as I know, the Air Force concepts are based on the tenders to be issued this year.

[Feminger] The Air Force indeed prepared for this. But the year of waiting will not be in vain either. We will have the opportunity to examine the methods of selecting the proper purchase in detail, on the basis of the Swiss and Finnish example. I will also disclose the fact that, along with delaying the tenders, the government guaranteed the conditions to have not only MiG-29 combat aircraft operational.

[Szabo] According to some opinions, the government decision to link the tenders to the start of NATO membership negotiations is a clever argument, but there are other reasons behind all this. In your view, is it possible that there will be no combat-aircraft purchase whatsoever here?

[Feminger] I am not a forecaster. Of course, everything is possible.

[Szabo] As far as I know, the general reduction in Army personnel also affects the Air Force.

[Feminger] That is true. One cannot avoid this. Of course, I hope, and I will also personally see to it that these measures do not endanger the ability of the Air Force to function, an Army service that enjoys priority. My opinion is that it is impossible to deal with the extraordinary serious situation that emerged in the Air Force—and in the Army as a whole—with methods used so far. It is necessary to place the Army reform on new bases.

[Szabo] Would you disclose what kind of combat aircraft would the pilots prefer?

[Feminger] Combat-aircraft purchase is not a military issue. Our task is to work out, evaluate, and compare the tactical and technical parameters of the various offers on the basis of our professional knowledge. A professional list will emerge on the basis of all this. But the final decision lies with politics, and this does not necessarily follow our list of priorities.

[Szabo] Tell us, have the pilots who recently carried out the test firing with the MiG-29's in Poland with excellent results received any appreciation?

[Feminger] Not yet, but I hope that this appreciation will come soon.

Hungary: Air Defense Radar To Be Set Up Despite Protest

LD1806140596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0500 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite protests by local residents, an air monitoring unit—a military radar station—will be built on Zengoe. Csaba Belenessy reports:

[Begin Belenessy recording] According to a parliamentary decision passed in November 1995, the navigation and monitoring of civilian and military aircraft in Hungary's airspace will be assisted by two large radar stations. The army would set up one of them on the highlands of Mt. Buekk and the other on Zengoe, the peak of Mecsek Hill. There seems to be no problem with the northern scene.

This is not the case in the south. The residents of Pecsvarad, which the 682-meter-high peak belongs to, are unwilling to accept the project. They are concerned about the health hazards of radio waves and they would not like to have a possible war target in the neighborhood. They are not even impressed by the plan for a lookout tower to be built also in conjunction with the military radar station on Zengoe.

Col. Antal Nemeth, an engineer at the Defense Ministry, and Maj. Gen. Lajos Csomos have been, for a while, trying to convince those attending the residents' forum in Pecsvarad. Then they admitted that whatever happens the radar station, which is to be built with U.S. assistance, will be set up on Zengoe peak. In their view, the Hungarian air monitoring system is so outdated that the time between the observation of a foreign aircraft and a response could be as long as six minutes. This period could be reduced to seconds by the new system. [end recording]

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Hungary: Finance Minister Medgyessy on Budget Situation

AU1906132796 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 19 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Ivan Varkonyi: "Medgyessy Would Cut the Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government's goal is that more people pay less tax, but to achieve this, in addition to reducing the burdens, the tax authority will have to be strengthened, Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy said in his speech at the company managers' forum of the Hungarian Employers Federation. In the interest of more effective control, in addition to increasing the staff of the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing, the Finance Ministry would like to see the use of cash reduced. For this reason, according to the plans, the tax office will only accept requests for value added tax refunds for deals exceeding 1 million forints [Ft] if the value of the goods is paid through a current account.

Medgyessy confirmed his former statements and said that the cancellation of the supplementary customs duty, the lowering of customs duties in accordance with international agreements, the reduction of tax burdens, and the planned reduction of contributions paid into the labor market funds—which is being considered jointly with the Labor Ministry—will mean a some Ft150 billion to Ft180 billion loss of income for the budget. This money will remain in the private sphere, Medgyessy said, and it will be removed from the enterprise costs, which can lead to lower inflation. In reply to a question, he said that, in order to secure the income, it is possible that the burden on certain items will not be reduced when the consumer taxes are changed. He mentioned the consumer tax on cars as an example.

Medgyessy repeated that they cannot see any possibility of lowering the rate of monthly devaluation next year. As soon as economic development and lower inflation make it possible, however, the ministry will suggest the reduction of the 1.2 percent devaluation.

Talking about the agreement made with the IMF, he said that it prescribes a change of the economy that will create balance and establish the conditions for sustainable growth. It is very likely that the conditions specified for 1996 can be adhered to, Medgyessy said, but it will be difficult to keep the 1997 budget within the stipulated framework. The primary budget balance calculated without debt repayments—which has been in the black years—cannot fall below 3.7 percent of the GDP. This level can be the same this year but, due to the Ft150 billion to Ft180 billion reduction in the incomes, major restrictive measures will have to be implemented in order to keep to the specified level. This means that the budget spending has to be cut, or else the stabilization may be threatened.

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B-H: Presidential Adviser Welcomes Lifting of Arms Embargo

AU1906103396 Paris AFP in English 1024 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 19 (AFP)—A top Bosnian official on Wednesday welcomed the lifting of the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, saying that he hoped it would lead to a balance of military forces in the region.

The embargo on the sale of arms to former Yugoslavia, which came into force on September 25, 1991, was finally lifted on Tuesday.

"We hope this will lead to a balance of forces in the region," Mirza Hajric, an advisor to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, said in Sarajevo.

Hajric said that they expected the U.S. Equip and Train programme to begin "anyday."

The U.S. programme of military aid is conditioned on the adoption of a defence law which the parliament of the Moslem-Croat Federation—one of the two entities in Bosnia—is due to discuss Wednesday. The other condition is the departure from Bosnia of all foreign Islamic fighters.

The United States has said it will spend over 100 million dollars on Equip and Train.

Last week in Florence, an agreement was signed on the disarmament of the former Yugoslavia. The agreement gives 16 months from July 1 to the former warring sides to comply with fixed armaments ceilings.

"It's now up to the international community to make sure that those who have more arms, Pale and Belgrade, will destroy them," Hajric said.

The agreement was signed by Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia and the two entities in Bosnia, the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic].

B-H: Abdic To Run for Presidency; Party Enters Elections

AU1506204096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1019 GMT 15 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar, 15 Jun (BETA)—Zlatko Jarusic, member of the elections headquarters of Fikret Abdic's Democratic People's Party, has announced in Mostar today that his party has registered for the Bosnian September elections.

Jarusic said that the party had collected 17,000 signatures of support, and added that Fikret Abdic would most likely run for member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

B-H: Presidency's Pejanovic Visits Tesanj, Views Serb Return

AU1806200096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Report by Alma Elezovic-Hadzic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Although this was the first official visit that Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the Serb Civic Council, it has been confirmed that information about events in the political, military, economic, and other spheres of activity from this region have been reaching the highest state levels, which confirms that in times of aggression, as well as now during peace, this municipality has had something to offer and it can be fully counted upon in the coming period of reconstruction and development in our homeland.

In his statement for the Radio of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Pejanovic pointed out that he personally experienced the openness of this region in a specific way and said that this region is a special kind of test for reviving the process of the return of expellees—Bosniaks and Coats to Doboj and Teslic, as well as citizens of Serb nationality to the Tesanj municipality. He pointed out, however, that the Serbs' process of return to this region is not realistic until the issue of the return of Bosniaks to Doboj and Teslic is completely solved.

Mr. Pejanovic pointed out that the process of reintegrating Bosnia-Herzegovina should be intensified throughout, but that it is now hampered by the authorities in the Serb entity who are hindering the peace process. [passage omitted]

B-H: Izetbegovic, Demirel Open Turkish Consulate in Mostar

AU1806185096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Report by Halil Setka—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Setka] [Passage omitted] Bosnia-Herzegovina President Izetbegovic and Turkish President Demirel attended the opening of the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey in Mostar. Addressing the people present, President Demirel said the following:

[Demirel in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] My country has actively participated in

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the political and economic stabilization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the creation of the Federation. Moreover, Turkey has actively joined in the efforts on stopping conflict between Bosniaks and Croats, which has opened the road to establishing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Setka] Ending his address, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel thanked the EU Administration and all international organizations for the reconstruction of the city and pointed out that the forthcoming elections will ensure the unification of Mostar and establishing equal freedoms for all citizens.

In his address, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, among other things said the following:

[Izetbegovic] The deep feelings of the Turkish people about our tragedy, the encouragement that they extended to us to persevere in defending our country's independence and the generous help [words indistinct] our people, have laid the foundations of our unbreakable friendship. Proof of that is in the results of this third visit of yours to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the agreements on future cooperation that we made yesterday. As you said, Dear President, it is our joint wish for the Old Bridge to again become the lasting monument to peace and harmony among peoples, just as it used to be for several centuries. We are convinced that all Mostar citizens will soon build a joint future for this beautiful city.

Your visit to Mostar is part of Turkey's lasting efforts to contribute to the resumption of confidence between the Bosniak and Croat peoples, as well as to the full implementation of the Washington agreements, to establishing the Federation, and cooperation between the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and [word indistinct].

[Setka] Following their speeches, the two presidents formally cut the ribbon at the entrance, which meant that the General Consulate of the Republic of Turkey in Bosnia-Herzegovina was formally opened, upon which the visit of President Demirel to Mostar ended.

B-H: Mostar Refugees Living in UK To Vote in Germany

AU1806163696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Expelled Mostar citizens currently living in Great Britain should take part in the coming elections at voting stations in Germany, our correspondent has learned in the Embassy of Bosnia-Herzegovina in London. According to the same source, people will most probably travel to the planned polling stations by buses. Here is a report by (name indistinct) Behram:

[Behram] As we have learned in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in London, about 180 Mostar citizens who meet conditions to participate in elections have registered so far. However, people in the embassy believe that the number is not final. [passage omitted]

B-H: Croat Deputy: Muslims Obstructing Accord Implementation

LD1806182996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The resumption of the 14th session of the constituent assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation has been announced for 19 June. Ivan Kristic spoke with Ivan Bender, chairman of the club of Croat deputies in the federation's parliament, in connection with this. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Kristic] Mr. Bender, why in your view has it taken so long for this session to be completed? Does this in fact reflect the situation in the federation and the difficulties the two federal partners have been having in coordinating their standpoints?

[Bender] That is right. We have to say that the project of the federation is nevertheless in crisis. More resolute steps should be taken to implement what has been agreed. The Muslim side is obstructing both the implementation of the Dayton and all subsequent agreements, and it is obvious that they are trying, by retaining their institutions, the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to extinguish the institutions of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia with the aim of creating a new situation in which they will be dominant. The Croat people will never accept this.

This is best seen from the preparations for the defense bill, where they want to create a unified army, and it is known what this army would be like. The Croat people want the federation to be as we agreed. It should be organized in such a way that Croats are guaranteed their survival and are masters in their own house. Unless this happens, it is quite certain that we Croat deputies will not accede to any compromise.

[Kristic] At the last part of this session you raised the question of the future of Vlado Santic, a general in the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. You have raised this issue before as well, but our partners have systematically been refusing to reply, and they are also avoiding replying to all other contentious issues. Why is it like this?

[Bender] This is further proof of our federal partner's real approach to the development of the federation. We

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will persist in this, because I believe we have both the knowledge and the means to obtain answers to the questions raised, and if we do not get the replies we want, we will ask the government what it and other institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina are doing. If after so much time they cannot provide answers to clear matters, one has to ask what they are doing.

[Kristic] Thank you, Mr. Bender, for this conversation, and we wish you success in this third resumption of the 14th session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's constituent assembly.

[Bender] Thank you, too. And I hope we will do a job which will satisfy the Croat people. [end recording]

B-H: Doboj Citizens Block Road in Dispute With IFOR

LD1806221196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2115 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 18 Jun (SRNA)—This afternoon, residents of the Doboj suburbs of Miljkovac and Orasje blocked traffic on the road linking them with the town center in protest against the Implementation Force's [IFOR] behavior on the road running from Doboj to the IFOR base.

The citizens are not allowing any vehicles through and requesting that IFOR restore the road to its former condition.

Members of the Nordic-Polish brigade covered the road with an inappropriate substance which later caused major problems both for pedestrians and for drivers because of the amount of dust generated.

On several occasions IFOR members promised to carry out the necessary additional work, but their promises have not been kept.

Traffic is being diverted onto other roads pending a resolution of this dispute.

B-H: Center Reports Human Rights Violations in Bosnia

AU1806191096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Human Rights Coordination Center of the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina has publicized the report on human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina presented at the summit in Florence last year.

It is pointed out in the report that the sides in our country have failed to make steps in this sphere, which can have essential significance for the peace process and, with a suitable political will, could be taken immediately. As most serious human right violations, the report lists the following:

—Discrimination or violence on an ethnic basis, beatings, and forced expulsions. In many cases, the authorities are either jointly responsible or directly involved in those mistreatments.

—Preventing the freedom of movement, hindering already agreed upon visits of refugees to their former homes through violence, and arresting people due to vague suspicions of war crimes.

—Administrative and technical barriers to the distribution of independent media are still present, while the state electronic media favor the ruling parties.

—The police continue the practice of arbitrarily arresting and detaining people, sometimes for the purpose of obtaining somebody for exchange.

The authorities should issue a clear message that disturbing, mistreating, and discriminating against the minority population will not be tolerated, it is said among other things in the report by the Coordination Center for Human Rights.

B-H: Serbs Take 2 OSCE Members Hostage

AU1806132896 Paris AFP in English 1318 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 18 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs who want help in finding missing relatives have taken hostage two members of the organization preparing Bosnia's first post-war elections, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said Tuesday.

The two members of the OSCE were abducted Monday in this Serb-held city in northwest Bosnia, said Joanna Van Vliet, an OSCE representative.

She said they were being held inside the building housing the OSCE office. Since Monday that building has been surrounded by dozens of Serbs who want help in learning the fate of nearly 2,000 Serb civilians and soldiers missing since last summer.

Van Vliet did not name the two members, but witnesses said one of them was the OSCE director in Banja Luka, Ronald Dreyer. She said the abductors were members of an association of relatives of missing or detained Serbs.

Michael Steiner, an aide to Carl Bildt, the international community's High Representative in Bosnia, was to arrive in Banja Luka later to negotiate the release of the captives.

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The OSCE is charged with determining whether conditions exist in Bosnia for elections to be held by September 14 as called for in the Dayton peace agreement.

B-H: International Representatives Meet Serb Protesters

LD1806163896 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As announced this morning, representatives of the families of Serb POW's gathered in front of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] office in Banja Luka since yesterday met Carl Bildt's deputy Michael Steiner this afternoon. Velimir Bozic reports.

[Bozic] Representatives of the families of Serb POW's and civilian prisoners are holding talks with Carl Bildt's deputy Michael Steiner. They have presented him with a list of demands from the protest meeting of Serb women gathered in front of the OSCE office [in Banja Luka]. Mothers, wives, and close relatives of Serb POW's have demanded that international community representatives secure the release of remaining POW's in Muslim and Croat prisons and their registration. They also want to have access to mass graves in the territory of the Muslim-Croat Federation as well as [words indistinct] of former battlefields. The talks are taking place behind closed doors and press statements are expected after the meeting. Alexander Ivanko and Chris Janowski, representatives of the international community, also visited the OSCE office in Banja Luka today accompanied by a number of reporters, but they did not talk with the Serb women who carried placards warning that it is high time for the international community to fulfill its obligations under the peace agreement, particularly Annex I, providing for the release of POW's by 19 January [1996].

OSCE representative Robert Frowick has just joined the meeting, which is expected to last for another hour.

B-H: Agreement Reached To Free OSCE Premises in Banja Luka

LD1806184996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1801 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 18 Jun (SRNA)—Michael Steiner, deputy of the high representative in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, reached agreement in Banja Luka this evening with a delegation of women whereby they will immediately lift their blockade of the premises of the OSCE regional center in the town. They have been blocking the entrance since 0700 yesterday.

"After four hours of exhaustive talks, I reached agreement with the delegation of women that they will immediately lift their blockade of the OSCE office, and that their demands will be resolved over the coming seven days. After this, we will meet again in Banja Luka," Steiner told journalists.

Biljana Malesevic, a representative of the women's delegation, thanked Steiner and stressed his cooperativeness and readiness to help the mothers and spouses whose sons and husbands are being held in prison.

"It is now up to us to convince the women to leave the OSCE offices in Banja Luka. We have put three clear and precise demands to the international community, and these should be resolved over the coming seven days," Mrs. Malesevic said, and explained:

"The first demand is that the International Committee of the Red Cross facilitate the registration of all prisoners, and that the mass graves be opened within the shortest possible time."

"Mr. Steiner and his team have seven days to give us their reply to these demands. Our subsequent actions will depend on this reply," Mrs. Malesevic said.

B-H: OSCE Hostages in Banja Luka Released

AU1806202596 Paris AFP in English 2016 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 18 (AFP)—Two representatives of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe held in their offices here by a group of Serbs were freed late Tuesday.

Journalists witnessed their release in this northwest Bosnian town.

B-H: Serbs Reject 'Additional Pressure' in Implementing Accord

LD1806221396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2134 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 18 Jun (SRNA)—Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic said this evening that the Serb Republic will not accept any additional pressure in the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

In an interview with Serb [Pale] TV, Klickovic said: "Any attempt to impose a solution bypassing the Dayton agreement will mean the suspension of its implementation. We will implement what has been agreed, but additional proposals are out of the question."

Klickovic and Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha, who also took part in the program, agreed that

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the Serb Republic government should adopt a platform for further talks at its next session. Both of them said that the Florence conference had restored the Serb negotiators' self-confidence.

Buha explained: "In line with the Dayton agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a decentralized creation." Regardless of the fact that some Sarajevo bodies and institutions are trying to represent an undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina, "their attempts to preserve an undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina are futile," Minister Buha stressed.

Minister Buha recalled that the Dayton agreement clearly defines which sectors [as received] are autonomous and which are not, and reiterated that this is how it should stay. "Although some find it difficult to utter the name of the Serb Republic, it made its first autonomous and accepted appearance on 23 March in Moscow, and triumphed at the ministerial conference in Florence," Minister Buha added.

Commenting on the disarmament agreement, the Bosnian Serb foreign minister recalled that it has brought about a new configuration of forces on the ground—2:1 to the advantage of the Muslim-Croat federation; he explained, however, that "for the Serb Republic, this is nevertheless not unfavorable because it is very likely that the Croats and Muslims will not have a joint army."

Commenting on the behavior of the international community, the Bosnian Serb foreign minister said that "it recognizes all its mistakes after the event." Professor Buha explained, "The international community now recognizes that the Croats and Muslims were receiving weapons during the embargo. They now also recognize that the Muslims committed crimes against their own people in Markale and Vase Miskina Street [both in Sarajevo]." He added: "If there were any justice someone ought to be held responsible for everything which has so far been hushed up." [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Leaders, UN Envoy Discuss Florence Conference

LD1806115996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 Jun (SRNA)—Gojko Klickovic, the prime minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksa Buha had talks in Pale today with Geoffrey Beaumont, the head of the Pale liaison office of the UN secretary general's envoy Iqbal Riza. The talks centered on the results of the Florence conference and the reconstruction of the Serb Republic.

After the meeting, Minister Buha stressed the need to outline forthcoming tasks and identify difficulties in preparations for the forthcoming elections in the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation [Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina].

Speaking on the possible postponement of the elections in the Croat-Muslim federation, Minister Buha expressed hope that the international community would respect the Serb Republic's intention to hold elections, irrespective of the developments in the federation.

"As far as we are concerned, we will go to the polls in September, more precisely on the date set by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] representative," Buha said.

Expressing dissatisfaction by the treatment the international community has so far accorded to the Serb Republic concerning reconstruction, Buha said that "if this situation continues, the Serb Repubic will have to switch to bilateral arrangements with other states and to activate its own powers."

Beaumont said today's talks were "good" and added that he would have similar meetings with most ministers of the Serb Republic government.

B-H: SGV Demands 'Urgent' Steps To Protect Sarajevo Serbs

LD1806171596 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1615 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 Jun (BH PRESS)—The Serb Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina has demanded that leaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation—Kresimir Zubak and Dr. Ejup Ganic—Avdo Hebib, minister of internal affairs of the federation, and members of international organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina take urgent measures to ensure the safety of the remaining Serbs and their property in reintegrated areas of Sarajevo.

According to the SGV, over the past month in these areas the number of Serbs who have been beaten up has risen to 25. Over 150 Serbs have reported cases of intimidation, from throwing bombs, shooting at houses, and smashing windows, to threats of murder and such. Among other things, four Orthodox cemeteries have been desecrated and three religious buildings plundered. Thirty-seven families have been thrown out of their homes and apartments.

Representatives of the authorities at various levels have been informed about these incidents, and the public as a whole has been informed about them via the independent media.

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However, the situation has not calmed down, the SGV concludes, and it cites an incident which took place on 13 June in Ilijas, which led to 22 people having to leave one local community in the last week.

We demand that, without delay, you take measures within your competence in order to ensure that the remaining Serb population and its property are safe. We believe that the preservation of the safety of Serbs and their property in the reintegrated parts of Sarajevo is a precondition for the safeguarding of human rights and the city's multiethnic structure, the SGV of Bosnia-Herzegovina says, among other things, in its demand.

B-H: Serbs Reduce Assembly Size, Establish War Crimes Court

LD1906123496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1140 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 19 Jun (SRNA)—Deputies of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, attending the assembly's 56th session in Pale today, have unanimously adopted Amendment 54 to the Constitution of the Serb Republic defining the number of deputies in the assembly. According to this amendment, the assembly will consist of 82 deputies.

The reduction in the number of deputies—according to previous Amendment 36, the assembly consisted of 140 deputies—is being carried out so as to create favorable conditions for the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

The number of deputies will be definitely determined by the constitution of the Serb Republic following the [forthcoming] elections in the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation.

A law on a special war crimes court was adopted with only two votes against and one abstention, while the government was tasked with carrying out all preparations for making the court operational by 24 June. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serbs To Base War Crimes Court in 'Serb Sarajevo'

AU1906123696 Paris AFP in English 1230 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 19 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serb parliament voted Wednesday to establish a war crimes court to try Bosnian Serbs indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and military commander General Ratko Mladic have both been indicted on war crimes charges by the UN tribunal which is based in The Hague.

The parliament was meeting in Pale, the stronghold of the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic]—the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina—to discuss implementation of the Dayton peace accords.

According to the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency, neither Karadzic nor Mladic were at the parliament session, but vice presidents Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic were there along with Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic. [passage omitted]

According to a draft given to deputies, the court would work along the lines of the tribunal in The Hague, and UN prosecutors would be able to present their cases in it. The court would be based in Serb Sarajevo, the name given by Bosnian Serbs to those districts in the Sarajevo region which still belong to the Republika Srpska, including Pale.

Karadzic is reported to have taken a back seat role in public life. Under the Dayton accords, anyone indicted by the UN tribunal is not allowed to hold public office. However, despite the presence in Bosnia of some 60,000 NATO-led peacekeeping troops, neither he nor Mladic has been apprehended.

B-H: RS Parliament Adopts Laws on Amnesty, Local Authorities

LD1906131496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1108 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Jun (SRNA)—At its session in Pale today the People's Assembly of the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS] adopted the law on amnesty and the law providing for amendments to the law on territorial organization and local authorities.

With no objections deputies adopted the amnesty law under which "criminal proceedings are being terminated and total or partial acquittal is recommended for persons who, in the period between 1 January 1991 and 14 December 1995, committed any criminal act against the social system of the RS."

This includes spreading rumors and illegal possession of arms and explosive material in line with Article 203 and 213 of the Penal Code of the RS—separate section. The law does not cover persons who have committed murder or other acts of serious crime.

The draft law on amendments to the law on territorial organization and local authorities was adopted after a lengthy debate. Under this law there are 64 municipalities in the RS. The following municipalities are being dissolved: Bihac, Vogosca, Glamoc, Gradacac,

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Bosansko Grahovo, Zavidovici, Ilijas, Konjic, Lukavac, Maglaj, Olovo, Rajlovac, Srebrenik, Srbobran [Donji Vakuf], Tuzla, Hadzici, and Central Sarajevo [all in the Croat-Muslim federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina].

Deputy Justice Minister Dragan Podinic suggested that the municipalities be set up before the elections and that a more comprehensive law on territorial organization and local authorities could be worked out later.

Up until now, the demarcation of the area of a municipality was the responsibility of the RS government. From now on, it will be done on the basis of the law and much confusion about the dissolved and newly created municipalities will be resolved in this way.

The assembly also adopted amendments to the RS Constitution.

A debate is going on with the political structures of Drvar municipality on its reincorporation into the RS. The authorities in Drvar have urged the government in negotiations with representatives of the Croat-Muslim federation to try and secure the return of some parts of the municipality to the RS.

This municipality is the center of the region, is of strategic importance, and has exceptionally favorable conditions for long-term economic and social development.

B-H: Serb Freed by Hague Tribunal Requests 'Compensation'

AU1906060796 Paris AFP in English 0428 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, June 19 (AFP)—A Bosnian Serb freed by the international war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia after being mistakenly held for three months on charges of murder and torture said he deserved compensation for his ordeal. Goran Lajic, speaking after his return Tuesday to his home at Neukirchen in southern Germany, said he had been detained for 90 days though completely innocent. His wife, left with their two children, had been led to believe that her husband was suspected of being a war criminal.

Speaking in a telephone interview, Lajic, 28, blamed the German authorities who arrested him on March 18 at Amberg, near Nuremberg, for doing nothing to check his story. He also complained that no one apart from a secretary at the international tribunal in The Hague had apologised for the mistake. "After I was officially declared innocent I was still taken back to my cell in handcuffs," he said.

But Lajic said the conditions of his detention in the United Nations prison at Scheveningen were satisfactory.

German authorities said that the mistake was due to the international tribunal, which had issued the warrant bearing Lajic's name and his date of birth.

Lajic, a refugee from Bosnia who arrived in Germany in March 1994, told the tribunal Monday that he had known for several months that another man with the same name was wanted as a suspected war criminal but said: "I was not worried because I knew I was innocent."

The indictment, drawn up on July 21 last year by chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone, charged Lajic with crimes against humanity, serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and breaches of the customary rules of war. He was alleged to have tortured, beaten and killed Bosnian Moslems and Bosnian Croats in the Keraterm prisoner of war camp in north-west Bosnia between May 1992 and August of that year. The charge sheet, citing four eye witnesses, also said that he was "directly involved in the murder of five prisoners."

The presiding French judge, Claude Jorda, said he hoped "this unfortunate error will be a lesson to the judges and more particularly to the prosecution." The judge said he was "concerned about the situation arising from this regrettable arrest" adding that he hoped it would have no adverse affect on Lajic's "administrative status in Germany."

Lajic, a deserter from the Bosnian Serb army, said Tuesday he did not know if he would return to his home in Banja Luka in the Serb-controlled part of Bosnia.

B-H: Commentary Criticizes Hague Tribunal Proceedings

LD1806213196 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Station commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is still uncertain if dropping charges against Goran Lajic [Bosnian Serb suspect freed by the Hague tribunal after it admitted a case of mistaken identity] has produced the final judicial epilogue to this completely stage-managed case. Lajic's defense team has announced it will seek compensation because the innocent man spent more than a month in prison and experienced various forms of torture and humiliation. It is also uncertain if the Hague tribunal will undergo some changes in the wake of experiencing this latest disgrace called the Lajic case.

One thing is for sure: the Goran Lajic case is yet further proof that the Hague tribunal does not have justice at heart, which should be the raison d'etre of every court—it is driven by political interests. This case definitively strengthens every normal person's conviction that the Hague tribunal was set up for the Serbs. Here is why:

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Let us just recall the media campaign waged throughout the war against the Serb people—it was driven by political interests. But, as the old saying goes—the liar is caught sooner than the cripple. The truth about the Serb people, as is the case with the truth about the Markale [Sarajevo massacre] case, is emerging. In order to save those who produced such lies on their own, or with foreign support, from being completely compromised, it was necessary to set up a permanent institution. There was a need to fashion a veneer of justice, to tie it into the much vaunted image of Western democracy and create an impression that everything is as it ought to be.

It is easy to try the Serbs, who have been pronounced guilty in advance, and everything will be all right.

We would somehow find ourselves convinced that the set up and existence of the Hague tribunal was not exclusively driven by political interests if it were not the first such tribunal set up after World War II. Between that time and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, there were 130 other wars in the world, but a war crimes tribunal was not set up for any other war, although some of them were more tragic and destructive.

Despite this fact, one could perhaps have continued to believe that this was not a political tribunal. Despite the fact that three sides participated in the civil war, of those indicted the Serbs were certainly not the most to blame.

We are convinced that everyone in the world knows full well why and how the civil war broke out. We believe that everyone is aware of the bestial and brutal attacks on the former Yugoslav People's Army columns in Tuzla, Sarajevo, Split, Zagreb, Karlovac, Novo Mesto, and many other places. These were bandit-style attacks on the regular army of an internationally recognized state, but no one is mentioning any indictment of those who committed these crimes.

In the face of all these facts, we do not have a single reason to believe that the founding of the Hague tribunal was not politically motivated. Nor is there any reason to believe that this is a legal institution. On the contrary, all the facts indicate that this is an instrument to exert political pressure on one people.

If it were able, the Hague tribunal would like best of all to put every Serb on trail. In view of the fact that this is impracticable, it has turned its attention to their leaders, knowing that a sentence against them would be a political sentence on the whole Serb people.

The Hague tribunal would be satisfied if it could sentence Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and Colonel General Ratko Mladic, the commander of its army. But as the French communist, intellectual and essayist (?Eve Baudet) said recently, the descendants of Al Capone cannot teach Radovan Karadzic anything about honesty. And we add: they cannot teach Ratko Mladic or a single Serb anything about this either.

This country, the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, has its own courts and Serbs cannot be tried according to the law of the Hague tribunal which says that might is right. Those who are trying to sentence them should themselves be on trail.

B-H: RS Government Denies Introduction of Visas for Yugoslavs

LD1806183696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1757 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 Jun (SRNA)—This evening, the Serb Republic [RS] Foreign Ministry issued a categorial denial of a report from Podgorica, according to which all citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] who want to visit the RS will have to seek a permit from its office in the Montenegrin capital.

"Such a decision can be adopted only by the RS government. The government has never discussed it and it is certain that such a decision will never be adopted in the case of citizens of the FRY," the RS government confirmed to SRNA.

According to the government, this case will be investigated urgently and measures will be taken against those responsible for the harm caused by this type of disinformation.

B-H: Serb Commentary Rejects 'Reconciliation'

AU1806103396 Pale JAVNOST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 96 pp 8-9

[Commentary by Branislav Ribar: "Forcing the Scolded People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina will never again exist in the form defined after World War II, which was known by the three "neither-nor" conjunctions (neither Muslim, nor Croatian, nor Serbian, but also....). And it should not exist as such. At least as far as the Serbs are concerned.

If we want to be honest, neither the Croats nor the Muslims want the reestablishment of the "old" Bosnia-Herzegovina. If this were not true, the "premature baby" born in Washington—the Muslim-Croat federation—would not still be in the incubator of the so-called international community.

The reconstruction or the reanimation of the prewar Bosnia-Herzegovina—if such an "intervention" were

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possible, which only the UN diplomats in charge of the fragile Bosnian peace believe in, in line with their duty—the same seed of evil would be planted from which the war developed 43 months ago, taking away young people's lives.

(Denial of) Life

And the children in kindergarten now, in the last decade of the 20th century, would have to take weapons as soon as they came of age, in their best years.

Therefore, the best thing the generation that has achieved the national liberation can do in order to have a better and a more peaceful future is to reject the so-called coexistence with the foreign enemy within one state.

Problems that have accumulated for decades, or centuries perhaps, cannot be solved with the establishment of confidence between the nations of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the arrogant international "peacemakers" stubbornly insist on, since the mistrust developed as a consequence of the joint life.

It is senseless to impose the logic of "let bygones be bygones" on the tens of thousands of mothers and fathers who lost their sons or on the martyrs who—through their willpower and energy and God's providence—endured over 1,000 days of hell in the notorious places of torture like the "Silos" in Tarcin, "Lora" in Split, or the "Viktor Bubanj" Barracks in Sarajevo. It cannot be imposed on the people who were on the assassination lists that were drawn up at a time when nobody thought that it would come to war....

It was, therefore, unrealistic—or, euphemistically speaking, naive—when a journalist who reported on the return of a group of Muslim refugees to their homes and the graves of their family members wrote for a Belgrade paper: "Former neighbors gained confidence first and then they went to visit their houses." (?!)

There are no protection mechanisms by which the United Nations and its military executive "body," NATO, both under strong U.S. influence, could guarantee a minimum of human and civil freedom for everybody in multinational areas. After all, around 40,000 Serb families did not flee Serb Sarajevo, leaving their priceless treasures behind, on a whim.

Instructors

They were not forced to leave by Radovan Karadzic, which he was accused of by Mr. Bildt, Mr. Steiner, and Mr. Smith (and if he had forced them, then this would not be a sin!); it was the arrogant and empty rhetoric, full of infantile promises. These gentlemen appreciate their story about the reality more that the reality they are talking about. They cannot be objective and neutral protagonists of the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as they are receiving instructions on their political behavior from the White House.

If we do not count [Serb Civic Council President Mirko] Pejanovic's rabble, no more than 2 to 3 percent of the Serb population has remained in Sarajevo. All of a sudden, they have become a national minority in their own city, in the worst possible meaning of that word. They are exposed—as the temporary president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carl Bildt should know—to all kinds of maltreatment, threats, harassment, dismissal from their jobs.... Their cemeteries are being devastated, as happened in Vogosca on two occasions recently, their churches are being demolished (Ilijas), they are arrested and taken to prisons....

The United Nations and NATO employees in charge of the protection of peace are not capable of protecting this small number of Serbs, so we must ask ourselves how they would have protected the 150,000 of them who they tried to convince to stay in their houses and apartments last winter.

The "democratic" world, regardless of how malicious and evil it might be, has respected and accepted the fact that the Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina have achieved their national liberation and, for the first time, obtained their state in the areas in which they have lived west of the Drina River. Their calculations in the war business are, however, spoiled by the incorruptible and honorable Serbian leaders, Mr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, and by everybody else who, in the new language of diplomacy, is characterized as "a Serbian hardliner."

There are threats that they will be arrested and brought to the Hague Tribunal, which is a nonsense that is inappropriate even for clowns in circus tents. President Karadzic and Gen. Mladic are the personification of the national liberation, people who are highly estimated and trusted by their people.

What is the basis and for what crimes have they been declared criminals of war by the architects of the new world order? Is it because they have drawn the attention of their people to the threatening Ustashas' and Mujahedins' daggers?!

"Prosecutors"

To what extent the Hague Tribunal is an unreliable institution without any authority in the judicial sense can be seen from the fact that their "clientele" are looked for by cunning people, some of whom are proven

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criminals of war (not suspects!) like Izetbegovic, Ganic, Tudjman.... The way things are in that institution can be seen from the statement, which should not have been made by a law student, let alone by Antonio Cassese, the Hague Tribunal president, who stated several days ago: "I expect that Karadzic and Mladic will come to the Hague Tribunal voluntarily. This would be good for them, since they will be able to deny the accusations, and we shall organize a fair trial."

Blackmailing the Serb Republic and insisting on the arrest of its political military leaders—which is being predominantly required by Carl Bildt—is not a coincidence, but a matter of interest,and it has exceeded all bounds. The Swedish diplomat, the first uncrowned Swedish king on the Bosnian throne, has not received a mandate from the international community (at least not officially, that is by the Dayton agreement, the implementation of which he is in charge of) to "catch" war criminals around the Serb Republic. Nor has he been ordered to do so by Alija Izetbegovic or Bill Clinton. He has been ordered to take care of the peace in the still very fragile Balkan region.

Carl Bildt, as a fervent supporter of democracy (in words only), does not allow, in agreement with his employers, a referendum to be held on the Serb Republic leadership, since he assumes that the result would show convincingly in whom the people in the youngest Serbian state place their full confidence.

We learned about his attitude toward the referendum—which is the most direct form of democracy, in which people decide on important issues—in December 1995 when he ignored the results of a referendum in which the inhabitants of the Serb part of Sarajevo refused to enter the Muslim-Croat federation.

The Serbs probably made more compromises to their own disadvantage than was necessary. Their leadership showed a level of cooperativeness that, together with the NATO aggression, led to the loss of several ethnically clean Serbian regions (Grahovo, Drvar, Glamoc, Petrovac, Sanski Most...) and, in the end, also to the loss of the Serb part of Sarajevo.

The international "guards of peace" and their proteges in the Muslim-Croat federation would like to deal with some "softer Serbs" (pro-Bosnian)—like Rajko Kasagic, a man incapable of high-level politics and diplomacy—in order to seize from them what they succeeded in retaining by the Dayton agreement, which can be described as the impudent robbery of their national entity and their leadership.

If democracy is really the core, the way of life, and the main election principle that the international community under the U.S. influence is guided by, then it is incomprehensible that it is interfering with the creation of the electoral system in another state. This is a violation of the principles of democracy. The Serbian people is politically mature enough. It has a political tradition that is 500-years longer than that of the United States, so it is able to appoint its candidates and elect its leaders.

Since they have felt that "democratic" winds from the West blow into their green Bosnian sails, the war criminals Izetbegovic and Ganic have taken courage and are also sending threatening and blackmailing messages to the so-called international community. Izetbegovic: "Objective elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are impossible and any kind of democratization of the Serb entity is impossible if Radovan Karadzic is still a free man. We expect President Milosevic and IFOR to find a way to take Mr. Karadzic to The Hague." Ganic: "We shall boycott the elections unless the election rules are changed and Karadzic and Mladic end up in The Hague."

The Anathema

In the meantime, angry voices are coming from the other side of the Atlantic, because the chief of staff of the Serb Republic Army went to the funeral of Gen. Djordje Djukic in Belgrade. Gen. Djukic was the first innocent victim of the shameless officers from The Hague and their political principals from the center of the international political power. (It was a premeditated crime to arrest a man only a day after he had a complicated operation when on his way to negotiations with the Croatian-Muslim federation and international mediators and to put him in a prison cell, even if it resembled an apartment).

They disapprove of the freedom of movement of the commander of the Serb Republic Army while members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are trained in Ankara, in spite of the criticism expressed by western European countries. (What is more, Clinton invited Malaysia to participate in that "peacemaking act," the results of which he is obviously convinced of!)

The powerful international community, under the influence of the United States and its military wing, NATO, might succeed in removing Mr. Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic from the public life of the Serb Republic, which is a very risky move regarding the retention of the peace, but no one will be able to force the Serbs west of the Drina River to live according to the slogans of the "Islamic Declaration" [by Alija Izetbegovic]. (Mr. Bildt and his numerous supervisors should read that pamphlet).

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There is no such "soft Serb" who would have the courage to depreciate the spilled blood of the Serb youngsters. Their graves and the women wearing mourning clothes would curse them for ever. This is the political platform for all future agreements with both the Muslims, the Croats, and the international peace mediators.

The "Disneylandish and Panic-like" [reference to former Yugoslav President Milan Panic] logic of reconciliation ("Peace, peace, since no one is to blame!") simply cannot bear fruit in the Serb Republic. Even if the Orthodox religion forces and obliges us to forgive, which is almost masochistic, we cannot, even if we wanted to; and we must not forget the crimes committed by our "brothers" of yesterday.

B-H: Karadzic's Position, Prospects for Democracy Viewed

AU1806173396 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jun 96 pp 16-17

[Commentary by Stojan Cerovic: "Coincidental Opponents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The operation of dismantling Radovan Karadzic is on. After Dayton he had become silent, concealed himself, and would perhaps have been on the way to being forgotten or at least left until the very end. Then surprisingly he went to meet his destiny. He attracted attention to himself by replacing prime minister Rajko Kasagic, who had come too close to Carl Bildt and threatened to really fulfill some of Slobodan Milosevic's promises, and now all the world's decisionmakers are asking for Karadzic to disappear immediately.

Since it is considered that the problem is too delicate for American and NATO soldiers, all eyes are upon Milosevic, who is hesitating, but no one believes that this matter is also too delicate for him. For he has proven many times that complexity and sensitivity in a problem urges him merely to draw out his stick. Moreover, foreigners, neither talented nor informed on the local technology, are telling Milosevic that they consider him most skilled to dismantle Karadzic, since it was he who put him together. They are reminding him, if it means anything to him, of what he committed himself to in Dayton.

The fact that Karadzic announced that he would retire into the background immediately after Kasagic's replacement, as it seems, ended up being not sufficient. Everyone saw him, and the story of him still pulling all the strings was widely heard. It previously seemed that he could formally remain the president of the Serb Republic until the elections. As president he would publicly not do much, no matter what he did in the background, but now he is being asked to formally withdraw. Carl Bildt is complaining that that Karadzic is damaging his work, which is anyway tough, of shifting into a civil situation and of preparing the elections, and because he is also ruining U.S. President Clinton's story of a great foreign political success, also just before the elections. Milosevic is therefore expected to contribute to Clinton's victory by at least creating the illusion that matters in Bosnia-Herzegovina are stabilizing and going according to plan.

The word "illusion" is very important. The fact that Belgrade and Pale are even promising and offering that nothing will be heard of Karadzic only shows that everyone has understood the rules of the game. It is not totally clear at the moment whether Karadzic will nevertheless be forced to hand in his resignation or not, and this is not the most important matter. He will certainly seem to disappear, and anyone who has heard anything about [Serb Republic Vice President] Biljana Plavsic knows what will be gained by this.

It seems as if the entire problem came up because of Carl Bildt, the only person in this story who is dealing with something real and is faced with real obstacles. If he had not persistently tried, through Kasagic, to convince the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs to cooperate, then Karadzic would not have been forced to show himself and to spoil the created illusion that everything is going well. That is why now Pale, Belgrade, and Washington must work on the creation of a new illusion, and it is certainly possible that someone will, by the way, tell Bildt not to take his work too seriously. They say that this is the time of artificial reality, so let him also try to look at the ruins of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the same way.

The problem lies, however, in the fact that the same laws apply to artificial reality, in the world of illusions, as well as to the old, real world. Symbolic successes are reached in the same way and with the same difficulties as real ones, and even the defeats are paid for in the same way. That is why new diplomatic efforts are needed, and that is why Milosevic will now ask for new illusory support from the world in order to carry out the task of the illusory removal of Radovan Karadzic.

The entire operation, whose result will certainly soon be known, is not at all easy and painless neither for Karadzic nor Milosevic. They both know best how incorrect and unjust it is that that the world makes such a great difference between them, and why one is being treated as a war criminal, and the other as a factor of peace and stability. Their dialogue, either direct or through go-betweens, must be free of everything human

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under the influence of this artificial difference that was made on the outside. Because of this, Milosevic will have to pretend that he has the right to demand that Karadzic withdraw, and the latter has to listen and swallow every swearword that may come to mind at that moment.

Fortunately, the two of them know each other well, and they have had many opportunities to see what they can expect from each other. That they have found themselves in a humiliating situation is natural for them and they well deserve it, but in this case, regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Dayton agreement, the great powers America and Europe also look foolish and defeated.

I am beginning to understand some of the reasons of those careful Western strategists who had been against interfering in local conflicts and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. It is not us, or the fact that we did not deserve any external intervention and arbitration. On the contrary. The problem is that the West has gone a long way in an entirely different direction so that, without much misfortune, it is simply not in a position to deal with such a situation. They had, and still have, great difficulty in understanding anything of what is going on, in creating a fitting conceptual apparatus, and in accepting this kind of a war as real.

In order to achieve this, to really believe the news from Bosnia-Herzegovina, they had to break down their entire picture of the world and themselves. It is not here that they moved far off, despite television, press, and all kinds of proof that that kind of violence is really taking place. To them, this case remained to a certain extent impossible, illogical, and unforeseen by the narrow, fictive repertoire of human behavior, with which one lives in peaceful, well-structured countries.

Because of this, and in accordance with this, the reactions of the diplomats and politicians had been ill-fitting and slow. Even when they sent such a large army it was because they had secured a cease-fire, and under the condition that there is no more violence. Just as it is important to show force, it is even more important that force is not used, that is, that it does not appear in reality itself. The West is stubbornly continuing to work indirectly and symbolically: with pressure, sanctions, promises. This has not been without educational effects, but some matters nevertheless need to really be dealt with.

If it cannot be expected from the war criminals to run to The Hague, if NATO does not want to arrest Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, then nothing remains but to ask Milosevic to somehow take care of this. In return, he unavoidably becomes the only, unchangeable, partner on the Serb side, just like Tudjman has become on the Croat side. Therefore, in order to solve the war crisis which they even mainly created, and that an order which accords with Western tastes is established, the democratic countries will help them to support their families in Belgrade and Zagreb.

This can also be said in the following way: The democratic countries are asking tyrants to produce a democratic result.

Moreover, at least in the Karadzic issue, it is a question of a person who would, most probably, win at the next elections among the Serbs, and the democratic countries are thus forced to in fact limit a democratic election in order to achieve a democratic result. This paradox is, in one way or another, valid for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The real democratic powers cannot attain authority in a democratic way. The freer the elections are, the smaller the chance for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If there is no readiness to postpone the elections until the people take a rest and pull themselves together, it would be best for the IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers to count the votes and for the results to be all nicely planned in advance, just like at the end of that war.

B-H: Serb Parties Register for Sep Elections

LD1806142696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1105 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 18 Jun (TANJUG)—Following the registration deadline for the September elections in the Bosnian Serb Republic, the only certain outcome is that the parties will contest the elections as part of three blocs: the left, right, and center. It is still to be seen what kind of coalitions the 18 parties that have been registered will be prepared to enter.

If the situation remains as it is now, the left bloc will comprise: The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic (leader Zivko Radisic) [Socijalisticka partija]; the Party of Independent Social Democrats (Milorad Dodik) [Stranka nezavisnish socijal-demokrata]; the Yugoslav Left (Mile Ivosevic) [Jugoslovenska ljevica]; the New Workers' Party (Vinko Djuragic) [Nova Radnicka Partija]; and the Private Initiative Party (the name of the president not known) [Stranka privatne inicijative].

The Democratic Patriotic Bloc [Demokratski patriotski blok] of Predrag Radic, as a center party, will comprise: the Democratic Center Party of Trebinje (Dragomir Grubac) [Stranka demokratskog centra]; the Peasant-Workers' Party of Kozarska Dubica (Mile Lovric) [Seljacko-radnicka stranka]; the Nikola Pasic

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People's Radical Party of Banja Luka (Dubravko Prstojevic) [Narodna radikalna stranka "Nikola Pasic"]; the Democratic Party of Bijeljina (Dragomir Dumic) [Demokratska Stranka]; and the Motherland Party of Prijedor (Milorad Milakovic) [Otadzbinska stranka].

The Serb Democratic Party [SDS] of Radovan Karadzic (whose registration document for elections in Sokolac was signed by Vice President Djojo Arsenovic) for the time being has no coalition partners. The Serb Radical Party (Nikola Poplasen) [Srpska radikalna stranka); the Nikola Pasic Radical Motherland Front (Bozidar Bojanic) [Radikalni otadzbinski front "Nikola Pasic"], and the People's Party of the Serb Republic (Radoslav Brdjanin) [Narodna stranka] are in the same position.

The following parties are yet to find coalition partners: The Serb Patriotic Party (Slavko Zupljanin) [Srpska patriotska stranka]; the Serb Peasant Party (Gordana Vidovic) [Srpska seljacka stranka]; the Serb Party of Krajina (Predrag Lazarevic) [Srpska stranka Krajine]; and the Party of Serb Unity (Radomir Peric) [Stranka srpskog jedinstva].

It can, however, be said with certainty that all these parties are yet to reveal their cards and that the current state of affairs will have changed by September.

The following parties have registered for local elections only: The Workers' Party of the Serb Republic (Zdravko Doslic-Tergaz) [Radnicka partija]; the Socialist Workers' Party (Radovan Bijelic) [Socijalisticka radnicka partija]; the Croatian Democratic Union (Ivica Juric) [Hrvatska demokratska zajednica]; the Party of Social Progress (Obrad Milidrag) [Stranka drustvenog progresa]; as well as two independent candidates: Momcilo Glamocic of Knezevo (former Skender Vakuf) and Aleksa Njezic of Gradiska.

All registration documents must be verified by the Sarajevo-based OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] interim electoral commission by 21 June. There will be a period of three days for complaints and the final list of names should be announced on 27 June.

Voters in the Serb Republic will be electing the president of the Serb Republic, the People's Assembly deputies, municipal councillors and a member of the joint presidency of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat [Bosnia-Herzegovina] federation.

Voters in the Muslim-Croat federation will elect two members of the presidency (one Muslim, one Croat), deputies to the federal and cantonal assemblies and municipal councillors.

It is clear now that the main contenders in the Serb Republic will be the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic and the SDS. It is, however, important for the Serbs across the Drina [in Bosnia] that both parties advocate peace, consistency in implementing the Dayton agreement, and the preservation of the Serb Republic.

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Croatia: Tudjman, Granic, Susak Leave on Visit to Turkey

AU1906082396 Paris AFP in English 0816 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 19 (AFP)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman left Wednesday for a visit to Ankara, during which he is expected to meet Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, the Croatian news agency HINA reported.

Tudjman was accompanied by Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Defence Minister Gojko Susak.

Susak and his Turkish counterpart Oltan Sungurlu are expected to sign a military cooperation agreement during the visit.

After the disintegration of the old Yugoslav federation, Turkey signed similar agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

During the two-day visit, other agreements on culture, technology and tourism are expected to be signed, Hina said.

On Monday and Tuesday, the Turkish president was in Bosnia-Herzegovina where he expressed support for the Moslem-Croat Federation—one of the two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina—and said that "conditions must be created that the Bosnian and Croat military power be stronger."

Croatia: Tudjman Interviewed Before Visit to Turkey

TA1806143296 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1300 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by Seref Yigit in Zagreb; date not given, recorded—Tudjman's remarks in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed translation into Turkish]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yigit] Mr. President, the Turkish public considers you as the guarantor of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation. How do you view the future of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation?

[Tudjman] I am hopeful for the future of the federation, which I think will be favorable for both the Bosnian and the Croatian peoples. In addition, this federation, which the whole world wants to take effect, carries great significance in terms of peace in the region and the world. Croatia will do everything it can for the Bosnian-Croatian federation to become operational.

[Yigit] What are your views on Turkish-Croatian relations?

[Tudjman] The bilateral relations between Turkey and Croatia played a very important role in resolving the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, which was one of the world's most complicated issues. I think that these relations should be furthered along this line for the benefit of the two countries.

[Yigit] Mr. President, what is the role of Turkey in the region?

[Tudjman] Turkey is the most important country of the southern wing of NATO. For this reason, Turkey has a very important geopolitical position. This is also true in terms of the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Turkish-Croatian relations are important with regard to their being two border countries in the Balkans. The relations between the two countries carry great importance in terms of putting an end to the crisis in the region and securing peace.

[Yigit] Do you have a message for the Turkish people prior to your visit to Turkey?

[Tudjman] Turkey has constituted an important bridge between the Islamic world and Europe since Ataturk. All the presidents made significant contributions along those lines. I hope that Turkey will pursue its positive policies and continue serving as a bridge. I sincerely hope that Turkey will resolve its issues favorably and continue assuming its role as a leader in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Croatia: Military Cooperation Accord Signed With Bulgaria

LD1806132496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gojko Susak and Dimitur Pavlov, the ministers of defense of Croatia and Bulgaria, signed today in Zagreb a bilateral agreement on military cooperation between the two countries. Majda Ivkovic reports:

[Ivkovic] The preparation of the agreement on military cooperation at the level of Ministries of Defense lasted several years and reflects both countries' interests. It also represents sound foundations for the development of security in this area of Europe. Ministers Susak and Pavlov said in a short statement made after the signing of the agreement.

Croatia is very interested in the exchange of goods with Bulgaria, Minister Susak said, announcing the visits of experts' teams to Sofia and departure of Croatian officers to military academies in Bulgaria.

Bulgarian Minister Pavlov said that the signed agreement on military cooperation would also represent

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sound foundations for cooperation between the two countries in other fields. More intensive military cooperation, including joint military exercises, will be possible when Croatia soon joins the Partnership for Peace, Minister Susak said concluding the official part of the meeting. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Commentary Rejects EU Call To Join Balkan 'Ghetto'

AU1906121796 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jun 96 p 9

[Unattributed commentary from the "Underlined" column: "Illusions About the Balkan Ghetto"]

[FBIS Translated Text] European diplomacy has changed nothing in its opinion on the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, apart from wanting to include Albania and exclude Slovenia. Postponement has become the constant in the position of the European Fifteen when talking about relations between Europe and the newly independent states, that is, states with centuries-old traditions. Namely, the full report by the president of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, who together with Lamberto Dini, the Italian foreign minister, recently visited Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia, has recently been made public. Santer's conclusion was noteworthy, in that he was dissatisfied by his visit to Zagreb and impressed with his visit to Belgrade, in which he found out that the most important thing for Milosevic was a regional approach, and that his primary care was to stimulate the flow of traffic in the region, in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and that he wished to test it in practice.

There is not a word, however, about the most important fact, and that is that the war on that territory has not been brought to its end. Obviously the Croatian stand on the need for openness toward Europe throughout the entire region is forgotten and ignored in Brussels. Europe is once again trying to push the old recognizable recipe for closing down the region, and creating a regional autarchy in which members would be mutually oriented toward each other.

By such thinking, by applying pressure and obstructions, Brussels has been constantly trying to persuade Croatia to agree to some form of Balkan regional ghetto.

It is as though the gentlemen from Brussels have forgotten the reality created by Serbian and Montenegrin aggression. For the peoples, the victims in this region, primarily the Croats, Muslims, and Bosniaks, there is the open question of the responsibility of the Serbian and Montenegrin leadership for causing the regional crisis. In his imperative call for unconditional regional association, Mr. Santer completely neglects and utterly erases the problem of responsibility for aggression and its consequences.

As long as the consequences of that aggression last, and not the small consequences but the big ones, and as long as the protagonists of the aggression are being supported, the regional approach, that is, regional association, is a pure illusion.

It seems that the gentlemen from Brussels continue to stick their heads in the sand because in the ears of every Croatian, Muslim, or Bosniak man who has survived aggression and suffered its devastating consequences—both moral and material—a call to a regional association with Serbia and Montenegro as a precondition for joining Europe sounds utterly cynical.

Croatia: Commentary on Milosevic's Changed Rhetoric, Policy

AU1806164996 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun p 1

[Commentary by Marko Barisic: "Why Milosevic Favors Normalization of Relations With Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The German DER SPIEGEL weekly has published what is almost a policy interview with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. In addition to trying to present himself as a peacemaker and a devotee of the Dayton agreements, as expected, he made a number of statements that might be interpreted as an attempt to create a new political policy for Belgrade on the region to the west of the Drina and Danube.

If our memory serves us, this is the first time that Milosevic has ever said the following: "The process of normalization of relations between the FRY and the Republic of Croatia is also important for the stabilization of the situation in the region. It would definitely remove the danger of conflict between Serbs and Croats." As we can see, according to Milosevic, the war is over, and there can only be a conflict—he chose his words very carefully—between Serbs and Croats. Where? In Bosnia-Herzegovina, naturally. It is exactly because of the solving of the Bosnian crisis that he has become a supporter of normalization of relations with Zagreb (mentioning neither eastern Slavonia nor Prevlaka).

However, his recipe is bound to cause additional worries in Sarajevo. We quote: "Neither the Serbs nor the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina can turn a deaf ear to the categorical views of Belgrade and Zagreb. Besides, Belgrade and Zagreb are the best guarantors that nobody attacks the Muslims. There is just the possibility of Muslims fighting Muslims, which I do not think is likely, or for the Muslims to wage war alone on the

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Croats and Serbs, which would be a suicidal move." The Serbian president apparently did not hesitate to send a clear message to Izetbegovic that the Bosnian war and political crisis are not a matter for the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats alone, but a problem that Serbia and Croatia will also participate in solving. And if the two states "normalize their relations" or make a deal, as Milosevic did not hesitate to suggest, the position of the Muslim side will be much more difficult. So difficult that, according to the Serbian president, they can only accept the status quo. If they choose to fight either the Serbs or the Croats, Milosevic predicts their "suicide," their disappearance as a political factor.

Milosevic's answer to the question about the return of Serb refugees to the "Croatian Krajina" also has to be placed in this Bosnian context. "We expect and hope for a positive solution," the Serbian president stated mildly, and added: "Full normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia would undoubtedly open the door for the Serb refugees to return."

The obvious change in his rhetoric is that he has turned toward Bosnia-Herzegovina and the internal affairs of the FRY. Milosevic is aware that the "Kosovo issue" has not even been opened yet and he specifically emphasized in the interview that Kosovo was an internal affair of Serbia and that the Albanians there are a national minority—and he happily stressed that "Mr. Kinkel" had told him the same.

Obviously, the Croatian regions are not really a part of Milosevic's aspirations any more and it is not surprising that he evaded a journalist's question about Cosic [Serbian academician and former FRY president] saying that Serbia loses in peace what it gains in war. The Serbian president is apparently aware that Cosic's remark had been invalidated by Croatian military operations and his messages to Zagreb about the need for a "normalization of relations" should not be a surprise. Although the messages are not the same as those that the Croatian leadership has offered, it is impossible not to notice how the outcome of the war is being incorporated into them. They deserve caution because of their sender, but they certainly deserve a detailed analysis by state officials, too.

Croatia: Commentary Surveys B-H Croat Parties

AU1806175696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Vedran Matosic: "Croatian Opposition Parties: Easily to the Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not a single party in Croatia can be indifferent about the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, according to the Dayton agreement, have to be held in the first two weeks of September. Although the coming parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a kind of equation swarming with unknown quantities and the technical aspects of the elections are just a small part of all the questions that need answering, the Croatian parties mostly agree that they should participate in the game, though not many of them parties can specify how.

The party contest in September will be the second since 1990 and many parties, in addition to the "national blocs" (the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], and the SDS [Serb Democratic Party]), are preparing to enter the party race. How do the parties from Croatia intend to participate in the elections?

Worried About the Future of Croats

The HKDU [Croatian Christian Democratic Union] recently founded a branch in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Claiming to be worried about the future of the Croats of the Sava valley, central Bosnia, the Banja Luka region, and of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, they decided to "found the HKDU in Bosnia-Herzegovina out of patriotic, moral, and political reasons with a single goal: the maximum protection of Croats' interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their return to their previous homes," HKDU Chairman Marko Veselica and Deputy Chairman Anto Kovacevic wrote in the HKDU's explanation.

All those parties with the minimum ambition to achieve something in the elections will give the same principal reasons for their presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, each party has different ideas about the political organization of the Bosnian region and about the way to the position to make decisions. For instance, the HKDU sees the future Bosnia-Herzegovina as "a decentralized state where the Croatian people will be equal." Furthermore, HKDU officials have stated that they "support Bosnia-Herzegovina as a united state within its internationally recognized borders; as a social, just, democratic, and legal state; as a state where all those who have violated international law will be brought to justice. Our public actions will be aimed at achieving a just public peace, because our party understands that a just peace is the only guarantee for the return of all people to their homes and that is the basis of the Christian democratic ideas of the HDKU."

Those are the political guidelines for the HKDU's participation in the Bosnian elections, with the intention of the way through to the "parliament of the Federation of three equal constituent nations, as any division will lead toward a disaster for the Croatian and the other two nations" is stressed in the communique of the Central

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Initiative Board for the establishment of the HKDU in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Election Strategy of the HSP

The Croatian Party of Right [HSP] had determined its attitude before and Anto Djapic maintained that "they will surely enter the elections, both at Federation level and for municipal bodies." Djapic also spoke of their election strategy, pointing out that they would "enter the elections in the Bihac-Una Canton in a coalition with the Muslim Party of Right." The electoral logic of the Right is not preoccupied with the results, as they think that it is important to be present on the slate, and their goal is for the "Right to take hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that is a challenge for which the entire party leadership will move to the neighboring state during the election campaign."

Apart from these two Croatian opposition parties, whose ambitions to participate in the September elections in the neighboring state are lasting and active, there are also parties interested in the elections but which intend to refrain from participating, as their opinion is that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina should decide on their future by themselves. For instance, the general attitude of the [Croatian] SDP [Social Democratic Party] is that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are capable of making decisions autonomously. Tonino Picula, member of the Executive Board of the party, said that the SDP had "no intention of exerting any direct influence on the Bosnian elections by political peddling or sermonizing," but he did not pretend that his party was indifferent to the elections.

"Of course, we will pass our judgments on whether the elections are well organized and democratic, as well as about the results. We are ready to make our experiences useful should any party of similar orientation ask us to do so, because Bosnia-Herzegovina is so close and we are interested in our neighbors," Picula said. He added that the parties in Croatia will surely be engaged in the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections to different degrees.

As for the possible results of the elections, Picula said that the national parties, in his opinion, still had the greatest chances in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other parties were not likely to endanger them. Picula said: "I am skeptical about the so-called civic parties, because the job of the national party leaders is not finished and the civic parties are not very different from the national parties and their ideas."

The SDP's Doubts

Picula described the elections as an "ethnic referendum," perhaps even more characteristic that the one in 1990, because "the blocs that used to represent multiethnic visions of the future of the country are gone, destroyed by all those years of war." In addition, Picula said that the SDP had its doubts about the conditions under which the elections would be held, which might not be best for democracy and legality and might be an additional source of tension.

Although the Croatian Social Liberal Party has lately been preoccupied with other political activities, it will undoubtedly be present in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Jozo Rados, deputy chairman of the Croatian Liberals, thinks that the party must find a way to participate in the political events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though direct participation in the elections is not the only way.

"We can be present in the election as a support for a party whose program we find similar to ours," Rados said, and added that the party had not worked out the details of its presence in the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are the national blocs likely to have been weakened by the war years and do the civic parties have a chance to achieve good results in the elections? Rados thinks that the national blocs will again prevail.

"I think that they still dominate the situation; the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in the regions controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the SDA in the regions controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army," Rados said, and supposed that the national blocs might win a comparatively smaller number of votes in urban areas, but the difference could not "really endanger them."

Mostar: the Litmus Test

Zlatko Tomcic, the chairman of the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], also expressed the general attitude of his party several months ago: "The HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a party of the neighboring state and its activities are completely autonomous." Nevertheless, he described the Bosnian HSS as a sister party with similar views, but their relations are not nearly as close as those of certain other similar parties. The Croatian HSS thinks it necessary to offer moral and logistic support to the HSS of Sarajevo, but also takes care not to interfere with the internal affairs of the neighboring state. Moreover, there is Tomcic's well known view that all Bosnian parties with Croatian attributes, if they cross the threshold, should act with a view to preserving the Croatian national identity and interests and "anybody who does not agree is a political manipulator."

There are other small parties with different programs and ideological orientations and their only activities in the possible September elections will be to judge the Bosnian political scene and its changes; their ambitions

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do not include direct participation. In the overall view, the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are primarily burdened by the imperative of being held at all costs—and the present situation is unclear, as we have said, in many respects.

Let us recall that the monitors and the media noticed many irregularities in the elections of 1990, when there was no war. The question is what kind of atmosphere there might be in the coming, post-Dayton elections. In that sense, the elections that are soon to be held in Mostar might be a litmus test for the parliamentary elections. Many things could be elucidated there and the attitudes of the Croatian parties might become more specific. Let us recall that the parties that have registered are the HDZ, the HSP, the Croatian Pure Party of Rights, and the List of Citizens of Mostar for a United Mostar.

Croatia: Official Says Slavonia Serb Forces Stay in Barracks

AU1806193396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1748 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vinkovci, 18 Jun (BETA)—Lieutenant General Slavko Baric, the Croatian president's envoy for military issues in the Croatian office with the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES], today in Beli Manastir accused the Serbs of not yet handing over their military facilities to the UNTAES forces following a meeting of the subcommittee for police issues.

According to him, the facilities so far handed over include only 15 facilities in Baranja and some 20 in eastern Slavonia that used to be weapons storehouses.

"We have information that the members of the so-called 11th Corps are still in the barracks, and there are no signs that they are going to be handed over to UNTAES," Baric said.

The demilitarization should be completed by 21 June, and on 1 July mixed UNTAES police should start functioning in eastern Slavonia under General Klein's command, but no agreement has yet been reached on what arms it should carry.

Baric said that Lipovac and Nijemci would be the first places into which Croat refugees would return. This should happen as soon as the mines are cleared away, which—as he said—would be discussed in three days.

Croatia: Stanimirovic Views Autonomy, Djeletovci Oil Fields

AU1906115996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 17 Jun 96

[Unattributed report—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview for Radio Kragujevac, Vojislav Stanimirovic pointed out that the people of our district remain adamant in their demand for a special status for the Serb district. The prime minister also discussed other topical issues.

Talking about the special status of the district, Prime Minister Stanimirovic said the Serb side would not give up its demand regarding the special status that, he specified, would enable the Serb people to remain in the district. With the mediation of the international community, we will have to meet half way between autonomy and what we are offered by Croatia, Stanimirovic emphasized, adding that the Croatian side is offering nothing to help the Serbs find a place in the sun in the district.

Characterizing the demilitarization process as normal and reiterating the Serb position that the process would be completed in keeping with the Erdut Agreement, Stanimirovic said that the population has faith in the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] mission. We believe our safety will be guaranteed, he said, warning that the people have a problem coping with the fast pace of the implementation of the agreement as dictated by UNTAES. Talking about potential problems due to the pace of implementation, Stanimirovic gave the example of discord regarding identification papers: Croatia insists on certificates of citizenship, Croatian identification cards, and the like, but we believe that, during the transitional period, the population should have the identification papers issued by the transitional administration. Justifying the fast rate of imposing the new solution with a lack of financial means, speaking about Croatia, prime minister said: In this case, quite a few concessions have been made to one side.

Although the agreement is being implemented very quickly, the district parliament, at a session in Mirkovci, called for an extension of the UNTAES mandate, said Vojislav Stanimirovic and added that the demand, based on the Erdut Agreement, would be forwarded to the UN Security Council through official UNTAES channels.

Answering a question about the political ramifications of opening telephone communications with Croatia, pointing out the connection is now much better, Stanimirovic added: We are aware that, sooner or later, we will be included in some systems of the Republic of Croatia.

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Asked to comment on the situation regarding the Djeletovci oil fields, he talked about opposite positions of experts of the Croatian INA [Croatian petroleum company] and the district's NIK [Krajina Oil Industry]. Vojislav Stanimirovic explained that, according to Croatia, a longer period of time and sizable investments are needed to begin exploiting the fields, while NIT experts say only a fortnight is needed to open some 50 oil wells. This clearly shows that the Croatian side is not interested in opening the oil fields, said Prime Minister Vojislav Stanimirovic in an interview to Radio Kragujevac, underlining the importance of the Djeletovci oil fields for the district's economy and life in general.

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FYROM: Minister of Economy Views Bilateral Agreements

AU1806193596 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 18 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with Bekir Zuta, minister of economy, by Katerina Spasovska; place and date not given: "Agreement on Free Trade With FRY To Be Ready by 1997"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Spasovska] The restoration of economic links with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and your announcement of a free-trade zone with the FRY were experienced as Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] return to the old embrace. What is your opinion on that?

[Zuta] Let us get this straight: From the outset there had been some speculation with terms like "customs union" and "free-trade zone." I think that this country has once and for all decided to be a sovereign and independent state and does not accept any concepts for confederations or unions in the Balkans. However, it is indispensable to develop a higher level of bilateral relations with countries with which it cooperates commercially. You know that big preparations for Macedonia's admission in the European Union are under way. There are serious chances of signing an agreement on joining the Union in the middle of June. In this context, the interest of Macedonia and of the economy is not to create any unions or organizations.

Nevertheless, we are willing to sit down and have bilateral talks, to negotiate. In this context, and with the same purpose, we started negotiations with the Government of the FRY on reaching an agreement on trade cooperation, which was actually meant to be accomplished in a number of phases. However, during the expert negotiations in Belgrade on 6 and 7 June, a new view was developed. Instead of embarking a gradual trade cooperation, it was decided to shorten the period and fix a date, and, conditionally speaking, January 1977 was mentioned as the time by which a free-trade zone regime would come into force. In this way we can eliminate the customs and noncustoms taxes between the two countries and the whole problem will be reduced to what existed prior to this—that is 1 percent customs duty.

Negotiations With Slovenia Completed

[Spasovska] We have had negotiations on a free-trade zone with Slovenia as well. What stagehas this process reached and are there any similar discussions on free trade with other countries?

[Zuta] The negotiations with the Republic of Slovenia have been completed. An agreement on free trade between the two countries has already been prepared. However, the mixed committee that was supposed to sit at the end of May did not manage to finish the agreement, and therefore it was not signed during Janez Drnovsek's visit to Macedonia. The new committee meeting is scheduled for July, when all the views will be adjusted and the agreement signed.

There are similar negotiations with Turkey. We have well-developed political relations with Turkey, but not economic. This is a failure. We have scheduled a meeting of the mixed commission in Skopje for 17 and 18 June, when some open questions will be reviewed. The Bulgarian Government has shown quite a lot of interest in forming a mixed committee, but there were some reshuffles on one side and the other, and obviously due to the situation in Bulgaria, the negotiations have been postponed.

Moreover, the Macedonian Government is trying to make interstate agreements in the sphere of protection of investments, double taxation, and in all other spheres of interest. So, we soon expect to sign an agreement with Italy on the protection of investments, and later on also on double taxation. We are conducting such discussions, and in some cases agreements have already been signed, with Russia, Germany, Switzerland, Romania, and Hungary. All this demonstrates that the government is trying to create conditions for economic development and for more markets. The rest depends on how much the economists will profit from them and how competitive they will be at those markets.

[Spasovska] Speaking of our economy's capability and competition, in the exchange with Slovenia and the FRY, Macedonia is in deficit. Is there a danger of increasing this deficit after the agreement on free trade is signed?

[Zuta] The question of deficit is a serious and weighty issue. It is a question that is related to the level of economic relations between the two countries. Here we must be familiar with the structure and the volume of exports and imports of the respective country. These relations are changeable categories. If we now export raw materials and import final products, it does not mean that the situation cannot be changed. This is a real relationship depending on the actual situation in the structure of the economy and production that is present with us and with our partner. We had a different problem with Slovenia—it was in the sphere of the origin of the products.

They declared products from other countries of origin as their own and we thought that it was damaging for us. First, they had a privileged treatment for goods that are not originally Slovenian and thus they created disloyal

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competition. We believe that these questions have been solved in the negotiations, and now what needs to be resolved is the structure and level of production, as well as the existing differences. Only if we have clear-cut relations can we rightfully see if there is a deficit or a surplus.

[Spasovska] In the negotiations with Turkey, Macedonia is asking for most-favored-nation status. How far is this posible?

[Zuta] This is a serious problem in economic relations between Macedonia and Turkey. This is going to be the topic of discussions on 17 and 18 June. Turkey does not load our goods with taxes, but it makes them much more expensive for the Turkish market, although there is great interest in our goods there.

We cannot develop these relations without adequate treatment. The agreement with Turkey says that the governments of the one and the other country will make efforts to give privileged treatment regarding additional taxes. This has not been accomplished yet and our economy is suffering. Macedonia could be of great interest to Turkey for the sale of its porcelain. Under new conditions, "Frinko" [refrigerator factory] could make a good profit by exporting refrigerators.

A Series of Agreements With Albania To Follow

[Spasovska] You did not mention Albania and Greece when you listed the contacts and the bilateral relations with neighboring countries. Have any negotiations on economic cooperation started with these countries?

[Zuta] We have not yet formed a commission with Albania. So far, we have signed only one agreement with Albania on cooperationin the field of science. Three to four other agreements have been prepared that will have to be signed during the Albanian Premier's visit. They will facilitate the signing of agreements on trade cooperation.

For known reasons, we do not have such relations with Greece. The establishment of bilateral relations implies that the wishes of the two governments for negotiations and agreements are identical. It cannot be done unilaterally. As the problems are resolved, there will come a phase in which economic relations will be mutually agreed.

[Spasovska] What is the development strategy of the Republic of Macedonia up to the year 2000?

[Zuta] Back in 1995, upon the proposal of the Ministry of Development, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia decided that it was necessary to elaborate a strategy for the development of Macedonia in sectors, up to 2010, 2015, and 2020, while the global approach would be for a midterm period.

The study is being prepared in the Macedonian Academy of Science and Arts [MASA], which has engaged the Vienna Economic Institute. The financial means have been provided by international institutions. A coordinating body has been formed to monitor the activities in the name of the government, to review the documents, and give suggestions.

The project is to be completed by the end of 1997. Ksente Bogoev, the president of MASA, Nikola Uzunov, and Nikola Kljusev are the coordinators.

Some of the workshops have been actively involved in the preparation of the development strategy after the year 2000.

FYROM: Macedonian Serb Leader Complains of Police Harassment

LD1806191196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1452 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 18 Jun (SRNA)—Since the establishment of the Democratic Party of Serbs [Demokratska Partija Srbija—DPS] in Macedonia [FYROM—Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] four years ago, its work has been constantly obstructed by the Macedonian state security service.

According to DPS Chairman Dragisa Miletic, in addition to numerous incidents in which people were called in for questioning, policemen have raided the homes of DPS activists without warrants or authorization. The police accused them of possessing weapons that were not found.

"They have also interrogated me in the police station on a number of occasions and threatened my family by saying that I should be worried about them," Miletic told SRNA today and added that provocations and the monitoring of his movements were intensified after the assassination attempt against Kiro Gligorov, the president of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

During Miletic's recent trip to Belgrade, the Macedonian police confiscated DPS seals and stamps.

"I asked for a receipt, which I did not get," Miletic said, and added that the seals had been registered with the competent court and could be misused.

"That is why I will seek redress through the courts and I am going to begin legal action against the official responsible," Miletic said.

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This incident has embittered the Serbs and Montenegrins living in Macedonia particularly because this Republic is presenting itself as a law-governed, democratic state.

FYROM: Commentary Views Progress Toward Western Integration

AU1806144996 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 14 Jun 96 pp 1, 11-12

[Commentary by Eleonora Karanfilovska: "Partners in the Region"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week was not just a diplomatically active period. Last week's events and the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] leadership's contacts showed that there have been some changes and that there is a new situation regarding not only Macedonia, but also the entire region. The events were mainly related to the so-called western development option. All right, there are not any differences inside the "western option." The three levels of relations that were so plastically depicted were NATO-European Union-the United States. [sentence as published]

"Obsessed" with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry's visit to Macedonia, we hardly paid any attention to the solemn presentation of the individual Macedonian program for cooperation with NATO, although the act by which Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski submitted the text to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in Brussels on 12 June was of a ceremonial nature. Macedonia is now approaching the second stage of cooperation with the Alliance. After this contacts will focus more on "selling" the idea that the expansion of the western Alliance's defense to the south, to Albania and Macedonia, will represent NATO's first infiltration of the East, which is to start next year. At the same time, it will be necessary to complete the equipment of the Macedonian Army according to NATO's standards. A large part of this has already been done. A mobile unit has been formed, which has to be "ready" at all times for rapid deployment throughout the whole Macedonian territory. It has been fully "equipped" as required—that is, the minimum of 80 percent. Some transportation vehicles have been supplied and others have yet to arrive. The land Army is fully armed with automatic and semiautomatic weapons. For the purpose of controlling the air space it is necessary to purchase interceptors and a military radar or two radars for civil aviation control that will be used by the Army as well. As far as other armament is concerned, the arms embargo is expected to be lifted, after which Macedonia will be able to buy on the world's markets. When the minimum standards are met no obstacles will remain. The rest will be a matter of politics, that is, it will be necessary to define the common interests of the Republic of Macedonia and the United States in the region, as a result of which there will be intensified cooperation in defense matters. "Our main thought was that, as a region, the Balkans contains some major obstacles for the construction of Marshall's Europe, but on the other hand it also has some major opportunities," U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry told the parliamentary deputies when paying high tribute to the Macedonian side for having decided to use these opportunities. "You have done your best to retain the peace forces of the United States and of the Nordic countries and you have helped the Balkans escape a large-scale war. You have helped this region embark on the road of peace and stability."

U.S.-Macedonian military cooperation has started. It is transparent and very clear, although some people are not very happy about it. As one Greek weekly wrote: "The United States is creating a new Yalta with borders to the north of Greece, in Macedonia." It is disgusting to speak about creating spheres of influence in the present conditions, although new lines of association have already been drawn, even though they are not aimed at any divisions. Events are dynamic and turbulent, they are changeable and at times even incredible.

The problem of cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the United States in the field of defense arises when you try to transfer it to the plane of overall relations between the two states. Here the appropriate balance does not exist. Nevertheless, it is an illusion to think that the Pentagon is taking steps that do not conform to the general policy of the White House and State Department.

On the other hand, cooperation with the European partners, if one can say so, is quite satisfactory regarding some of the EU member states, particularly Germany or France, for instance, since Jacques Chirac became president, but this cannot be said for the entire Union, although efforts for cooperation are being made. Regardless of the prejudices in the Union and its manners—they treat all countries that aspire to join it as contagious and therefore find it necessary to impose a quarantine—it is hard to believe that the European states will construct relations openly and freely with those they call "former communist countries." That is why we were surprised that when Dini and Santer were in Skopje they wondered why Macedonia has such an attitude to the conditions set for her by the Union. They recommended that a country that is so eager to cooperate with its neighbors should not object to a regional approach. On the contrary, good neighborly cooperation could bene-

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fit. At the same time, the European Union did not set such a condition for Bulgaria or Romania, nor even for Slovenia. Furthermore—the evolutionary clause, which does not automatically offer associate membership to Macedonia, was first set up for Albania and then for Macedonia, which leads to the conclusion that the same concept will be applied in the establishment of relations with the former Yugoslav countries, excluding Slovenia, but with the addition of Albania.

Considering how often various Macedonia's guests change their opinions, one must either conclude that the hosts are extremely persuasive or that the problem is with those who come here, although they are people who can decide on the fate of other peoples, nations, and states. Take the European Union as an example. It fell over itself to prove that we will have a great time "regionally," so great that they even introduced the "evolutionary clause" for us, which will help us, regionally, to feel so much better that we may even decide, regionally, to remain where we are. They have now been persuaded that Macedonia does not like being hugged regionally, and therefore they are making concessions. Nevertheless, the head of the Macedonian negotiating delegation Jane Miljovski was right to say that it is difficult to negotiate if you do not have contacts with those who can make the final decision. You present your arguments to people who represent the negotiators, you strongly support your arguments, but you do not know how they are going to be communicated to or accepted by the negotiators themselves. That is why the visit of Lamberto Dini, the chairman of the EU Ministerial Council and also new Italian foreign minister, and of European Commission President Jacques Santer to Skopje last weekend was of the utmost importance.

The talks were extremely difficult, but some progress was made, although it was Macedonia's President Kiro Gligorov who was first shocked during his stay in Paris by French President Jacques Chirac with the initiative on regionalization. Mr. Chirac himself was unpleasantly surprised to discover that the regional approach and the evolutionary clause were not conditions for all the countries in the region. He could not get an answer from his associates why that was so, in spite of the fact that France was the leading advocate of the idea.

At the same time, the Macedonian side has divided the idea about the "regional approach" into two parts and did not reject it at the outset. Functional regionalism, which basically means better communications in the Balkans, that is, infrastructure, telecommunications, and so on—is not a problem for Macedonia. Every other "superstructure," such as the formation of regional bodies for cooperation in other fields, is an idea that cannot be easily realized. First, the countries in the region have different opinions on the basic issues, for instance regarding the human and minority rights, privatization, collective systems of defense, and so on, and second, they are on different levels of development and transformation.

Saturday's meeting with Dini and Santer in Skopje affirmed that when French President Jacques Chirac promised the Republic of Macedonia that it would be treated equally with the other countries in the region, he really meant it. Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski said that the talks focused mainly on the motives for the regional and the evolutionary clause, but it is clear that despite the Macedonian side's efforts to "persuade" them, the Europeans have not totally given up their view. Mr. Dini stressed that Macedonia does not have any reason to be afraid and he reprimanded the Macedonian Government for being over sensitive to the regional approach and the evolutionary clause. Despite the hosts' high appraisals of Macedonia—they even concluded that Macedonia has more advanced relations with the Union than any other former Yugoslav republic—one has the impression that the talks were open and calculating regarding the reasons for the clauses in the agreement with Macedonia that have not been applied to the other countries in the region. This could be very unpleasant if the real reasons are not stated. Does it mean that Macedonia must pay for the fact that there is no consistent European policy on the Balkans or is Kosovo the word that is not spoken? Furthermore, must Macedonia be the accelerator of transformation processes in the Balkans even if it might cause a slowdown in its own processes?

In spite of the European embellishment of the draft law on Macedonia's trade cooperation with the Union, our delegation insisted on a more limited definition of regional cooperation as cooperation in the entire southern Balkan region. Nevertheless, as transpired at the EU Council of Ministers' session in Luxembourg on Monday, France, which has the "copyright" on the idea of regionalization, is not willing to give it up that easily. When the other ministers insisted that the promises that Dini and Santer had made during their Balkan tour could not be disavowed, Macedonia was exempted from the condition of a regional approach. The firmness of the promises that the Macedonian side had received in Skopje was proven when the Macedonian Government accepted the negotiating delegation's report on the course of the negotiations and when it confirmed the draft text on the agreement for cooperation with the Union on the same day the Council of Ministers was sitting. At the same time, the government communique emphasized that it had been assessed that the course of

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the negotiations had been very intensive, progress had been made, and the European Commission had given us the maximum number of concessions.

Now we are waiting for the EU member states to approve the draft agreement. The agreement is scheduled for signing next week, on 18 June. However, there still remains a transitional phase in connection with the evolutionary clause before Macedonia becomes an associate member of the EU, although it does not represent a major obstacle any more.

The accelerating factor in cooperation with the Union is the relations with the United States. If the idea of expanding NATO's southern flank is realized, Macedonia can expect intensified cooperation with the Union and more rapid association. Finally, we quote Mr. William Perry's speech in the Macedonian Assembly: "I came in Skopje because the United States would very much like to see your country as a part of Marshall's Europe." What is the vision of this new Europe? Marshall's vision was Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—united in peace, freedom, and democracy. As you know, Marshall did not only have a vision but he also had a plan how to make this vision a reality in postwar Europe.

Marshall's road offered Europe a new road to reconstruction and renewal.

FYROM: Commentary Views Army's Achievements, NATO Conformity

AU1806185396 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 15-16 Jun 96 pp 4-5

[Commentary by Sasko Dimevski: "Macedonian Army With NATO Charm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "You have helped the Balkans drag itself from the edge of a larger-scale war and you have helped this region on the road to peace and stability," U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said in his meeting at the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] parliament, in which he highly praised Macedonian foreign policy and its role as stabilizer in the Balkan upheavals over the last few years. Perry used his third visit to Macedonia to promote once again the idea of a Marshall's Europe, united in peace, freedom, and democracy, and he said that he wanted to see Macedonia in such a Europe. Perry had first explained this idea in Tirana in April at the ministerial meeting when he first expressed very openly his opinion that Macedonia is seriously taking the road to full membership in NATO.

Fulfillment of Strategic Goals

In just four years since the first administrative law in the state was passed, the Law on Defense, which was immediately followed by the formation of the Macedonian Army, our state is rapidly heading towards achieving one of its key strategic goals in the field of defense and security: its membership of collective security systems. A component of this designated goal has already been fulfilled and there remains only the last step: NATO membership. It will not be at all important whether the strict conditions have been fulfilled or whether someone is more advanced or lags behind in the negotiations with the alliance; the most important thing will be whether the candidate country for membership in NATO passes the political filter of the North Atlantic military alliance.

Macedonia has fulfilled with unprecedented speed whatever it has been asked in finding its place under the security umbrella. The basis was the Law on Defense, followed by the resolution of the Macedonian parliament in December 1993, when our political desire to join the Western European military alliance was clearly proclaimed. Later, in spite of the major troubles with Greece, very soon after we signed the Interim Accord, we became members of the Council of Europe, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and in November we became members of the Partnership for Peace program. In this way we opened the road to nearly all the bodies of the alliance and we got the opportunity to participate in the preparations and planning of all NATO's activities. After our admission to Partnership, the Ministry of Defense expressly prepared the required documents, producing the framework document, as well as the individual program that was two days ago officially signed in Brussels in front of Secretary General Solana. Although Macedonia was accepted as the 27th member of Partnership for Peace, it managed to surpass a number of countries that had been admitted to the initiative before us but which stopped there. In its international activities, the Ministry of Defense has developed a very close and fruitful cooperation with a number of NATO member countries and with a few from eastern Europe over the last few years. The most important bilateral cooperation in defense is the close connection that the ministry has with the Pentagon. We have been playing "with open cards" with the Americans for a longish period of time, which is why we have received their open support. This was possible owing to the significant presence of U.S. troops within UNPREDEP [UN Preventative Deployment Force] in our country, and in recent times some of them have been here under the U.S. flag, as well as because of the continual exchange of information and training of high-ranking officers of the two armies under the "Bridge to the United States" program, and, finally, also because the military cooperation of the Macedonian Army with the Vermont National Guard.

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When the agreement on regulating the status of the forces of NATO and Partnership member countries and particularly when the annex protocol was signed, bilateral relations between Macedonia and the United States reached the highest level. With the signing of the agreement, Macedonia became the seventh member of Partnership to regulate the status of the forces and it has also regulated the status of the forces to take part in the scheduled exercises in Albania in the middle of July and in Macedonia in October. On the other hand, with the exchange of diplomatic notes, the two governments have actually found a way to regulate legally the status of the U.S. troops that are here now or that will come in the future, which will not be covered by an agreement between Macedonia and the United Nations. This document is of particular importance for us, because it demonstrates the clear U.S. interest in being present on this territory and their concern to maintain security in the region. Moreover, it also represents a basis for future direct bilateral arrangements on a military plane.

The Ministry of Defense will have to count on Russian resistance to Macedonia's determination to join international security systems as soon as possible, apart from the fulfillment of NATO's strict conditions. Russia's role is of great importance for us because it is generally opposed to the expansion of the alliance, but it is also a permanent member of the Security Council and can thus make obstructions in voting on the continuation of the mandate of the peacekeepers in Macedonia. Russia is strongly opposed to the expansion of the alliance into countries in the former eastern bloc and, most curiously, it places us among those countries. Macedonia has not been a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor does it use Russian weaponry; it is far from Russia, so there are no reasons for the opposition to our association with NATO. As far as continuing the mandate of the peacekeepers is concerned, Russia believes that the situation in the region is such that there is no more need for such a large number of "blue helmets," while the actual background for this request lies in the problem of the presence of U.S. troops in Macedonia and on the border with the FRY.

Restructuring and Reequipping

Apart from the efforts for international affirmation of the Macedonian defense views and aspects over the last four years and in conformity with the Law on Defense, Macedonia has chosen to form a small and efficient army to be trained and equipped with modern weapons, capable of repelling the first blow of a possible aggressor, creating conditions for mobilizing a military formation, and waging a long-lasting war throughout its territory.

For this purpose, since its formation the Macedonia Army has been established in conformity with NATO's strict criteria. Units have been restructured in their organization and formation according to these norms. This expensive process was completed in a relatively short period of time and the expenses were low. There was a redeployment of officers and units, new ranks were introduced, new mobile units were formed of the A formation (up to the level of a brigade), and thus units were created 80 to 100 percent of which will have the most modern equipment.

Parallel with this process, another process, the gradual professionalization of the army, is being promoted by the Ministry of Defense and, according to some army strategists, professionals will be about half the overall army. For a year and a half specialized defense soldiers have been working in the Army, in special units, border units, as drivers, and as professional operators of sophisticated military systems. The latest news is that a month ago another unit of professional soldiers was formed trained for planned exercises with the partners from the Partnership for Peace program. These soldiers are being trained and equipped with means and systems compatible with NATO and Partnership and the training and the command system went according to NATO rules. So Macedonia has achieved another condition: to keep one soldier out of every 1,000 in full shape to join the Security Council's peacekeeping operations at any time or to participate in NATO exercises.

In addition, it is worth mentioning that at the internal level there are activities to complete the equipping of the army. One of these days the arms embargo against all the former Yugoslav countries will be lifted. This was an obstacle for our equipment in the past, but it does not mean that the Macedonian Army is not armed. The army is completely equipped with conventional modern automatic weapons, including civilians who make up 1 percent of the population and reservists who are seven times larger. The infantry has modern facilities for antiarmored battle, artillery, mortars, rocket mortars, light rocket launchers, and antitank missiles. In addition, the air force has a number of transport helicopters of the "MI-17" type and a dozen light aircraft, as well as several dozen antiaircraft guns and missiles.

Since all our neighbors have a military potential between 1.5 and 10 times greater than ours and in conformity with the concept of our defense, state military strategists believe that for repelling the first blow of a possible aggressor we need more capability for antitank warfare; to achieve greater mobility we need more ar-

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moved transporters; and for better control of the air we need a number of fighter aircraft, as well as transportation and combat helicopters. In addition to this combat equipment, Macedonia also needs a three-dimensional radar to cover the whole state, as well as two to three small two-dimensional radars to be used for civil and military purposes. The last project, to protect and arm the airspace, is going on in cooperation with the U.S. Government, that is with a civil-military expert team. The negotiations are in the final phase and the radar systems are expected to be put into operation very soon.

Finally, it is necessary to note that, although it is a relatively young country that has been internationally recognised over the last two or three years, Macedonia has achieved significant results with its activities. This conclusion refers particularly to the Ministry of Defense, because it has managed to take short-cuts and avoid processes that have taken years in other countries and thus has managed to affirm Macedonia as a respectable factor for peace and stability in the region and in the southern part of Europe, to make it a member of Partnership for Peace, which is the anteroom to NATO, and to build up positions that promise that Macedonia's strategic goals in the field of defense and security will be achieved very soon.

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Poland: NATO Military Committe Head on Expansion, Russia

WS1906111196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 18 Jun 96 p 10

[Interview with NATO Military Committee Chairman Klaus Naumann by Malgorzata Alterman; place and date not given: "General Klaus Naumann Exclusively for GAZETA WYBORCZA; Politicians Must Answer Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"The top soldier in NATO," General Klaus Naumann, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, arrives in Poland today.*

[Alterman] What should our military experts focus on in preparing Poland for membership in NATO?

[Naumann] The key issue is to develop the principles of cooperation between your armed forces and NATO. Poland has made a lot of progress in this field, which is visible particularly in Bosnia, where your troops are doing an excellent job cooperating with ours in the Nordic Brigade, affectionately known as the Nord-Pole Brigade.

[Alterman] You recently said that requiring candidate states that are transforming their economies with tremendous effort and at huge cost to spend vast amounts of money on adapting to NATO standards would not be appropriate.

[Naumann] NATO expansion should neither step up the arms race nor compel you to spend huge amounts of money on purchases of Western military equipment. We do not want to launch a new arms race, but to guarantee new members security and motivate them to achieve the highest possible level of cooperation with NATO.

[Alterman] In Berlin, the Russian interior minister clearly expounded the preconditions for enlarging the alliance: political membership yes, but no integration with military structures.

[Naumann] Our politicians should answer Russia, and they "always" said that NATO will not give in to any conditions. The decision is up to NATO and its candidate states. All those standing in line to join NATO want to become part of its military structures. Once their membership is ratified, they will.

[Alterman] More and more often we hear that NATO should not expand its military infrastructure on the territory of new member states because of the costs and Russian protests. As a soldier, would you agree to defend such a country?

[Naumann] Everything depends on what you mean by infrastructure. In NATO, infrastructure means air bases, ports, warehouses, and testing grounds. You have all of that. Once Poland becomes a member of the alliance, no one can prevent it from using that infrastructure for the purpose of NATO military exercises or in time of war.

In NATO, we share the costs of developing the NATO infrastructure. The Germans contribute 26.8 percent of the joint budget, the Americans a bit more, the Dutch some 4 percent, others even less.

[Alterman] Do you believe we can receive full security guarantees upon entering NATO? Many advocates of NATO enlargement in the West say the new members should not be granted such guarantees "automatically."

[Naumann] This is a problem to be settled by politicians. I cannot imagine a better formula for guaranteeing peace. We Germans were a frontline state during the Cold War, and we never had the slightest doubt that our allies from the United States, Canada, Belgium or the Netherlands would stand at our side. No one denies that taking joint risks and preparedness for collective defense are the keys to NATO success.

[Alterman] Some observers do claim, however, that reform will cause NATO to lose its sharp edge, playing into the hands of Russia.

[Naumann] We clearly stated in Berlin that NATO is and will be the foundation of security and stability in Europe. We will not turn into a discussion club for toothless old men. I do not see anyone trying to push the United States out of Europe. On the contrary, to provide the United States with a stronger foothold in Europe, we are sharing responsibilities with it, creating a European defense identity within the framework of NATO.

[Alterman] How can the Russians be persuaded to accept our joining NATO?

[Neumann] Everyone sees that Moscow has become more flexible, and I hope this does not change as we can continue the dialogue. As chief of staff of the German Armed Forces, I was assigned the task of overseeing the pullout of Soviet troops from Germany. In the course of the operation, we tried to remember how proud the Russian nation is. They appreciated that. If such factors continue to be taken into consideration, I think we will find a solution everyone will find satisfactory—we, you, and the Russians.

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Poland: Official Interviewed on Integration With EU

WS1906073096 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 11 Jun 96 p 6

[Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Polish Government plenipotentiary for integration and foreign aid, by Klaudia Sanetra; place and date not given: "We Want To Be in the Mainstream"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sanetra] Several conferences with the participation of EU representatives have been held in the past few weeks. Everyone has encouraged us to work out a national strategy of integration. The Sejm also has passed a resolution that obligates the government to work out such a strategy by the end of 1996. Does this mean that we are coming closer to membership and that the existing adjustment program is in fact insufficient?

[Saryusz-Wolski] The adjustment program has existed since 1992—that is, since the moment the Sejm consented to ratifying the agreement on association with the EU. Also, since 1993 we have had a program of economic and legal adjustment to the European Treaty. It is being further implemented, and today it is becoming a preaccession program. However, I believe that now that the summit meetings in Essen, Cannes, and Madrid have been held, we feel that we need a more comprehensive program, and it is for this reason that the Sejm has passed a resolution that obliges the government to present a national strategy as we come closer to membership. I believe that it should include a message from politicians, who ought to try to persuade people to focus their energy and efforts on our goal—full membership in the EU. Nonetheless, the most important thing is to do the very basic work—that is, to adjust our law, economy, and administration to EU requirements. Another important thing is social communication as far as this goal is concerned—education, information, and actions taken as part of our foreign policy.

This strategy should be a long-term one. We should already start thinking about how to consummate our membership in the EU even though we have not been formally invited yet. Of course, we must present ourselves very well. We must get ready for negotiations, which are bound to be extremely complex, which will include many different areas, and which will require a great deal of professionalism. However, we also should think about the more remote future, the more so because at the intergovernmental conference a debate is under way on the constitutional shape and architecture of the EU. It needs to be specified how our interests relate to the solutions that are being envisioned there.

[Sanetra] Nevertheless, the future of an expanded EU will be determined without us. All we can do is adjust to the new EU.

[Saryusz-Wolski] The most important thing for us is to prepare as well as we can, to make legal, economic, structural, and social preparations. This is because the examples given by countries that are members of the EU show that this membership can be used either very well or badly. Now, after all, we want a membership that would make allowances for our political, social, and economic aspirations. I refer to this as the second generation of thinking about Poland as a member of the EU, and I think that this should also be incorporated into our strategy.

It would be good if this strategy for coming closer to membership enjoyed wide support among political elites and the society. For the time being, this support certainly makes us feel optimistic; however, it must be maintained. Let us not forget that the EU is not only a wonderful draft for a united Europe, but that it also involves specific issues, such as beef, strawberries or cherries, money. The fact that Poles support membership in the EU so greatly is our big capital. After all, the final decision is made by the nations themselves—they express their views in referendums. Now, if we take a look at the results of the referendums that were held, after the Maastricht meeting, in France and in Denmark, we will find that it is no wonder that those people are a little jealous of the wide support for the EU in Poland. They also warn us, however, that this support may not last forever. We, in turn, reply that there are certain limits to the political and democratic legitimization of adopting laws and regulations made by others while we ourselves are not taking part in these procedures. We can wait, we say, but there are limits to this waiting. Therefore, although it may sound like a warning forecast, it is necessary to prevent a situation in which people are growing impatient, waiting for the goal to be finally implemented, but the goal is not drawing any closer.

[Sanetra] What stage of preparations are we at? Recently, Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych said that it may take up to 10 years to adjust our laws to the EU.

[Saryusz-Wolski] I believe that there are some sound arguments behind this prediction. However, it must be remembered that such a thing as the entire law of the EU does not exist. Our legal system is changing and so is the EU law. Thus, it is like the horizon, which cannot be caught up with.

Some regulations must be changed obligatorily because this is envisioned in the treaty. For the most part, the treaty expresses only intentions; nonetheless, there is no doubt that the more regulations we change and the

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more quickly we do it, the greater our chances will be to obtain earlier and "better" membership status. The European law is a huge, constantly changing complex structure that consists of many thousands of pages. No member state has adjusted to it 100-percent

We have covered part of the distance. As far as the law on competition goes, we have gone far, but where state assistance is concerned, we are still at the very beginning of the road. Nevertheless, we are quite far regarding the protection of intellectual property. It is difficult to calculate an average. Generally, the EU is praising us, but we have a great deal of work ahead of us. From the point of view of harmonizing the law, there is undoubtedly still more ahead of us than there is behind us. As for systemic solutions, most of the work has already been done: introduction of a market economy, legal state, parliamentary democracy, and a civil society. It is beyond doubt that we have carried out a most fundamental systemic transformation and adaptation to the EU. Now, to use builders' terminology, we have to put the finishing touches to the building; the walls have already been erected. Fortunately, we do not need to do everything at once. Certain adjustment steps will be taken at a later time, once we actually join the EU.

[Sanetra] In your view, what areas will be the most difficult?

[Saryusz-Wolski] We have divided problems into various categories. Some solutions are already being implemented; they belong to the A category. Some need legislative work only—they do not raise any doubts or cause political conflicts; these comprise the B category. The C category is rather costly. It consists of solutions concerning environmental protection, social or industrial standards. Their introduction entails costs, both for companies and the state budget. We cannot always afford this, and we will try to implement those solutions over a longer period of time. It all depends on money: how much we will be able to finance by ourselves and how generous the EU will be to us. As is known, it has not been very generous lately. There is also another group, the D category, whose regulations will remain unchanged—no one knows for how long because it will not be us but the other side that will decide this. These are regulations concerning, for example, the labor market as well as free movement of the work force. Thus, there are certain areas where we will ask for a transition period, and there are also areas in which the EU will want such a period.

[Sanetra] Under which category does our agriculture fall?

[Saryusz-Wolski] The thing is that it is still unknown what the EU agricultural policy will look like in the future. A reform is under way, and, roughly, it envisions transition from a system of subsidizing prices to a system that involves supporting incomes. Agricultural subsidies will not be given up, but they will be granted to a lesser degree. The reasoning behind this is to support agriculture in a way that does not distort economic performance. At the moment, the reform is surrounded by a favorable atmosphere. The Uruguay Round, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the World Trade Organization have led to liberalization in trade, including the agricultural sector. Market trends are also rather favorable. Demand is growing faster than supply, which makes sales easier. This is an opportunity that the EU will probably seize to adjust its prices to the level of world prices. Nonetheless, social issues will remain unresolved. This is why the EU will need tools to support peasants' incomes and rural areas, to create an infrastructure there, and to modernize the conditions of life and work in those areas; it does not have to be work in the food-production sector. I believe that this policy will be very specific in the year 2000.

Now, our agricultural policy is supported to a much smaller extent than policies in EU countries. It should also be noted that, in the EU, subsidies are being reduced or their structure is being altered, whereas in Poland policies of supporting agriculture are suspended between expectations and the capabilities of the state budget. It is necessary to find some intermediate solutions. Fortunately, no one is any longer seriously considering the possibility of Poland's joining the EU without its agriculture. This sector of our economy is too big to be excluded. After all, we should adjust to the EU as well as we can, and we should know about future EU policies as much as possible.

We should aspire to become not only a full but also a thoroughbred member of the EU, so that we will be able to occupy a place in its mainstream. I believe that our potential and social energy allow us to do that.

Poland: Interior Minister Identifies UOP Leaks in Oleksy Case

WS1806102896 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 17 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "KNYSZ": "Zacharski and Jasik Guilty? Siemiatkowski's Notification"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Warsaw Prosecutor's Office has launched an investigation into leaks in the Oleksy case from the Office of State Protection [UOP]," Interior Ministry Spokesman Ryszard Hincza reported.

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The Prosecutor's Office was notified by Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski. He claims that the sources of the leaks are Generals Henryk Jasik (former interior minister, dismissed by Oleksy last December) and Marian Zacharski (chief officer in charge of the Oleksy case). Siemiatkowski informed the special Sejm commission investigating the Oleksy case about this. According to deputies sitting on the commission, last week the minister accused the generals of carrying out materials from UOP that incriminated Aleksander Kwasniewski and handing them to Marek Krol, chief editor of the WPROST weekly. The materials are said to have served as a basis for the infamous article entitled "Treason." The source of the leak was established because the article published by the weekly contained the same errors as did the UOP materials.

The chief editor of WPROST denies that Gens. Zacharski and Jasik had ever handed him any UOP materials. Gen. Jasik himself denies ever having done so and declares that he is ready to stand before a court.

Poland: PM May Suggest 'Personnel Changes' in Cabinet

LD1806134496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz does not rule out a government reshuffle. The Cabinet's first six months in office ends in about two weeks and might result in changes in the government's composition.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] I do not rule out that, after the government's first half-year in office, after carefully observing the efforts of each member, I will forward proposals regarding personnel changes. [end recording]

The prime minister feels that a possible motion of no confidence in the government by the Freedom Union [UW] will signal to foreign partners a lack of stability in Poland.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] An unprecedented event is starting in Warsaw tomorrow—namely, the NATO workshops. In the presence of several dozen guest defense ministers and many guest prime ministers and presidents, we will discuss the future of NATO and the future of Poland, which is seeking participation in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. These very irresponsible types of initiatives, like the one announced by the Freedom Union [UW], without any sensible justification behind it, serve Poland appallingly badly. [end recording]

The prime minister announced that in two days' time he will meet the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] leadership to discuss the motion to dismiss Minister [for Ownership Transformations] Wieslaw Kaczmarek. A few dozen PSL deputies have added their names to this motion. The prime minister has deemed the coalition deputies's motion to be ill-considered.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] I feel this to be an ill-considered step. I cannot imagine that this sort of motion could be supported by a coalition grouping. And I do not think this will happen. [end recording]

Poland: UW Considers No Confidence Vote in Government

WS1806124796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 18 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "MAKO" under the "Day in Brief" rubric: "The Freedom Union Does Not Trust the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Freedom Union [UW] is to suggest a no-confidence vote in the Cimoszewicz Cabinet, UW deputies announced in Poznan. [Former Prime Minister] Hanna Suchocka claims that the prime minister is responsible for the entire government. Among the most ineffective Cabinet members, the former prime minister mentioned Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek (for the downfall of the Gdansk Shipyard), Minister of Health Jacek Zochowski, Minister of Culture Zdzislaw Podkanski, Minister of Education Jerzy Wiatr, and Minister of Internal Affairs Zbigniew Siemiatkowski. Suchocka said that the UW is to hold talks with other parliamentary clubs to discuss joint action to be taken if an attempt at overthrowing the government succeeds.

Poland: ROP Leaders Comment on Current Issues

WS1906082296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 17 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by "WZ, BECZ, E.M., and KG:" "ROP Will Foment a Revolution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Jan Olszewski: "We will vet the economy and the security service." Jacek Kurski: "The Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] is concealing the results of polls."*

The use of the staff from the times of the Polish People's Republic to build special services and structures has proved to be a failure. Former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, head of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], has told journalists in Wroclaw that it is necessary to build the entire apparatus of special services from the bottom up. He was asked in Wal-

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brzych on Saturday whether ROP would inspect the privatization of Porcelana. His reply was: "Yes. It would be necessary to review this measure in economic instead of political terms and demand that the robbed portion of our national wealth be returned. According to Roman law, property gained by means of crime and force cannot have legal protection."

Porcelana's labor collective and Henryk Swierczynski, owner of 70 percent of stock in the enterprise (S & K Holding), have been in conflict for several years.

ROP spokesperson Jacek Kurski called apologies by the Polish Foreign Ministry head for the pogrom in Kielce a scandal: "It was an abominable murder conducted by both the Security Administration [UB] and Kielce rogues provoked by UB. No one apologized to us for Poles who had been murdered in Stalin's prisons; however, it is known that Jews made up 30 percent of the UB apparatus."

Kurski complained in Warsaw on 16 June that the CBOS blocked the publication of the results of the second poll that was conducted in April and placed ROP second after the SLD (with only a 4-percent difference): "The results were sensational; they could have provided us with the support of new voters and could have influenced current political negotiations." According to Kurski, the results of April polls were made public only in May, together with those of the May polls, and no one noticed them. "Public opinion research centers are ruled by people of a liberal-leftist stance, who have an interest in lowering the rating of the right-wing forces."

On 22-23 May, the editorial office of GLOS also leveled accusations against the CBOS. CBOS chief Lena Kolarska-Bobinska explained this situation as follows: "Between elections, the CBOS usually publishes electoral preferences of our society on a monthly basis because we conduct our basic polls monthly. Sometimes we manage to conduct another poll (however, this is done irregularly due to the lack of means), and its results are then combined with the results of the following month's poll in order not to deprive our readers of the additional data."

Poland: ROP Program Critically Evaluated

96EP0065A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
11 May 96 No 19, p 18

[Article by Jerzy Baczynski, editor in chief of POLITYKA: "The May Manifesto: The Movement for the Regeneration of Poland—Take Away, Punish, Distribute"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Movement for the Regeneration of Poland (ROP) proclaimed on 3 May its platform, termed "A Contract With Poland." Since the presidential elections ROP leader Jan Olszewski and the nascent political groupings close to him have been gaining 10-12 percent support in successive polls. Lately, to be sure, the ROP's support has somewhat declined (8 percent in April), but much indicates that the Movement will win seats in the next Sejm and, as shown by POLITYKA's simulation tests, it may even form a government majority together with Solidarity and, e.g., the PSL [Polish Peasant Party]. This is sufficient reason for considering more closely the Movement's program planks as presented in the form of that "Contract" for the first time.

According to the Movement for the Regeneration of Poland, as indicated by its very name besides, this country is nowadays in a state of decay and ruin, to which it was brought jointly by the Communists, Lech Walesa, and the first Solidarity governments. They all, as J. Olszewski said in presenting the "Contract," "tried to build the Third Polish Republic on rotten PRL [Polish People's Republic] foundations," and "the traditional policy of ignoring the needs of the weak and poor, of decline of the family, of enfeebling Polish private enterprise, and of pilfering national wealth, leads to disaster and endangers national independence," the "Contract's" authors state. In Poland, as everywhere in the Third World, destitution, corruption, bribery, gangsterism, and the power held by foreign concerns and domestic *nomenklatura* are growing. For this very reason the ROP is offering a 20-point "Program for the Moral and Civil Regeneration of the Country."

The manifesto itself seems hardly in the proper order: The sequence and ranking of its discrete points seem fortuitous and it says little about the Movement's actual priorities. Judging from the comments of ROP organizers, however, it is Points 13 and 14 that are the key points of the entire program and should logically rank first. These points call for the "lustration" (purge) of individuals holding "important political, administrative, and judicial posts," and for so-called economic lustration. That is because the regeneration and moral renewal of the country must begin by settling the score with the past.

The slogan of lustration has, since the fall of the Olszewski government, been the principal distinguishing platform plank of Olszewski's party. On the other hand, the concept of economic lustration, previously unknown under that name, is a kind of innovation. The framers of the "Contract With Poland" define it as follows: "We shall take away from the former *nomenklatura* lawlessly appropriated national wealth. We shall punish those guilty of the big economic crimes—the FOZZ [Foreign Debt Servicing Fund], Art-B, and the perpetrators of al-

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cohol, ruble, mark, coal, and other scams. On the basis of applicable legal procedures all privatization projects done in violation of the law will be reviewed."

Even if we consider this whole program as sheer propaganda, the above definition of economic lustration suggests the introduction of some kind of drumhead courts, people's tribunals, that would follow special procedures. Generally speaking, "Taking away appropriated wealth from the former *nomenklatura*" simply cannot—quite aside from the question of the actual scale of "appropriation by the *nomenklatura*"—be done by means of civilized legal norms. It may seem strange that Jan Olszewski, a lawyer himself, advocates such breaches of law.

Unfortunately, the ROP's economic planks look no better. As a catalogue of promises they consist for the most part of the same elements as the electoral platforms of other Polish parties, regardless of whether they call themselves rightist or leftist. We have thus promises of reduced unemployment, increased outlays on education, revival of housing construction, development of agriculture, greater powers for local governments, a just income distribution, support for Polish industry, and so forth. Altogether it is an ensemble of political and economic commonplaces (although it is noteworthy that the text does not make any mention of the issue of integration into the European Union). But the most interesting reflections are provoked by the attempts to answer the question of how all this should be done.

For illustration, consider the important Point 12, "We Shall Promote Polish Industry" (my comments in parentheses—J.B.). The authors state, "To this end we shall make the zloty exchange rate more realistic (which means devaluation) and impose duties on goods constituting dishonest competition (antidumping proceedings already serve to combat dishonest competition; moreover, Polish duties already are very high and we cannot introduce new protective duties because this would provoke retaliation and violate Poland's international obligations). We shall halt the spiral of the steady rise in energy prices (what do Polish coal miners and fuel and power personnel say to that?). We shall slash the prime interest rate charged by the NBP [the National Bank of Poland], which is nowadays the prime mover of inflation (this interest rate can be cut only by the independent NBP and not by the government, even when the latter is dominated by a single party—that is, unless, as under communism, the independence of the central bank will become a fiction). We shall take immediate steps to reduce the current catastrophic deficit in the balance of trade (first, the deficit is not catastrophic; second, immediate measures can only mean devaluation of the zloty, which in its turn means higher inflation, and hence also higher NBP interest rates, which conflicts with the preceding sentence)...."

To fulfill its many promises in the economic domain the ROP relies, properly speaking, on just two instruments: lower interest rates and spending from Treasury funds. Cheap credit would be offered to businesses ("Point 4. We Shall Reduce Unemployment"), students (see Point 5 on loans for education), young married couples ("Point 9. We Shall Revive Housing Construction"), members of housing cooperatives (Point 10), and farmers (Point 11). Well, in a market economy there is no such thing as "cheap credit": If it is to be below the binding interest rate on the market, then somebody has to subsidize it (of a certainty, the state budget—yet the ROP is proposing a cut in taxes).

The ROP is as generous with Treasury assets as it is with "cheap credit"; these assets are to be spent on "government-guaranteed pension funds," on restitution of nationalized property, on paying debt arrears, on so-called universal property enfranchisement, meaning stock vouchers for the entire public and not just for employees, though with special consideration of workforces; on peasants, who will be allocated the land and equipment of state farms; on tenants, who shall acquire gratis the ownership of their cooperative, plant-owned, and municipally owned housing. Judging from this enumeration, either the ROP shall multiply Treasury assets like some present-day King Midas or it genuinely believes that the former *nomenklatura* has concealed somewhere from the public an entire Second Poland.

From the comments of the Movement's leaders it ensues that they view their party as the principal rallying center for the entire so-called Solidarity camp. The Freedom Union party, which ROP Spokesman Jacek Kurski defined as "the closest ally of the postcommunists," is not considered part of that camp. As for the trade union Solidarity itself, it is relegated to the position of an organizational rear echelon for the ROP. Besides, the ROP's platform openly includes all the principal platform planks of Solidarity (the draft of the Constitution, pension funds, health service reform, a profamily tax system, privatization vouchers for all, and so forth). In hastily proclaiming its "Contract With Poland" the ROP has as it were robbed Solidarity chairman Marian Krzaklewski of his platform planks, thus depriving that trade union's leaders of political initiative. The ROP has positioned itself as a political party standing above the trade-union movement, which it terms "ideologically close." In this design there is also no room for Lech Walesa, whom an alliance between the ROP and Solidarity would deprive of a political platform of his own as well as of a huge segment of his electorate from the previous presidential elections.

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The "Contract With Poland," proclaimed a year before the next parliamentary elections, appropriates in their entirety the platforms advocated so far by the principal contenders for the leadership of the Solidarity camp, Marian Krzaklewski and Lech Walesa. It is hardly unlikely that this may also have been a cardinal purpose of the May Manifesto.

Poland: Role, Strength of Opposition Parties

96EP0060A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 20 Apr 96 No 16, pp 31-33

[Article by Mariusz Janicki and Wieslaw Wladyka: "The Gearshift of Power: What Is the Purpose of the Opposition?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Opposition politicians much too often blame their political adversaries for their own failures, as if somebody were forbidding them to win elections. This inconsistency and the rather absurd feeling of being wronged produce their own consequences: He who has wronged us is our enemy, and there can be no dialogue with the enemy; he can only be combated by every means possible. Therefore, evidently, both the parliamentary and the extraparliamentary opposition so often cite ideology and history instead of facts. The question is whether and when will we have a chance for a modern opposition, which would politically legitimize not only democracy but also "unfair" rivals.

In the Polish political vocabulary the concept of the opposition has a twofold meaning. On the one hand the opposition is still thought to consist of those constituencies that, while not necessarily engaged in politics at present, used to oppose the regime before 1989 and now have become frozen as it were in a pose of protest, believing that the old divisions and struggles still mean something and that former merits provide historical and moral justification for leading the nation. Nowadays the radical exponents of this kind of opposition include 1980 Gdansk Shipyard striker Anna Walentynowicz and Andrzej Gwiazda.

Then there is the other, newly bred kind of opposition (or rather kinds, because they were and are several), meaning the kind opposed to every successive governing alignment in post-1989 Polish democracy. This is a modern opposition because it is part of the new system of society and it engages in politics in a new manner; to it both presidential and parliamentary elections as well as the balance of power in the Sejm with the division into the governing majority and the, precisely, opposition minority, are constitutional and fundamental issues.

Then also, considering that since 1993 the parties viewed as postcommunist have been in power, and to a growing extent at that, the old concept of the opposition is being resurrected emotionally and as an idea, although a sharp dispute is continuing over which groupings are entitled to inherit the mantle of the genuine opposition from the heroic era. The big question is which grouping nowadays is implementing most fully a program of struggle for independence and democracy and most consistently opposes the reflux of the "Commune." Naturally, it is those who, after the lost presidential elections, have adopted militant new names: the Movement for Rebuilding Poland, the Patriotic Camp, the Peasant-Independence Coalition. Here we face again a fundamental struggle, nearly a descent back to the conspiratorial underground. Besides, the concept of "rightism" is being used just as instrumentally, in the sense of its being opposed to "leftist" postcommunists (hence also in the diagram [not reproduced here] we group the parties according to how they define themselves rather than on the basis of their platforms).

When the Opposition Used To Govern

These semantic complexities at times hinder deciphering the present-day political geography, and in general they also do not make it any easier to play the role of the opposition in a modern democracy.

It is characteristic that, according to its opponents, the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], which after all used to be in the opposition vis-a-vis the successive post-Solidarity governments, had not deserved the name of the "opposition" before its electoral victory in 1993. It was the opposition that had been in power and thus justice was done, whereas the postcommunists were simply rulers who had been successfully removed from power—with some people even believing that there was no room for them in the regained democracy and independence.

Thus, quite diverse meanings are ascribed to the concept of the opposition, and nowadays the opposition in Poland exists in several varieties. In Poland we distinguish three principal varieties: objective (substantive), principled, and fundamentalist. The first is closest to European standards in the sense that it involves not some destructive struggle but conflict between specific rationales. As for principled opposition, that consists in accepting the principles of the democratic game binding nowadays in this country, but it also consists in programmed political negation of the governing political force for moral, historical, and ideological reasons. As for fundamentalist opposition, it consists in rejecting not only the current coalition cabinet but also the entire political context, the entire situation deriving from, among other things, the "betrayal" at Magdalenka [site of roundtable negotiations between the Communists and Solidarity, February-April 1989].

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In a parliamentary democracy the classical opposition is considered to be those political parties that lost the struggle for power on their own or by joining the majority coalition. Remaining in the minority, these parties are waiting for their next electoral chance, and that waiting consists in gathering forces and arguments at the expense of the parties in power. Hence the tremendous role of any public debate, and especially of parliamentary debates, because it is primarily in the Sejm that a party's rationale and voting can weaken the adversary. The weakened adversary can then be defeated in the electoral race and thereupon the opposition party can itself begin to govern. Such at least is the model, patterned on that of West Europe, which has become accepted in Poland (in the United States it is different because the parliament there is in a natural, one could say institutional, opposition to the executive power of the president).

Manipulators of Democracy

The above is roughly speaking. But before the game in parliament begins, one has to have a seat therein. Thus the situation is different for parties that have failed to pass through the eye of the needle and get more than 5 percent of the vote and thus have no representatives of their own on Wiejska Street (Sejm building in Warsaw), or that failed to have their presidential candidate win the runoff elections and move into Namiestnikowski Palace.

That extraparliamentary opposition often tries to account for its failures by questioning in principle the binding rules of the game and offering some special interpretations that can hardly be reduced to a simple prescription. The particular Polish democracy is governed by those who benefit from it most, manipulate it, derive various advantages from it, and enter into secret deals even when formally they remain in the opposition to each other in this prearranged theater of open politics.

Jan Olszewski, leader of the Movement for Rebuilding Poland, is preparing for the next elections—which he has a considerable chance of winning—under the slogan of combating the existing "alignment" (God forbid, not combating democracy, because that is better left unsaid). He is attacking with equal energy both the postcommunists and the post-Solidarity parties sitting in parliament, and especially Freedom Union, which is supposedly sick with the "roundtable" syndrome, as well as the *gruba kreska* ["thick line," the notion that the names of former *nomenklatura* scheduled to be penalized should be crossed out with a thick line]. In this way he is actually obstructing the formation of a bipolar political scene in Poland, with the postcommunists located at one pole and the post-Solidarity people at the other, which, while of course somewhat of an anachronism, would after all somehow clarify the political geography and facilitate conducting the struggle for power.

The kind of opposition that could be termed fundamentalist basically reduces to a revolutionary program: an abrupt change of "alignment," that is, of everything, even though its methods and techniques are for the time being adapted to electoral rules. Nevertheless, many supporters of the lawyer and former prime minister Olszewski, such as Z. Wrzodak of the Ursus Tractor Plant, would not reject the idea of practicing "democracy on the street" instead of in parliament. In one way or another, an electoral success of the Movement for Rebuilding Poland would cause considerable political trouble to not only the SLD but also Freedom Union and threaten the entire existing "alignment," because Jan Olszewski seems to advocate the strategy of a struggle for "all or nothing" and does not intend to accept a compromise with anybody. His negotiating skills became evident while he was prime minister when talks on broadening the governing coalition took place with intervals of silence lasting as long as half an hour and longer.

We Play and Overturn the Chessboard

These days Jan Olszewski allows new applicants to join the Movement for Rebuilding Poland only according to his rules. But while Olszewski has at least a chance—as shown by public opinion polls—of getting into parliament, the situation of the parties that will not win seats there or will lose seats (Christian-National Union, Center Accord, and certainly also the Confederation for an Independent Poland and Labor Union face this possibility) is much worse. To exist outside the parliament is a difficult time of trial for any opposition party because it then faces the threat of either fading away or being swallowed by stronger rivals. Solidarity is behaving somewhat like the Movement for Rebuilding Poland in that it, on the one hand, engages in detailed negotiations with the government, and on the other negates the entire six years of political and market reforms. At any moment the leaders of Solidarity may rise from the table and declare that they will no longer play this odious game.

It was uniquely paradoxical, for example, that the Suchocka government fell precisely on the motion of, and owing to, Solidarity, which became increasingly opposed to it. Without going into the coeval and historical reasons why it did happen, it has to be stated that the machinery itself of opposition criticism reflected some political normalcy typical of classic parliamentary gamesmanship. Later, after September 1993, everything again became complicated, or rather simplified because the "us-them" dichotomy regained its predominance.

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One unusual consequence is the growing clout of the extraparliamentary opposition, as measured chiefly by its presence in certain media, including television, which have often quite deliberately undertaken the struggle against the postcommunist winners in the elections. In Western democracies extraparliamentary parties exist in the obscure limbo of those whom the public has rejected, but not so in this country.

The electoral victory of Aleksander Kwasniewski led to comments that the political equilibrium has been upset, with democracy tilting too much to the left. Attempts were even made to restrain the victors and advise them to curb their appetites and surrender some power to the opposition. In politics such attempts usually produce no results, as it soon turned out. Actually, moreover, they are naive and rather insincere. Nevertheless, the existence of this disequilibrium complicates or even makes it impossible for the enfeebled minority to adopt the stance of objective opposition and thus prompts it to become principled opposition, which is, in addition, strengthened by ideological and historical arguments (such as that the postcommunists are ruining the country, have not made a reckoning with the past, have not come clear about their financial dealings or about tennis at Mer [name of tennis courts], and in general that they are horrid).

It Is Easy To Lose Face

Thus there is the problem of what kind of opposition should be adopted in order to best promote the strategy of one's party. Should we struggle against the governing alignment always and everywhere, deny its being right in anything, and basically deny that it has any good intentions? So that our sole proposition is that the government should be changed as a basic prerequisite? Or should we react objectively to the motions proposed and measures taken, meaning that our attitude and vote should be decided by considerations of merit? Sometimes the government is right and the president is not mistaken, and then the matter requires our support. We observe that nowadays the opposition has a big problem in defining its objective position and is rather inclined to hew to positions of principled protest and principled refusal vis-a-vis both the government and the president. That was clearly reflected in the stance of the parliamentary opposition on wage indexing and taxes. It used to be that the Solidarity governments also suspended indexing and the Solidarity minister of finance did not raise the tax thresholds, though bound to do so by the law. Now taxes and wage indexing are being seized upon by the Solidarity opposition as its political weapons. It could be said that this is the right of every opposition, which should continually vex those in power, but on the other hand the voters' memory is not necessarily short and an excess of zeal can ultimately backfire on the zealots. It is not unlikely that the budgetary obligations that would be nowadays extorted from the government by the opposition would have to be after a time implemented by the opposition itself when it comes to power and that there will be no money for that. The concept of continuity of governance, of inheriting the entire budget as is, is slowly percolating into the awareness of politicians. The principled kind of opposition, looking to score from every mistake made by the governing coalition, on the principle of the conventional hard parliamentary game, is fully accommodated in the rules of democracy, although sometimes it ends up in a blind alley. One has to be very careful not to lose face.

There is no end to such complexities, for it turns out that a kind of opposition also occurs within the governing coalition itself, with the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] voting in opposition to the SLD on many particular issues. It also is known that these parties do not have the same views on the Concordat, on privatization, on the fiscal policy of the government, or on the concepts of administrative division of the country. For the time being these differences are somehow glossed over in the interest of mutually beneficial cooperation, but sometimes little is lacking for the coalition to crack apart and explode into smithereens. Similarly, the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] now and then expresses its dissatisfaction with its partner from the SLD or the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland]. Recently there even was a joint conference of Ewa Spychalska's trade unionists with the leaders of the PSL. This is probably the clearest manifestation of an internal opposition that, while substantive, is somewhat accommodating. This undercurrent also extends in a way to Labor Union and the Polish Socialist Party. Other than that there is a vacuum.

To Join in Order To Split

More even, within the PSL itself there exists a faction opposed to its chairman, and it is represented in the government side by side with the politicians reputed to be close to Waldemar Pawlak. Incidentally, PSL-ers have considerable historical experience in combining the tactic of cogovernance with that of being in the opposition. Already PSL leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk in the years 1945-47 demonstrated—to be sure, under extreme conditions imposed from outside—that it was possible to be simultaneously a deputy prime minister and the leader of the largest opposition party. Besides, any coalition is exposed to the action of centrifugal forces and a situation is conceivable in which, following

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the collapse of the coalition, the former partners in governance scatter in both directions, with some joining the new power alignment and others reinforcing the camp of the opposition. In one way or another, a consideration of these opposition energies leads to the conclusion that Polish politics develops chiefly by way of forces that are centrifugal and dispersing rather than integrative and cumulative.

In the parliament that will emerge from the 1997 elections only a few parties will count, if present-day polls are to be believed: the SLD, the ROP (Movement for Rebuilding Poland), Solidarity, the PSL, and Freedom Union. Properly speaking there will exist only two realistic possibilities for forming a governing coalition: either the SLD and the PSL or the ROP, Solidarity, and the PSL, with Freedom Union being excluded in either case. Everything indicates that Leszek Balcerowicz's Freedom Union will not be able to reach an agreement with the ROP's Jan Olszewski, and that it will reject an alliance with the SLD. Once again the PSL will be a valuable card and will demand a political price for its support. Except that whichever party will be the governing one, the opposition to it will by then not even be principled but fundamentalist, with Freedom Union leading it, and at the same time it will not be significant.

There will be a new state of disequilibrium, since then between the government and the opposition there will not exit even a modicum of cooperation, understanding of shared interest, or attempts to at least reach an agreement on defining the Polish raison d'etat. The very principle of parliamentarism, and of the opposition as its organic part, will face a dramatic ordeal. "Since democracy consists in governance by means of persuasion and debate," John H. Hallowell states in his "Moral Foundations of Democracy," "it implies the existence of what in the British tradition is termed the loyal opposition. So long as the opposition respects the fundamental principles underlying the democratic system, it remains not just legitimate but indispensable to the proper functioning of the government."

The Curse of the Majority

The benefits ensuing to democracy from the existence of the opposition are manifold and difficult to enumerate completely. In the end, the opposition represents the interests of the minority (or rather of various minorities at that) vis-a-vis the majority. As such, its function is virtually institutional and, so to speak, philosophical. Here we consider chiefly the political role of the opposition as a natural component of the power elite. Clearly, the stronger and more efficient the opposition is, while remaining loyal to democracy, the stronger and more efficient democracy becomes. This can be seen in the stable Western democracies where nowadays individual political forces win elections by just several percent of the vote and the results of referendums are sometimes decided by fractions of a percent. This shows that although the victor can, if he is persistent, assume all executive power, he still basically cannot govern if nearly one-half of the society is opposed.

In Poland there reigns the rather widespread opinion that the weakness of the opposition is practically a danger to national security, that really in our country this is problem number one, because the interests of the minority—which is not so small again, after all, as the elections show—are represented at random, in an uncoordinated and cohesive manner. At the same time, if some opposition nourished by new hope and energy emerges into view, this at once arouses fears that it will not be loyal to democratic principles in its actions, that it will at once, upon, say, receiving 10-percent social support, desire to become the self-appointed conscience of the nation. The impression arises that the so-called objective opposition wants a great deal from the governing coalition, while principled opposition wants everything and fundamentalist opposition rejects both shared governance and any opposition whatsoever, with no quarter given.

It may be assumed that, through trial and error, Polish democracy will with time develop a model of governance incorporating permanently a strong role of the opposition. Theoreticians of democracy (principally Amelia Lijphart, and also Giovanni Sartori) point out, however, that if "the democracy of majority governance" brings disappointment, which is natural especially in a multiparty system, then there still remains the so-called democracy by consensus; "Fragmented and deeply divided societies cannot base themselves on majority governance—they have a choice between either consensus or total absence of democracy." Such consensus consists on mutual exploration of a system of governance under which the majority principle is weakened or even abolished and governance is based on agreements among various political forces. An additional insurance against dictatorial majority rule should be the multiplicity of important government institutions remaining outside parliamentary games. this concerns, among other things, the civil service, the security council, and the entire structure of the judiciary including the procurature. Despite the bad recent lesson learned, referendums should not be abandoned. Lastly, there still remains the potential role of the president, who may be either a great statesman or a promoter of narrow partisan interests. And finally, there is really no substitute for common decency and goodwill.

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Poland: Solidarity Holds Platform Conference

96EP0065B Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 10 May 96 No 19, pp 4-5

[Article by T.W.: "Banners and Bread: Solidarity and Politics—For the Development of Poland; Platform Conference of Solidarity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This was the third platform conference, convened by tradition in the Warsaw Polytechnic building by the Mazowsze Region of Solidarity. This time the basis for discussion was comments by academics. There was no dearth of conflicting opinions and sharp polemics.

The main address was delivered by Professor Jadwiga Staniszkis, whose paper was devoted to Solidarity's strategy for the coming parliamentary elections and, more broadly, to its activities "for the development of Poland." That strategy should be based on three foundations: first, the role of Solidarity as the principal, or rather sole, force for reform, also as regards the country's economic efficiency and functioning of democratic institutions. Poland should not be a capitalist oligarchy; we need a people's capitalism. The second foundation is electoral strategy. It should consist in forming a coalition with other parties.

"Solidarity's Electoral Drive"

In this context J. Staniszkis proposed "Solidarity's electoral drive" for concluding broad alliances with various political forces of the center-right, including both the Movement for the Regeneration of Poland and other groupings. As regards the dispute, "Walesa or Olszewski," Solidarity should treat the former as a respected historic figure and the latter as the leader of the most dynamic political force in Poland. The drive's strategy will serve to energize patriotic and nationalist constituencies on the local scale, in regions, and in the country as a whole. It has room for people from various parties, but as individuals and not as representatives of their parties. It also has room for persons who are not accommodated within existing political alignments, for businessmen, academics, and so forth, on condition that they declare their acceptance of the broad reform program of Solidarity. The third foundation is the implementation of that program after the elections, primarily in parliament. Here a political contract with the candidates standing for elections under "Solidarity's electoral drive" is indispensable. An up-to-date model of a consultative body such as is already embryonically present in the form of the Trilateral Commission is needed. Such models exist in modern societies, e.g., in Austria, Holland, or Sweden.

Vision and Values

J. Staniszkis offered the reminder that the engine of Solidarity's success in the 1980's contained two elements: the values and vision of a just society and an efficient economy. The faith that they would be fully attained, that another utopia could be created, was naive. But today we also know that people need such a vision and it should be aspired to. "It bestows strength, a feeling of dignity, and thanks to it we become better persons." We must bear in mind this message of the primeval Solidarity.

Dr. Tomasz Zukowski presented an analysis of the political scene of Poland and the place occupied on it by the main political forces. The determinants of these places are: first, the free-market or social option, and, second, the option of a positive attitude toward religious values vis-a-vis the option of a secular attitude.

On that scene Solidarity plays three different roles, as it were. First, NSZZ [Solidarity Trade Union] has about 2 million members. Second, it is an organization with, as opinion polls indicate, some 15 million supporters, with 45 percent of Poles expressing trust in it. A somewhat smaller percentage do not trust it; that is because of the price paid by Solidarity when it accepted responsibility for an extremely difficult period of reforms. Since 1993 Solidarity has been gradually regaining broad public trust as the main opposition to the current governing coalition. The third role of Solidarity is that of a contender in the coming parliamentary elections.

The New Order and Independence

The electorate declaring the wish to vote for Solidarity ranges from 15 to as much as 20 percent. Thus, Solidarity in its three roles is nowadays the most popular representative of the right side of the political scene, verging close to that scene's center.

Solidarity has a chance to rally round itself the moderate side of that scene. If we are to explore a compromise on the right side, the most effective way could be a gradual construction of common platforms with the right, a broadening of platform consensus, and the creation of a commonalty of values.

Dr. Wlodzimierz Petrow presented a comparison of Poland with 11 other postcommunist countries as regards political structures. He also analyzed the possible unfolding of the political situation. He declared that all the political parties, and not just the rightist ones, are characterized by relatively low membership. Even within the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] the gamut of divisions within it is both deep and broad.

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Dr. Krzysztof Cilke stressed that Solidarity is perhaps Poland's most original contribution to the world. It is unprecedented for a trade union to be at the same time a political movement fighting for a new order and independence. Solidarity's charisma consists in that it had responded to the nation's need for both banners and bread, that it united the worker ethos with the national ethos.

New Perils

Both the speakers and the conference participants stressed that at present one of the greatest perils in Poland is the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a single grouping, as if emulating the Third World. Solidarity is definitely opposed to this; it does not consent to an oligarchy. Its opposition carries with it the chance that Poland may yet join the First World. Another peril is the rather popular principle of the "only applicable" ideology of change—the reverse of Marxism, that is, extreme *lesseferyzm* ["laissez-faire-ism"]. The reified view of man must be combated and his treatment as a subject rather than an object, in accordance with the teachings of John Paul II, must be promoted. Also necessary is the regeneration of Solidarity, also in the literal meaning of the word "solidarity" with a lower-case "s," as a movement not against someone but against something, as Marian Krzaklewski emphasized.

Several discussants offered the reminder that Solidarity must indeed again raise its banners, which would mean, among other things, its active presence in politics.

Polemics and Disputes

Maciej Jankowski said he thinks that the decision on with which parties to form an electoral coalition will be taken by the National Congress of Delegates in June. And Marcin Tyrna was of the opinion that this decision must be final, because it is high time to decide instead of prolonging discussions. Persons on whom their fellow Solidarity members bestow their trust should not shrink from the responsibility of making that decision. On the other hand, Jan Tomaszewski stated that discussion is necessary, though at a proper time.

Zygmunt Wrzodak said he doubted the accuracy of opinion polls. "How can it be," he asked, "that politicians who represent the purely Polish patriotic option hold, according to the polls, such a low degree of trust? From experience we know that the reality is completely different." Wrzodak believes that inaccurate polls promote a kind of "creation of a second reality."

Zygmunt Wrzodak [head of Solidarity at the Ursus Tractor Plant] also believes that the electoral program of Solidarity should be more aggressive, stress the antiworker and antinational policy of the communists, and allow for lustration within its own ranks as well. "And only one coalition is possible—between the Movement for the Regeneration of Poland and Solidarity, for reasons of both party platform and the considerable dynamism of the Movement." M. Krzaklewski argued against this notion.

After the Elections—Then What?

An electoral platform should not consist of empty verbiage; it must contain specifics. Maciej Jankowski said that, and everyone agreed. Within the alliances under the broad umbrella of Solidarity the identity and role of Solidarity itself as a trade union should not be forgotten. That also should be borne in mind. And Andrzej Smirnow said that even before the elections, while drafting the electoral lists, we as Solidarity should focus on persons with a broader vision of Poland's problems, who understand the Polish raison d'etat.

Several discussants stressed the great importance of the experience gained by the Senate Solidarity Caucus, which, as M. Tyrna stated, has learned the rules of the parliamentary game and how to form occasional coalitions for specific purposes.

Poland: Visas Not To Be Required of Former Soviet Citizens

LD1906111396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1023 GMT 19 Jun 96

[By Aleksandr Potemkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] WARSAW, June 19 (Itar-Tass)—Despite the pressure from the West and difficulties the country experiences in connection with the inflow of foreigners "from beyond the eastern border," Poland will not introduce visas for former Soviet citizens, said Polish Interior Minister Zbigniew Semiontkowski at an international conference on migration on the European continent which ended in the Polish capital on Tuesday.

According to the minister, his country does not intend to pursue the policy of visa restrictions on its eastern border from "moral considerations," since it repeatedly advocated cancelling visas and restrictions in migration of citizens.

Each foreigner enjoys the same rights in Poland as its citizens unless he or she violates law, Semiontkowski stressed.

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On discussing questions of migration and relations between immigrants and indigenous population in the countries of the continent, the conference, attended by representatives from governments of a score of European states and several international organisations, announced the launching of a new programme of the Council of Europe under the motto "Tension and Tolerance".

It provides for several measures aimed at improving the situation of immigrant ethnic groups in countries of residence, including lower unemployment among immigrants, at fighting manifestations of racism and at taking better account of ethnic problems in the operation of state administration services.

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Romania: Iliescu Discusses EU Membership, German Relations

AU1806194096 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 17 Jun 96 p 7

[Report by "ay": "Bucharest Waiting for Signals From Bonn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest—According to Romanian President Ion Iliescu, chances are that many German politicians who have so far been reserved on his country's EU membership will change their positions. He knows that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has also been quite restrained in that respect, but thinks he will be able to change that during his visit to Germany from 25 to 28 June.

Talking to German correspondents in Bucharest, Iliescu said that this "change" in Germany's position constitutes an urgently necessary signal. He will pay Germany the first official visit of a Romanian president after the end of the Ceausescu dictatorship. Iliescu has met Kohl several times already; one of these occasions was the EU summit in Essen.

Iliescu severely rejected the approach of grouping the candidates for EU membership in "ranks," whereby many people expect the group that includes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to be the first to join the EU, while the other countries would be accepted later. Such a procedure would equal discrimination against Romania. Iliescu pointed out that Romania was among the first countries to apply for membership and that, contrary to other Central European states, the vast majority of the population and all parties advocate membership.

In his view, the EU could also benefit from Romania's membership: First, the entire region would be stabilized economically and politically, and, second, the EU would be strengthened as a trade bloc by gaining an additional market of 23 million consumers, located at the crossroads between Asia and Europe.

The president attributes great importance to intensifying relations with German industry. He is also hoping for a signal in that respect; beside an investment protection agreement, several contracts on cooperation and investment projects are expected to be signed during his visit.

In the past, Romania was clearly in the shadow of its neighbor Hungary and other Central European states in terms of investment. Yet, this has changed over the past 12 months. Foreign investment increased by almost 50 percent during that period. With some 5,500 joint ventures and firms who invested over $170 million in Romania, Germany has become the country's leading partner in investments. Total foreign investment was $1.75 billion at the end of May. At some $160 million, Germany is followed by South Korea, which has taken over the former Citroen car factory and launched a major investment project in the port of Constanza recently.

Iliescu vehemently pointed out that Romania is not an underdeveloped, or even an undeveloped country. Not only does Romania have a traditional industrial structure, which needs to be improved, but it is also the second-biggest market in Central Europe, second only to Poland. Romania plays a special role in linking East and West, for instance through the Black Sea Cooperation Zone. The traditional silk route across the southern states of the former Soviet Union will become an oil route in the not too distant future, when the planned and agreed oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Romania and western Europe are opened, Iliescu said.

Romania: Defense Minister on NATO, Relations With Hungary

AU1806202196 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 18 Jun 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Zsolt Ivan Nagy in Temesvar; date not given: "The Romanian Defense Minister Fears for Trianon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Surprising statements have been made in Bucharest often in recent months on the possible consequences if Hungary becomes a member of NATO before Romania. We interviewed Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca about this and about developments in bilateral relations. Gheorghe Tinca told us that he expects to meet Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti in Bucharest in early July.

[Nagy] In your view, what are Hungarian-Romanian relations like, including the cooperation between the two armies?

[Tinca] I would call the system of relations between Romania and Hungary rich, and this also applies to the cooperation between the two Armies. I always felt that my Hungarian colleague Gyorgy Keleti endeavors to further develop these contacts, and I also endeavor for the same. The large number of our joint military actions shows this. Our intergovernmental relations are also good, and I do not think that there are many people in Romania who feel that there is lack of realism and readiness for dialogue in the Horn cabinet in Hungary or that the Horn cabinet does not want to find a compromise solution in the basic treaty issue. I would add that we have also achieved promising results in

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the economic sphere. Thus, it is not the Hungarian Government that bothers me; instead, the policy of irredentist and extremist circles in Hungary and abroad bothers me. It is not pleasant for a Romanian to hear speeches that criticize the Trianon Treaty and present our nation in a bad light. It is not pleasant to listen to the Hungarian lobby in the West, a lobby that states untrue things about Romania. In my opinion, the manifestations of these extremists also hinder the development of bilateral relations.

[Nagy] In your view, what could be the consequences of a situation in which Hungary becomes a NATO member before Romania?

[Tinca] Romania cannot and does not want to hinder Hungary's possible earlier NATO membership. Nor is Romania interested in taking any measures if this happens. However, we think it is our obligation to declare that such a decision could affect the atmosphere of our bilateral relations and of the regions' stability and security. When the U.S. military bases were set up in Hungary, there were people who declared that the time had come to realize their decades-old dreams.

[Nagy] Do you mean here the reannexation of Transylvania?

[Tinca] Of course; I think this is the issue here. If they attack Trianon, it is obvious that this criticism refers to the current Romanian-Hungarian border. And the festivities organized on the occasion of the 1100 years of the Magyar conquest [of Hungary] are full of manifestations that are offensive to the Romanians. Of course, there are also people among these two nations who follow our relations with realism and want to develop these relations. However, we should not forget the offenses either. Returning to your question above, we cannot and do not want to hinder Hungary's earlier NATO membership; however, we would like to draw the attention to things that could happen. I see very clearly certain Hungarian and foreign circles who, misinterpreting Hungary's NATO membership, declare that this is the moment when they can realize their old dreams.

[Nagy] But the Hungarian Government repeatedly distanced themselves from such declarations and rejected even the idea of border modification.

[Tinca] That is true. I always claimed that we cannot blame the present Hungarian Government for anything. I admit that they have the right to defend Hungary's interests, just like the cabinet in Budapest must also admit that we also have the right to defend Romanian interests. But we live in democracy, and nobody can guarantee that another government of historians will not get into power in Budapest sometime in the future.

[Nagy] How do you evaluate the role of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania regarding NATO membership?

[Tinca] It is very difficult to live together with someone whom you believe to be your friend and who keeps repeating that he would like to separate and wants a different life. These things lead to a feeling of antipathy among the Romanians. Nobody knows how these things develop. Obviously, every Romanian follows the efforts aimed at the creation of autonomies on ethnic basis. There is no such thing anywhere in Europe, and I do not see any reason why Romania should be a pioneer in this respect. Romanians and Hungarians are capable of living together, even if they do not always agree on everything. In the intention to separate, I can only see a concept connected with the attacks on Trianon.

Romania: Minister Tinca on 1995 Army Activity, 1996 Tasks

AU1706185996 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 12 Jun 96 p 2

["Excerpt" of the '1995 Balance Sheet' report presented by Romanian National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca to the special session to examine the 1995 activity of the Romanian National Defense Ministry; in Bucharest on 11 June]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Yesterday, on 11 June, at the headquarters of the Romanian National Defense Ministry, a special session was held dedicated to examining the activity of that ministry in 1995. We are publishing excerpts from the report read on that occasion by National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca.*

The reform of our military organization did not conclude at the end of 1995. The principal effort made by the central bodies of the MApN [National Defense Ministry], as well as those of the various categories of the armed forces, and the territorial military bodies is to be channeled to achieve especially the following objectives: consolidation of the institution of the civilian minister and the clear defining of the political and military attributions at the level of the ministry; improvement of the activity of training and commanding the Army at the level of the General Chief of Staff, as a new structure; ensuring the democratic control of civil society over the Army; improvement of the organization and operative structures, as well as that of the latter's leadership system simultaneously with maintaining their combat ability at an even higher level; setting up a Rapid Reaction Force; reorganization of the legislative system, as well as that of the territorial military bodies; continuation of

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the restructuring and reorganization of military education; ensuring interoperability with the modern armies (....)

Modernizing Arms and Military Equipment

The principal objectives pursued in the domain of bestowing the Army with combat equipment are the following: modernization of currently existing equipment and armament of the Army to expand their lifespan and increase their performance; modernization of the MiG-21 jets, IAR-330 helicopters, Romanian-made TR-85 M1-type middle class panzers, infantry combat vehicles, STAR 1 M-type low-height radars, and 2x30-caliber antiaircraft cannons; equipping the Army with new, high-performance armament systems meeting the required precision, mobility, flexibility, and interoperability standards; such armament would be: amphibious armored personnel carriers driven by a single motor, 9 mm-caliber pistols, A-960-type infrared-guided fighter aircraft missiles, night vision equipment, or the C-751 and C-801 air force and antiaircraft automated equipment systems (....)

The Problem That Hurts Most: the Budget

To proceed rhythmically and constantly to achieve the established objectives in the reorganization, modernization, and reeqipment of the Army, it is absolutely necessary to know the approximate budget to be earmarked to it over a period of four to six years; the detailed planning of the army budget should be done each year for the following two-year period, so that the funds needed by the defense could be correlated better with the genuine financial possibilities of the state.

To utilize the budget resources most efficiently, we will have to fundamentally change our conception of organizing and carrying out the combat training of the troops by giving up everything that is not productive (demonstrative drills, centralized meetings, large-scale drills, national-level contests, etc.) (....)

Simultaneously with the measures to reorganize Romania's army, we also acted to increase its ability to pass smoothly, by means of mobilization, from the state of peace to the state of war.

The check-ups we carried out in 1995 showed that the mobilization plans of the majority of our military bodies are merely partially viable, this being a consequence of the incertitude regarding our national economy's possibility to ensure the necessary human and material resources, which in turn is due to the transition process to market economy. (....)

Ulcers, Hypertension, Nervous System Ailments

The health of Army personnel in 1995 was termed good, as 88.16 percent of the military cadres who underwent medical checkups were found healthy, and only 12.4 percent [figures as published] were found to be suffering from various ailments. Among the latter hypertension ranks first, occurring in 9.21 percent of the cases, followed by problems of the nervous system with 9.2 percent, and ulcers with 9.0 percent. (....)

Many believe that physical exercise is just a fashion or a hobby, something that is strange to our people. Watching one's bodyweight is considered a frivolous preoccupation, something by which one wishes to increase one's sex appeal. Those who think in this way are utterly mistaken and should follow the example of other armies, where proper bodyweight is an eliminatory precondition in a military career. This is why we will insist on keeping physical exercise compulsory and on increasing its quality to meet the established standards, as it is our belief that by doing so we will improve the health condition of the Army and contribute to augmenting the troops' operative capacity.

Thirty Dead; 61 Wounded

One of the principal directions of our efforts within the general framework of actions intended to secure the combat ability of the Army was the one made to strengthen military order and discipline.

The measures taken to that purpose yielded positive results, which, however, were limited to decreasing infractions, and influenced to a lesser extent decreasing the number of accidents compared with the previous year. One can assert this if one considers that the number of such accidents, on the whole, dropped significantly (14) but the number of the dead (30) and wounded (61) increased.

Of the 1,102 individuals involved in accidents, 508 were military cadres—civilian employees and other persons employed under contract—which represents 38 percent of the personnel, and which, if compared to similar incidents involving soldiers doing their military service—62 percent—reflects almost precisely the civilian-servicemen ratio in the Army structure. This highlights the fact that there is an undesired equality between the two categories regarding their spirit to observe military order and discipline.

The examination of the centralized data at the Army General Staff led to the conclusion that of the 694 servicemen who perpetrated the respective acts, 159 had criminal records.

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We found that the proportion of such events that happened on Army premises or in connection with Army service dropped, which proves that order has improved. However, the number of such events outside Army premises increased, which can be ascribed to shortcomings in the education of the soldiers before they were drafted.

Losses Worth 2.7 Billion Lei

In 1995 the army units reported material losses worth 2.7 billion lei, due to imputable causes, money that is to be recovered from the persons who caused them. [passage omitted]

Due to the fact that the majority of grave events and material losses caused to the Army had a penal nature, following investigations completed by authorized bodies in 1995 a number of 30 officers, 85 warrant officers and noncommissioned officers, 35 military cadres employed under contract, and 634 servicemen and civilian employees have been prosecuted by military courts for the perpetration of such grave acts.

An analysis of the factors that led to such a disciplinary state indicated certain causes, which, being rooted in the current state of our society, influenced the way of thinking and acting of some members of the military personnel, determining them to violate the regulations and perpetrate grave acts. Such factors are:

—intensification of the infractions, manifested by an increase in human aggressiveness, corruption, and the trend to obtain material and financial gain without work;

—a drop in the quality of the draftees and the predisposition of many of them to violate the law, a reason because of which prior to their army service they were sentenced penally by courts, and after beginning service in the army they also influenced the social behavior of their colleagues;

—augmentation of undisciplined behavior while operating motor vehicles, which led to an increase in the number of highway accidents with military victims;

—the existence of certain deficiencies in the leadership style of the troops, manifested by managerial laissez-faire in the act of command, the inertia of certain officers occupying high-responsibility posts, the insufficiently correct perception of the particularities of the current period, and the nonrealization, in due time, of the genuine problems facing the units and subunits under certain officers' command;

—insufficient training of the soldiers to be able to correctly carry out their normal and guard duties, as well as the lack of sufficient skills to properly handle their weapons, the latter leading to an increase in the number of people shot dead or wounded. (....)

PARP—NATO

One of the measures by which we firmly embarked on the path of the complex process of [NATO] integration is represented by our joining the Analysis and Reviewing Process of the Partnership Program (PARP), which is to bring its contribution to the acceleration of the process of our interoperability with the NATO forces, and, in the long run, to achieve the five objectives of the PFP [Partnership for Peace].

For 1995-97 we established the units belonging to our principal army branches that are to be put at the disposal of the PARP. These units are being trained in accordance with NATO standards and are, therefore, by mid-1997 expected to reach a superior interoperability level with the NATO forces. (....)

Role of the Military Intelligence Directorate

By means of the Military Intelligence Directorate openings were achieved at the level of the National Defense Ministry and the Army General Staff with similar institutions in other countries.

The activity of keeping the leadership bodies of the army structures informed by means of specific documents has registered an increase exceeding 30 percent compared with the previous year.

Proper preconditions have been created for the functioning both of a component consisting of expert military cadres, able to carry out missions at any time, as well as a component of training and forming experts to set up a reserve of military cadres who would supplement the specialized units in times of crisis and war.

Romanian military attaches abroad have directly contributed to the prearrangement and carrying out of 263 visits and contacts at various levels, with various bodies of foreign armies. In our country 159 protocol-diplomatic actions have been carried out with foreign delegations, which occasioned useful swaps of information, and the basis was laid for mutually advantageous cooperation.

In the domain of our relations with the neighboring countries' armies a central role is occupied by Romanian-Hungarian activities, which took concrete shape in 75 joint actions, including those under the Open Skies accord. Furthermore, in the evolution of the Romanian-Bulgarian military relations, an important moment was represented by the signing of the "Document on the Supplementary Measures to Strengthen Confidence, Security, and Military Contacts between

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Romania and Bulgaria." Similar documents are to be signed with Hungary and Ukraine.

Our bilateral military relations with the Ukrainian Army remained under the level we hoped for, although the Romanian party has proposed that they should be amplified. (....)

Counterespionage

The activity of our counterespionage made an important contribution to protecting and defending the higher interests of the Army.

They acted in a responsible way to unearth, prevent, discover, and neutralize certain actions that could have affected the combat ability of large and smaller units of our Army.

I assess, however, that the successive replacements at the level of their commanding bodies have not always been carried out properly to ensure adequate counterespionage structures, operating on the principle of unique command in that domain, and this aspect has to be remedied in the immediate future. (....)

Currently, under the leadership of the central Commission for Perfecting the Military Intelligence System, they are working on setting up certain rational information flows and circuits. They are defining precisely the type of information needed by the various army leadership bodies, so they can make well-founded decisions, and they are acting to reduce the number and volume of the documents that are elaborated and circulated within the Army. Within this process they take into consideration both the specific requirements set by the needs of the Army and the correlation of the military information system with the similar systems of the public administration. (....)

In my opinion, this system ought to be perfected even more, by bearing in mind the following: the diversification of the nature of possible risks and threats for our country; the hierarchization of the latter and the elaboration of strategies able to counter them (such strategies should be based on a realistic dimensioning of our forces destined to repel possible aggression;) the type of war Romania might be forced to wage; our current legislative system and the mutations that could be necessary due to the fluid nature of the geopolitical and geostrategic situation; the need for the medium- and long-term planning of the material and financial resources necessary for defense. (....)

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Slovenia: Drnovsek Views Search for New Foreign Minister

AU1906083596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek, who was a guest in our program Studio at 1700, spoke of the significance of lifting the arms embargo for our country and said that this means the resolution of a burning question that international politics refused to tackle for a long time. He also said that the state operative defense headquarters also discussed the significance of this decision today. The headquarters also discussed the Slovene Army combat readiness, the formation of the military air force and air defense corps, and some other issues. The headquarters also supports the organizational directives for the harmonization of the defense systems with the NATO standards.

Dr. Drnovsek said that we used the time during which we were not allowed to import arms for some organizational and other matters.

One of the questions to which Dr. Drnovsek replied also concerned the question that is circulating in our public, namely, who will be the new Slovene foreign minister. Dr. Davorin Kracun and Miran Mejak are mentioned most frequently as candidates. When asked whom he would propose for the new foreign minister, Dr. Drnovsek said:

[Begin Drnovsek recording] Nobody for the time being. I would be happiest with the present solution; I cooperate well with the former minister, Zoran Thaler, and things are going well. However, the parliament relieved Foreign Minister Thaler of his duty last month and, as the prime minister, I, of course, respect the parliamentary decision and its legality. That is why we are trying to find the best possible candidate at the moment and to see who could win the support of the parliament. I must say that the situation now is very chaotic. In a way, everybody is against everybody else, and, above all, everybody is against the government. Therefore, [word indistinct] assessment that any sort of proposal or candidate whom I would attempt to [words indistinct], that is, the parliament will reject it. I bear all this in mind, and I try to hold some consultations, also with individual potential candidates and individual parliamentary parties; however, for the time being, I did not get far enough yet to state that a certain candidate stands the chance of being supported by the parliament. I will persevere in my pursuit. If there is no success, then it will be realistic for Zoran Thaler to remain the acting foreign minister for some time, after which I would take advantage of the legal possibility of performing the duties of the foreign minister for three months parallel to being the prime minister. This would be an additional burden and would only come into question if I could not find any other, better solution. [end recording]

Regarding his recent visit to Rome, Prime Minister Drnovsek assessed that the meeting was successful and that the greatest attention was paid to economic issues and possibilities for the greatest possible cooperation between the countries. He also said that the statements of the Italian politicians indicate that a new stage in Slovene-Italian relations is on the horizon.

Slovenia: Drnovsek on Signing of EU Agreement, NATO

AU1906081896 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 15 Jun 96 p 31

[Interview with Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Sasa Vidmajer; place and date not given: "I Was Not Nervous, but I Was Relieved"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Vidmajer] Mr. Prime Minister, when you signed the association agreement in Luxembourg a few days ago, we detected a trace of a smile on your face instead of the usual sternness. What were the feelings when you drank the champagne toast?

[Drnovsek] Special. Although we already knew on Monday that everything would end up well, there was nevertheless some tension and expectation over closing the long process of rapprochement with Europe. Of course, I, personally, was very happy, too, as were all EU foreign ministers with whom we held talks on numerous occasions over the past two years. They were rather spontaneously happy and glad that the problems, which in a sense were laid on Europe's conscience, has been resolved.

[Vidmajer] Was there a lot of nervousness in the last days before the signing, when it appeared that the mad cows [cattle suffering from BSE—Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy] could prevent this foreign policy breakthrough—which could have resulted in the signing not taking place before the elections?

[Drnovsek] That was the last problem, and it was rather serious. I would not say that there was a lot of nervousness, at least not on my behalf, although we were seriously reckoning on the possibility of the signing being delayed. Despite the seriousness of our case, it was difficult to expect that the British would lift their veto, because their government had staked all its credibility on the blockade of the EU. For that reason, it is even more significant that they made an exception; on the other hand, the British explicitly

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supported our integration into the EU and also our full-fledged membership; Prime Minister Major assured me of that himself. There was another type of mediation, too; we negotiated directly with Washington, which Rifkind visited. In any case, we value the British move highly, and we were greatly relieved when they said that they would not obstruct Slovenia.

[Vidmajer] On the occasion of the signing, you filed a request for full-fledged membership. Although this move is no longer for propaganda purposes alone, like before, when you first announced it, it nevertheless seems to be primarily intended for domestic consumption.

[Drnovsek] No, I believe that making such a move immediately was necessary because we are now actually in the game for full-fledged membership. Informally, we have already received a questionnaire intended for the candidates for full-fledged membership from the European Commission, and that is why, understandably, we hurried. [passage omitted]

[Vidmajer] Was time really so short that a fatal delay would occur in the drawing up of the shortlist of candidates for full-fledged membership if had we not signed the associate agreement?

[Drnovsek] Very probably we would actually start lagging behind, we would enter directly into the electoral campaign, politicization would be widespread, and matters would only begin to be resolved next year. The dispute with Italy has, so far, been rather productive for Slovenia to an extent that it was even an international promotion of our country. We showed ourselves to the world in a positive light in the conflict with a stronger adversary, as the most successful country in transition that Italy was unjustly blocking in its integration with Europe. Had the conflict continued, however, we would have reached the stage in which everybody would get accustomed to it, for example, as is the case with the Greek-Macedonian or Greek-Turkish disputes. I was afraid that we could enter into a situation that would result in a long-term halt in our rapprochement with the EU and NATO and would, at the same time, mean that the country's prospects would be burdened with a mortgage that could influence the economic relations and investments. That is why now was the best time to close the matter. This became apparent with the adoption of the Madrid summit conclusions in December, when the EU passed a clear recommendation that Slovenia's associate membership should be resolved on the basis of the Spanish compromise, of which Italy and Slovenia were clearly told. It was clear that it would be almost impossible to change the conclusions of the EU summit. Since then all our domestic policy and foreign policy actions have had the goal of closing the matter. In Italy they pursued the same line of thought. [passage omitted]

[Vidmajer] Do you think that Slovene society demonized Italy too much?

[Drnovsek] I believe not, the problem really existed. It was started by the Berlusconi-Fini government and, at that time, emerged in connection with the European question. The interim Dini government was not burdened by ideological and historic issues; however, it was not sufficiently firm to be able to afford a compromise, that is, to make moves that would go in the direction of solving the question, but rather continued with the old policy. After the elections, Prodi's government was in a completely different position, above all stronger and more capable of making decisions. Objectively speaking, the problem existed, but I personally was particularly bothered that we became so quickly divided at home, the political scene became polarized, and the media were seized with despondency.

[Vidmajer] Do you expect that the Italian stance will last, bearing in mind that it came about primarily as a result of outside pressure. How do you interpret Rome's statement that it will be easier to resolve bilateral issues with a Slovenia that is an EU associate member?

[Drnovsek] The chances of continuing the dialogue with the Italian Government in a different atmosphere and of cooperating well are realistic. Perhaps pressures will reappear. Ultimately, we have no guarantees, there are only more or less realistic expectations. I believe that this was the pressure of the extreme right-wing organizations, while the majority of the Italian public does not see a problem in it. From this viewpoint, the Italian Government can control the issue without any great difficulties. Italy's objective interest is to regulate the relations with Slovenia and for Slovenia to join the EU and NATO, which will contribute to the Italian security; in other respects, Italy can also gain a lot, also, economically. Some Italian statements perhaps aim to soothe a portion of their public or to keep the issue in the game; it can happen that they will raise the question in a milder form again. [passage omitted]

[Vidmajer] How important for the breakthrough into the EU is the U.S. interest, also the security interest (the linking of the South European NATO troika—Italy and Hungary via Slovenia)? Do you believe that we overestimate Washington's behind the scenes pressure?

[Drnovsek] The United States has evidently assessed that, for stability in this part of Europe, it is important that Slovenia maintains political stability and takes part in the European and Atlantic integrations. The relations

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with the United States have developed extremely well over the past two years. The October meeting with Clinton was the climax and also a public demonstration of the level of relations. On that occasion, President Clinton gave assurances that the United States is very interested in Slovenia's integration into the EU and the Atlantic institutions and that they would do everything to iron out the dispute with Italy. I believe that they did a lot. Of course, others were important, too. In the last year, we improved our relations with Great Britain and accomplished a breakthrough with France, while the relations with Germany and Austria were very good even beforehand. I believe that there is no longer the pressure in the sense that we are relying on one country alone, that we are under the patronage of one or two countries, but that we managed to balance this out quite a bit.

[Vidmajer] You mentioned recently that Slovenia could become a NATO member before it becomes an EU member. Is this optimism based on the U.S. support, in light of the fact that the U.S. influence in the enlargement of the North Atlantic alliance will be direct?

[Drnovsek] The optimism is based on the official and informal talks with the top U.S. administrators, U.S. senators, statesmen of France, Great Britain, and Germany, and the NATO leadership. My impression is that Slovenia has achieved a breakthrough lately and that, in NATO, it has managed to break through into the first circle of candidates for membership. Because the process of NATO enlargement might develop faster that the EU expansion, we will most probably become a NATO member first. [passage omitted]

[Vidmajer] Recently the positive aspects of EU membership have been at the forefront. Among the negative aspects, Slovenia was preoccupied the most with the issue of foreign ownership of land. How will membership influence everyday life, primarily the economy?

[Drnovsek] This primarily involves the adaptation of the economy. In many departments, adequate measures will be required, and the European competition will be indisputably greater for our companies. Had we wanted to continue living comfortably, however, we would have stayed in the former Yugoslavia, where we had a soft market and circumstances that did not require adaptability. The entry into Europe is a battle for survival, however, we at least have the chance of becoming better and more productive and living better. There will probably be quite a lot of whining, but I am convinced that, ultimately, the result will be better. How would those who are now advocating Slovenia closing up and restricting its real estate market react if Europe were to start implementing the Schengen Accord on our borders properly and if the Slovenes would be forced to wait on our borders with Austria and Italy for hours and go through a rigorous control while the rest of the Europeans would travel freely?

[Vidmajer] The lack of coordination in foreign policy is evident even to the outside observers. What are your relations with the president of the state. It has been rumored that they are not exactly cordial; however, was is not Kucan who influenced the United List of Social Democrats to agree to the Spanish compromise in April?

[Drnovsek] He claims that there are no special links between himself and the United List of Social Democrats. Anyway, there is way too much speculation on this issue for domestic political use. In my opinion, there is a considerable degree of coordination. Personally, I am greatly involved in the foreign policy. The work with the foreign minister was very coordinated. The relations with the president of the state, to the extent to which our contacts go, are generally normal and correct.

[Vidmajer] Will you take over the Foreign Ministry now that the European agreement has been signed?

[Drnovsek] Many of my political opponents are suggesting this to me, probably not out of an excess of benevolence. I believe that this is not the best solution for the foreign policy and that the parties are currently looking for a point of attack against the prime minister. The possibility that I would take charge of the Foreign Ministry for three months would only come into consideration if I truly could not resolve this issue any differently, if, therefore, the parliament would not support the candidate. I will probably propose a candidate shortly.

Slovenia: Defense Minister Welcomes End of UN Arms Embargo

AU1806153296 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Statement by Defense Minister Jelko Kacin on the UN Security Council lifting of the arms embargo for the countries of the former Yugoslavia; place not given, on 18 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] This finally terminates the unfair and impossible situation that Slovenia has endured for many years. In gaining its independence, Slovenia not only achieved its sovereignty and international recognition but also ensured that its territory, residents, and economic and defense potential were not used in the conflicts between the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

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Slovenia was, nevertheless, a victim of the unjust embargo, and now this impossible situation has been overcome. The situation became additionally exacerbated when Slovenia signed the EU associate membership agreement last week. We were, therefore, an associate EU member that was at the same time a victim of the embargo. The situation was truly impossible.

At the moment this primarily means for us different circumstances, and the possibility of obtaining, above all, the spare parts for our military hardware that normally originate from the east, that is, from the countries that are within the Partnership for Peace program, trying to achieve as much as possible in their integration with NATO. Secondly, this will allow us to purchase the lacking ammunition, especially for the heavy arms we have had in our arsenal for a long time. This is also the end of the preparatory period, which we used to the maximum extent possible, for creating the bases for decisions on the direction and manner of modernization of the Slovene defense system.

Of course, we did not sleep while the embargo was in force. The management of the project for development programs by the year 2000 within individual expert groups prepared the bases and the strategic orientation for the future development. As of now, the conditions exist for the realization of these more demanding projects.

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Federal

FRY: Minister Says No Talks on Separation of Kosovo

LD1906121996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1135 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister of Internal Affairs Vukasin Jokanovic said they cannot talk about the separation of the Province of Kosovo from Serbia, the private Belgrade daily DNEVNI TELEGRAF said Friday.

One day earlier, Jokanovi told journalists in the Yugoslav Parliament that it is inconceivable that the President of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) Aleksandar Despic stated (one June 6) that 'we should talk about a delimitation between Kosovo and Serbia.'

Despic said that Serbia was at a historical turning point and that he saw two ways into the future: Insisting on territorial integrity, without any possibility of secession and the other was to allow ethnic Albanians to secede from Serbia and create an independent state on Kosovo.

Jokanovic assessed that the position of the president of the Academy of Science and Arts was inappropriate also because all of Europe was busy finding a solution to the problem, TELEGRAF said.

The Yugoslav minister said that Despic's opinion was probably the result of 'some old arguments in favor of the division of Kosovo made by those who do not know Kosovo and do not know what in fact should be divided.'

'I heard that Albanian academicians welcomed with enthusiasm Despic's statement and it looks as if he is speaking on their behalf,' Jokanovic said.

He added that Despic's statement caused anxiety among the Serbian and Montenegrin people in Kosovo and in Serbia, and delighted Albanian separatists in that Serbian province.

Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, who make up 90 percent of the population, have a strong separatist movement active for two decades already whose objective is the forcible merging of that Serb province with neighbouring Albania.

FRY: Doubts Expressed Over Jun Visit to Kosovo by Milosevic

LD1806180796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1359 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 18 Jun (SRNA)—Representatives of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo will rally in Pristina on 22 June irrespective of whether Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic comes to the rally or not.

According to DNEVNI TELEGRAF today, this was confirmed by the leaders of the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins who said that "the president will most certainly come because there is no reason why he should not heed the call of his own people."

They stressed that Milosevic was not being invited by Serb nationalists or nongovernmental organizations but by concerned people who want to have serious talks on the future of Kosovo and Metohija.

The same paper yesterday quoted a high-ranking federal official as saying that "Milosevic has no reason to go to Kosovo" and that "it never even entered his head to go to Pristina."

A similar "piece of information" was given to a SRNA correspondent today who was told by officials in the Serbian Presidency that they did not know of "any trips by the president on 22 June."

The planning committee for the 22 June meeting have said that they asked the authorities to provide a hall, and that all other preparations for a dignified welcome for the Serbian president are about to be finalized.

FRY: Assembly Legislates Amnesty for Draft Dodgers

LD1806172996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1637 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 18 Jun (TANJUG)—Continuing a previously interrupted first session of the regular spring assembly sitting which started on 14 May, the deputies in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly this afternoon adopted the Amnesty Law.

This law envisages the suspension of criminal proceedings and sentences for all those who evaded their national service. According to the law, the amnesty covers approximately 12,500 persons who, prior to 14 December 1995, committed the criminal act of failing to respond to military call-ups, who evaded national service, or who deserted from the armed forces.

The amnesty law does not apply to professional soldiers and to commissioned officers.

The Chamber of Republics adopted this law at the first session of its regular spring sitting in mid May. [passage omitted]

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FRY: Opposition Condemns Electoral Constituencies Law

LD1806174996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1343 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 18 June (TANJUG)—Representatives of floor groups of the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Democratic Party, the People's Party of Montenegro, and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro in the Chamber of Citizens of the Yugoslav Assembly announced today they will launch an initiative for the Federal Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the adopted amendments to the law on electoral constituencies.

At a joint news conference at the Federal Assembly, Miroljub Labus (Democratic Party) said that the adopted changes are "illegal" and "violate the constitution and the law on the election of federal deputies."

According to him, the decision to amend the law on electoral constituencies "has no legal force" as far as the deputies in the Chamber of Citizens are concerned, because it was adopted in the absence of part of the opposition which, he said, "can now either boycott the elections or reach an agreement on a joint Yugoslav democratic coalition." [passage omitted]

FRY: Official Calls Dayton 'Disastrous' for Arms Industry

LD1806184096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1605 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 18 Jun (SRNA)—Zoran Nedeljkovic, president of the independent trade unions organization at Zastava Special Purpose Products [ZNM] of Kragujevac, said today that the agreement signed in Dayton was disastrous for Yugoslavia's military industry.

According to DNEVNI TELEGRAF, he has sent a letter of warning to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the authorities in Kragujevac in which he claims that unless something is done urgently almost the entire workforce of 6,000 people will be without a job soon.

"We are collapsing because, as it seems, the aim is to devastate the Yugoslav military industry," Nedeljkovic says in his letter, adding that last year ZNM was given the go-ahead for the so-called Travnik program (artillery).

"However, production has not started yet, since under the Dayton agreement we are not allowed to manufacture weapons above 30-mm caliber," he said.

Another reason for dissatisfaction among the workforce is the fact that the government has failed to honor an agreement under which the special-purpose manufacturers are guaranteed contracts with the Army of Yugoslavia worth 70 million dinars.

By the end of the week the ZNM trade unions will most likely call on workers in other Kragujevac enterprises to come out in a joint protest.

Serbia

Serbia: Interior Minister Says SANU Kosovo Views Unacceptable

AU1806164396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1313 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 18 Jun (BETA)—FRY Interior Minister Vukasin Jokanovic has said today that "it is incomprehensible that Aleksandar Despic, chairman of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences [SANU], should state in front of Serbian academicians that the demarcation between Kosovo and Serbia should be discussed."

"It is incomprehensible that the chairman of a serious national institution such as SANU can come up with the issue of demarcation between Serbia and Kosovo particularly at such an inappropriate time when everyone, including all of Europe, is striving to find a solution to the problem in Kosovo," Jokanovic told reporters in the FRY Assembly.

Jokanovic said that "this is not befitting a SANU chairman."

He assessed that Despic's views were "utterly unacceptable and do not correspond to the true state of affairs in Kosovo." [passage omitted]

The federal minister said that he did not "believe that this is only Despic's view, and that it was probably backed by the old propositions on the partition of Kosovo by people who do not know Kosovo, and do not know what it is that they want to partition."

"I have heard that Albanian academicians were delighted with Despic's statement, so he seems to have been speaking on their behalf," Jokanovic said.

He said that the statement had caused great anxiety among the Serbian and Montenegrin people in Kosovo and Serbia, but had stirred tremendous enthusiasm among the separatists.

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Serbia: Bosnian Serb Stance on Brcko Arbitration Assessed

AU1806130096 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 96 p 6

[Commentary by G. Maric: "Without Brcko There Is No Serb Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Serb Republic will not agree to arbitration for the area of Brcko until the subject of arbitration is precisely determined in accordance with the Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, said recently.

"The Peace Agreement," Krajisnik added, "anticipates that arbitration should only decide on the width of the corridor near Brcko, which cannot be narrower than it is now."

The Croats and Muslims, as Krajisnik explained, demand that the subject of arbitration should be the town itself, showing intentions to include Brcko in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If that should happen, the Serb Republic would lose its territorial integrity.

In Article 5, Annex II [as published] on the borders between the two entities—an integral part of the Dayton Agreement—the following is said:

Widening of the Corridor

"The parties agree to accept obligatory arbitration on the disputable part of the border between the entities in the area of Brcko, which is marked on the map."

This, according to the interpretation of the Serb side, means that the arbitration should only decide on 10 km of the border, from Boderiste to the railroad station in Bukovaca, in the Ulica part. The Serb Republic, in this area, asks for the border to be moved, i.e. the corridor to be widened to 20 km.

The Muslims and Croats, however, interpret that the border can be moved to the north as well—towards the Sava River—and that, if their requests are acknowledged, Brcko may belong to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Croats and Muslims have been encouraged by the statements of Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, who said that "the status of Brcko is disputable, and the town has definitely not been allocated to the Serb Republic in the peace agreement."

The arbitration commission for the area of Brcko will have three members: The Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will each determine one member, and the chairman will be determined by the parties to the dispute or, if they cannot agree, then he will be appointed by the president of the International Court of Justice.

The procedure, according to the agreement, is to be carried out in accordance with the rules of UNCITRAL [expansion unknown], but the parties to the dispute can agree on a different procedure. The arbiters will apply "applicable legal principles and principles of fairness." The decision is to be made by majority vote.

The demarcation decision on the territory of Brcko must be made by 14 December next year, and—according to the peace agreement—unless the arbiters "agree differently," this territory "will still be governed as it has so far." This solution means that the Serb Republic remains without the widening of the corridor and without the possibility of independently organize air traffic between its western and eastern parts, as well as with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt that the Croats and Muslims will attempt to prove their right to Brcko with statistical data from 1991. According to the census, out of the 87,332 inhabitants of Brcko Municipality, 44.4 percent were Muslims, 25.4 percent Croats, and 20.08 percent Serbs.

The Loss of the Town—The End of Dayton

The Serb Republic sees its chance to keep Brcko and widen the corridor in the fact that, at present, it owns around 30 percent of the territory of Brcko Municipality—which is less than the land owned by the Serbs in it.

Further, in this part of the Serb Republic, beside a little more than 17,000 Serbs from Brcko, there are 28,890 refugees who have moved there from towns and villages that belonged to the Croat-Muslim federation.

Most refugees come from Sarajevo, 6,476; then from Jajce, 4,865; and from Lukavac—2,177. In Brcko, there are also former inhabitants of Srebrenik, Vares, Zenica, Travnik, Banovici, Gradacac, Zavidovici, Konjic, Drvar, and so on.

The following, it seems, is essential. If Brcko should belong to the federation, then, it is quite certain that the majority of the inhabitants of the Serb Republic from Posavina, Bosnian Krajina, and the Doboj region will start an exodus in the direction of Yugoslavia and the territory around the Drina River. Over 600,000 people would be in that avalanche.

Besides, the arbitrated "fall of Brcko" could be an introduction to a new war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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In any case, if the Serb Republic loses Brcko, then that will, as it seems, be the beginning of the end of the Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the consequences of which cannot be fully foreseen by anybody at this moment.

Serbia: Oil Industry To Triple Output

LD1806165896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1456 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 18 Jun (TANJUG)—The Serbian oil industry is set to triple production from its refineries when the Pancevo oil refinery comes on stream again tomorrow. Serbian oil industry representatives informed Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic of this today, it has been announced.

Spasoje Djakovic, director general of the Serbian oil industry; Dragan Tomic, director general of Jugopetrol; Srboljub Stankovic, director of Naftagas; and Radovan Pesikan, director of the Pancevo refinery, informed President Milosevic that the necessary quantities of crude oil for the start-up of current refineries has been secured, and this will make possible not only stable supplies to the oil derivatives market but also pave the way for a reduction in gas prices, and for normal production at the Pancevo refinery.

Stressing the importance of the successful functioning of the oil industry for the overall economic development of our country, President Milosevic supported the initiative to lower gasoline prices, deeming it a measure which, without doubt, will have an impact on the consistent realization of the policy of stable prices and a stable exchange rate for the dinar. At the same time, this measure will be an important stimulus to all other businesses to realize their development plans and carry on business operations in stable market conditions. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Montenegro: TV Removes PM From Photo With Clinton, Djukanovic

AU1806161496 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jun 96

[Report by MONTENA-FAX: "Panic Disappears From a Clinton-Djukanovic Photograph"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, MONTENA-FAX—Montenegrin television carried in last Wednesday evening's [12 June] primetime newscast a photograph showing U.S. President Bill Clinton shaking hands with Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, with the explanation that the meeting had taken place on the occasion of Djukanovic's working visit to the United States.

The MONTENA-FAX news agency has learnt from reliable sources that the photograph also featured former Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic, who is a prominent American businessman and who actually organized Djukanovic's attendance at an election donors' convention of the U.S. Democrats, where Djukanovic met with the U.S. President.

According to those sources, the television montage crew was instructed to remove Panic from the photograph, in order to add weight to it for propaganda purposes, so that the event could be presented as an official meeting between Clinton and Djukanovic.

Kosovo

Kosovo: 'Extremely Tense' Situation Reported

AU1806183896 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After the latest incident in Podujeve [Podujevo] and the unclarified killing of a Serbian policeman in Mitrovice [Mitrovica] last night, the situation in these two Kosovar communes is extremely tense. The Kosova leadership has continuously reiterated and warned that the policy of unceasing terror against Albanians has created a tense atmosphere of permanent danger for many years now. Here is a telephone report from our correspondent Mehmet Haziri from Prishtina [Pristina]:

[Haziri] Following the wounding of a Serbian policeman in Podujeve in unclarified circumstances, the Mitrovice branches of the Information Commission of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] and of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms reported today that one policeman was killed and another was wounded in an unclarified incident that occurred at about 2300 [2100 GMT] on Monday [17 June] in Shipol in Mitrovice, a district in the city's suburbs.

These sources report that Serb policeman George Predrak from Krushevc in Serbia died of his wounds, while his colleague Zoran Vukojcic was sent to be treated at the Prishtina hospital.

So far, there are no reports at all about the circumstances in which these two policemen were wounded. Meanwhile, Serbian forces have blocked the area where the incident occurred and are committing acts of unprecedented violence against the citizens and casual passers-by, seven Skenderaj residents among them. Beqir Spahiu suffered the worst, the police seizing 600 German marks from him.

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The police have evidently increased their presence and brutality during the day in Mitrovice, which has made the situation extremely tense.

Such a situation continues to prevail in Podujeve and suburbs, where, after the 16 June incident, a large campaign of violence has been launched against the Albanian population. It is reported that 30 persons have been tortured by the police, who are staging open provocations in the Albanian bars and cafes.

The LDK Commission branch in the city has reported extensive gunfire near the Serbian police station in Luzhan, a locality 12 kilometers away from Podujeve, which has been blocked by the Serbian police forces.

A report by the Kosova Information Center remarks that the new wave of Serbian violence and state terror and the police haste to perpetrate terror against the Albanian population as a response to unclarified incidents speaks for the possibility of large-scale fabrications at a time when the focus of attention on the Kosova issue by the international community, as well as among official and scientific circles of Serbia, is at its greatest.

It is very indicative that none of these incidents has been clarified, and there is a danger that such fabrications and provocations may assume hazardous proportions. The peaceful orientation of the Albanian political movement and the fact that armed conflict has so far been avoided in Kosova is undoubtedly mainly owing to the nonviolent policy followed by Kosova.

The Kosova leadership has continuously condemned every terrorist act and has asked the citizens to restrain themselves to the maximum from behavior and action that would make the situation tense. That is why the latest incidents in Podujeve and Mitrovice should serve to enhance the efforts of the international community for a just solution to the Kosova issue in compliance with the political will of its people.

Kosovo: Milosevic To Unveil Kosovo Battle Memorial

LD1906112796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0958 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pristina, 19 Jun (SRNA)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic will visit Gnjilane on 28 June and attend the ceremony at which a monument to Prince Lazar [military hero defeated by Turks in Kosovo 500 years ago] will be unveiled, SRNA has learned from sources close to the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia.

However, President Milosevic has not responded to an invitation from the leadership of the Serb Resistance Movement [Srpski Pokret Otpora], and around 50,000 Serb citizens of Kosovo who had asked him to visit Pristina on 22 June. [passage omitted]

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